Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL

[Queen's Consent signified; Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown and the Duchy of Cornwall, signified.]

Bill read the Third time and passed.

HOUNSLOW CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [Lords]

Read a Second time and committed.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF POWER

Aluminium Smelters

Mr. Lane: asked the Minister of Power what representations he has received from other large coal consumers about the proposal for a coal-burning aluminium smelter at Lynemouth; and what reply he has made.

The Minister of Power (Mr. Roy Mason): In view of the commercial considerations involved, I think that any representations should remain confidential.

Mr. Lane: Will the Minister give us an assurance that when coal deliveries to the Lynemouth smelter start other large coal users who get their supplies from the same pit or pits will be able to get them at the same price?

Mr. Mason: I would not give any assurances for three to four years hence, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that no subsidies are involved in this deal.

Mr. William Hamilton: Is the Minister able to say whether there will be other aluminium smelters fuelled by coal and whether or no a statement will be made about the matter before the Recess?

Mr. Mason: I cannot promise a statement on this matter before the Recess. Negotiations are still proceeding on the two other smelter projects.

Mrs. Thatcher: May I first congratulate the Minister? I hope, for his sake and for the Ministry's sake, that he stays longer in this post than he did in his previous one. May I ask him to look again at the question my hon. Friend asked, since it is crucial in relation to the interpretation of undue preference or advantage in the Coal Industry Act that other buyers of the same quantity, from the same pits, at the same time, should have the same price as the aluminium smelter users?

Mr. Mason: I am obliged to the hon. Lady for her introductory remarks. I personally hope that I shall be able to stay a little longer than on the previous occasion. The National Coal Board is well aware of its statutory duty to avoid, and I quote:
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage".

Sir C. Osborne: asked the Minister of Power what information he has obtained as to the price of electricity made available to aluminium smelting concerns in this country, and from international sources the price elsewhere in the world; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Mason: I have nothing to add to the statement made by my predecessor in reply to the hon. Member for Haltem-price (Mr. Wall) on 6th February last.—[Vol. 758 c. 59.]

Sir C. Osborne: Is the Minister aware that the great hydro-electric plants in Siberia are producing electricity at l/25th of the price being charged by their competitors in the West, and that electricity represents 60 per cent. of the cost of


producing aluminium? Before he allows this great capital expenditure in this country, will he look into these two facts and see what their effect is on world markets?

Mr. Mason: I am obliged for that information. I shall certainly look at it, if the hon. Gentleman wishes. He asked about obtaining information from abroad. I must advise him, as did my predecessor, that these contracts are confidential, and we cannot get to know about them.

Mrs. Thatcher: Would the Minister, when considering those facts, also consider taking off the fuel tax on oil for electricity generation for these smelters, because it is thought that they could generate their own cheap electricity without any expensive investment grant or other subsidy if that was done?

Mr. Mason: I cannot give an assurance at this stage, but I will keep the point in mind.

Mr. G. Campbell: asked the Minister of Power if he will now make a statement on the siting of proposed aluminium smelters and the supply of fuel or power to them.

Mr. Mason: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given by the President of the Board of Trade to the hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Milne) and others on 29th May.—[Vol. 765, c. 1798.]

Mr. Campbell: Does the Minister realise that continuing uncertainty over Invergordon is most unsatisfactory for the North of Scotland; and that the Government clearly did not give proper consideration to all the important factors involved when they made the initial announcement last year?

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman should, I think, direct that question to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland. I am responsible for fuelling the stations but not for fuelling the station that may be in Invergordon.

Mr. William Hamilton: Will my right hon. Friend repeat the assurance of the Minister of State, Scottish Office, last Wednesday, that a statement on the aluminium smelters will be made before the Summer Recess?

Mr. Mason: I cannot give that assurance, because I shall not be making the

statement. As my hon. Friend knows, the Board of Trade, the D.E.A. and the Secretary of State for Scotland are all involved, and if a statement affecting Scotland is to be made it will be more proper for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to make that statement.

Mrs. Ewing: Is the Minister aware that many unemployed persons in Scotland have waited on in the hope of an early announcement, and that many local populations have a real fear of mass exodus unless a decision is announced shortly?

Mr. Mason: The hon. Lady will appreciate that we have announced this redevelopment programme which will result in a new smelter industry in Britain, affecting parts of Wales, the North-East and Scotland.

Dual-Fired Power Stations

Mr. Lane: asked the Minister of Power what consultations he has had with the Electricity Council, the Central Electricity Generating Board, and the Gas Council on the possibilities of enlarging the numbers of dual-fired power stations.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power (Mr. Reginald Freeson): Dual-firing of power stations was discussed by the then Minister of Power with the nationalised fuel industries during the Fuel Policy Review. The Government's policy on conversion of coal-fired power stations to other fuels was stated in paragraph 99 of the Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd. 3438).

Mr. Lane: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that, as I understand it, about half the new stations being built in Common Market countries are dual-fired, and is he satisfied with the negligible number in this country?

Mr. Freeson: As the hon. Member will appreciate, this is a matter for the Central Electricity Generating Board to consider and on which to make the necessary applications to us.

Oil Products (Temporary Surcharge)

Sir G. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Power what is the result of the steps he has taken to secure a reduction in petrol prices, in particular the withdrawal


of the Suez closure premiums; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Hastings: asked the Minister of Power if he will now remove the oil fuel surcharge payable by growers in the horticultural industry.

Mr. Mason: The level of the temporary surcharge on oil product prices is under review and I expect to inform the House of the outcome very shortly.

Steel Imports

Mr. Hall-Davis: asked the Minister of Power what proposals he has for securing a reduction in the volume of imports of bulk steel into the United Kingdom and an increase in the volume of exports.

Mr. Freeson: We are studying this problem with the other Departments concerned, and with the industry. The excess of world steel-making capacity makes it very difficult.

Mr. Hall-Davis: In view of the fact that the value of bulk steel imports in the first four months of 1968 was as great as for the whole of 1965, will the hon. Gentleman agree that this is not just a matter for study but one of the gravest concern when seen in the context of our balance of payments position?

Mr. Freeson: We accept that there should be concern, and we are concerned in this matter. However, it is not confined to this country. There is a world excess of steel-making capacity, and there are international consultations and studies going on, in which we are participating.

Mr. Patrick Jenkin: Will the hon. Gentleman recollect that the consultations and studies to which he has referred were initiated by his right hon. Friend's last predecessor but one? What progress are they making? Does he not agree that it is useless for industries in different countries to engage in what is tantamount to mutual dumping?

Mr. Freeson: There is no progress to be reported at this stage. The discussions and studies are continuing. It is, of course, open to the industry to request anti-dumping action to be taken by the Government. But this is not merely confined to this country. There is a world

excess of steel-making capacity, and it must be clear that, if there is to be international agreement, it must be mutually arrived at.

British Steel Corporation

Mr. Ridley: asked the Minister of Power whether 'the amount, and the terms, of the British Steel Corporation's commencing capital debt have yet been agreed.

Mr. Mason: No, Sir. The precise amount of the debt will not be known until the value of the unquoted securities, which are still to be valued, has been settled. The total may be in the region of£820 million. I hope to say something about the terms of the debt during the debate on the Resolution to increase the Corporation's borrowing limit next Friday.

Mr. Ridley: Why has this commencing capital debt not been agreed? It is now over a year since the Corporation was set up. Is the Minister aware that it is impossible to conduct business properly unless matters of this sort are known at the beginning? Will he take action where his predecessors have failed to get some progress?

Mr. Mason: Yes. But the hon. Gentleman must appreciate that settlement of the terms for the debt obviously raises complicated matters. It will take some time, and discussions are continuing with the Corporation.

Sir Knox Cunningham: asked the Minister of Power what, taking account of the obligation to pay interest upon its commercial capital debt, was the appropriate profit or loss of the British Steel Corporation for its first half year.

Mr. Mason: I have not yet determined the terms of the debt and I cannot, therefore, give such a figure.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Is it not likely that when the right hon. Gentleman has determined the debt the figure will show a substantial loss? If so, what steps is he taking to improve the position? In any event, will the taxpayer have to pay for the loss?

Mr. Mason: If the hon. Gentleman wants to be political about this, then he may care to know that in 1966–67 the


nationalised steel companies made a loss of about£10 million, but 10 months of that was before vesting day.

Mr. Berry: asked the Minister of Power how many letters he has received objecting to the salary of the Chairman of the British Steel Corporation.

Mr. Mason: None, Sir.

Mr. Berry: Would the Minister agree that his reply confirms that the public expect the right salary to be paid to the right man in the right job? Would he not further agree that this applies equally to the public and to the private sector? Will he bear in mind that those who are paid so-called "large" salaries pay a large part of them back to the Treasury in taxation?

Mr. Mason: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is aware of how much Lord Melchett gets. It is, at the moment,£16,000, and it is a sum he agreed on.

Mr. Patrick Jenkin: Would the right hon. Gentleman like to set an example, and ask the nationalised industries in their annual reports to give the salaries of directors net after tax, as well as gross?

Mr. Mason: I will consider it, but I really do not think that it is necessary.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: asked the Minister of Power what has been the result of his discussions with the British Steel Corporation about its price structure.

Mr. Mason: I am in touch with the Corporation about the major price review which they are now undertaking, but it will not be completed before the end of the year.

Mr. Taylor: Is the Minister aware that shipbuilders, engineers and others in Scotland are greatly concerned that the Steel Corporation, like the gas industry and the Coal Board, will end by charging more for its product in Scotland? Will he give a guarantee that under nationalisation Scottish shipbuilders and engineers will not be expected to pay more for steel than those in England and Wales?

Mr. Mason: I cannot give an assurance of that kind—[HON. MEMBERS:

"Oh."]—nor do I propose to do so until the review is complete.

Mr. James Hamilton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many steel firms in Scotland are closing because they cannot compete with competitors in the South? Will he give an assurance that there will be a unified policy about prices of steel?

Mr. Mason: These are matters which I shall have to take note of after the review has been completed.

Sir G. Nabarro: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Selective Employment Tax premium and similar advantages given in Scotland are largely nullified by the excessive price which Scottish firms have to pay for coal, gas, electricity and other services under this iniquitous differential pricing scheme?

Mr. Mason: If the hon. Gentleman wants to pursue those questions, they should not be directed to me.

Gas Industry

Mr. Emery: asked the Minister of Power whether he will announce the financial target of the gas industry for 1969–70.

Mr. Mason: Yes, Sir, when it has been decided.

Mr. Emery: It appears that the general approach of both Ministers is that there is no progress to report. In pressing the Minister, I realise that he has only just taken over, but we have had from both—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Questions, please.

Mr. Emery: Will he, therefore, speed up the inactivity—

An Hon. Member: How can one speed up inactivity?

Mr. Emery: —of his two previous colleagues in getting a result in order that we can properly assist the financial state of this industry?

Mr. Mason: I expect to reach a decision on this question before the end of the year.

Mr. Palmer: asked the Minister of Power if he will state the expected rate of return on the£1,600 million to be


spent by the gas industry up to 1973 in the provision, among other things, of natural gas supplies to consumers.

Mr. Freeson: Investment by the gas industry is expected to earn at least the d.c.f. rate of 8 per cent. prescribed for the nationalised industries generally.

Mr. Palmer: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving a figure which the previous Minister of Power seemed unable to give. Is he satisfied that this expenditure has been properly reconciled with comparable expenditure on nuclear power and on the coal industry?

Mr. Freeson: The answer, of course, must be "Yes, Sir", because the expenditure derives from the policy laid down in the White Paper following a very long series of very detailed studies.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Can the Minister say how much the public will gain in a reduction in prices by this natural supply? There is a general feeling at present that this great discovery will give very little advantage; in the form of cheaper prices to the people who buy the gas?

Mr. Freeson: As I have said previously, it will take quite some time before the full effect of natural gas coming fully on stream will show itself in price levels, but we believe that it will have an effect in real terms on gas prices.

Gas Consumption and Prices

Mr. Emery: asked the Minister of Power what forecast of the level of domestic gas prices was used as a basis for the estimates of gas consumption in 1971 and 1975, respectively, contained in the Fuel Policy White Paper.

Mr. Freeson: The White Paper estimates took into account likely movement of gas prices in relation to competing fuels, not absolute levels.

Mr. Emery: If we do not have the financial objectives and a statement about the fuel duty until the end of the year, how is it possible to form a long-term judgment of the financial position of the industry?

Mr. Freeson: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman re-reads the excellent publications which have been produced by the gas industry and the appropriate sections of the White Paper.

Mr. Eadie: Is my hon. Friend aware of the feeling in the country that the gas consumer has been conned over the question of gas prices? Will he look into the high-powered advertising that goes on and which is believed by some of us to have deceived gas consumers?

Mr. Freeson: The expenditure of the gas industry, as of the other nationalised industries, on advertising is only a small proportion of its turnover. In fact, there is every reason to believe that ultimately, when natural gas comes fully on stream, there will be an impact on price levels for the consumer.

North Sea Gas

Mr. Crouch: asked the Minister of Power what estimate he has made of the value of the capital assets of the gas industry which will be obsolete as a result of the speed at which North Sea gas is to be introduced.

Mr. Freeson: The book value of assets made obsolete will be influenced by the rate of converting distributing systems to natural gas, and the conversion of oil reforming plant to produce synthetic natural gas for peak loads. The programme will adapt to developing needs. Subject to these factors, the Gas Council estimates that the book value involved might be about£300 million.

Mr. Crouch: Apart from being somewhat woolly, that is an incredibly disappointing Answer. While my hon. Friends are anxious to see progress made with natural gas as quickly as possible, is he aware that the White Paper referred to the uncertainties involved in this whole project? Would he agree that£300 million is an excessive amount to become an abortive investment?

Mr. Freeson: Not in the circumstances. In accepting that this will be, in effect, an obsolescence write-off, one is taking into account the fact that there will be a total benefit not only to the gas industry but to the other fuel industries and to the economy as a whole.

Mr. Hector Hughes: As my hon. Friends comments are based on the speed with which North Sea gas will be introduced, can be say what that speed will be and how it is ascertained?

Mr. Freeson: The estimated period of the programme on which the Gas Council


has embarked has appeared in the White Paper and various other publications. I am not able to say in detail at Question Time how that programme was ascertained.

Steel Industry (Private Sector)

Mr. Michael Shaw: asked the Minister of Power if he will give details of the committees set up by him representing both the British Steel Corporation and the private sector with a view to ensuring fair competition, particularly on the question of pricing policy.

Mr. Mason: The Iron and Steel Advisory Committee, on which both the public and private sectors are represented, provides a forum for discussion of common problems.

Mr. Shaw: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the private sector's interests are fully safeguarded in this matter?

Mr. Mason: The Corporation is Statute-bound to publish its prices, its customers have a right to complain to the Iron and Steel Consumers' Council, private competitors can complain to me about what they regard to be unfair practices and there is the Committee to which I referred in my Answer. What more does the hon. Gentleman want?

Electricity Industry

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: asked the Minister of Power whether he will make a statement about his consultations on the structure of the electricity industry.

Mr. Mason: I shall be continuing the consultations on the need for changes in the structure of the electricity industry. It is likely to be some time before I shall be ready to make a statement.

Mr. Lewis: Can the Minister offer any hope that his statement will be made before the Summer Recess? Will he bear in mind, in his discussions, that the industry requires less rather than more Government interference and control by this House so that it can get on with its commercial job?

Mr. Mason: I cannot promise to make a statement before the Recess. I will take into consideration the latter point made by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Palmer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that employees in the industry are anxious that an early statement should be made, remembering that delay is very bad for morale?

Mr. Mason: I appreciate that, but this is rather a technical matter which will take some time. We want to make sure that if any change is merited, it occurs without disruption to the industry.

Mrs. Thatcher: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is more than a technical matter? If he is unable to make a further statement, can he say with what purpose in mind he is looking at the structure of the electricity industry? Is it to bring production and marketing closer together, in accordance with the comments in the P.I.B. Report?

Mr. Mason: We are taking that into consideration. It is one of the points we are examining.

Mr. Manuel: In connection with any possible changes in the structure of the electricity industry, does my right hon. Friend envisage the industry working more closely with the gas industry? Is he aware that large savings could be made—for example, in advertising and salesmanship matters—and that these industries could work closer together instead of often being in opposition to each other?

Mr. Mason: Yes, Sir. I am aware of that and no doubt the House will have noted that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has on some minor points, though not on major matters, been trying to get both sides to work together, especially in the use of showrooms and meter reading.

Meter Reading

Mr. Kenneth Baker: asked the Minister of Power what consultations he has had with the Electricity Council and with the Gas Council about the scope for greater productivity in meter reading; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Freeson: I have had extensive discussions with the industries' area boards in different parts of the country about joint meter reading and the possibility of feasibility studies being carried out. These discussions have covered other


aspects of efficiency in meter reading as well.

Mr. Baker: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that about 5,000 men are going round the country reading gas meters while another 5,000 are reading electricity meters? Will he give some urgency to the task of combining the two forces into a national meter-reading force and so make a substantial overall saving?

Mr. Freeson: I suggest that to begin with the hon. Gentleman checks his figures. Those he gave were not quite accurate.

Mr. Baker: That is no answer.

Mr. Freeson: If the hon. Gentleman will contain himself, I will explain the position. I have looked again at the question which the Weir Report considered—that of an independent meter-reading service—and I have concluded that that is not the right way to deal with this problem.

Mr. Spriggs: Is my right hon. Friend aware that hon. Gentlemen opposite had 13 years in which to do something about this, but did nothing?

Salaries

Mr Kenneth Baker: asked the Minister of Power what representations he has received for changes in the salary structure of the persons appointed by him in the coal, gas and electricity industries; what reply he has sent; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Mason: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the Answer given on 1st July by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity.—[Vol. 767, c. 1081–6.]

Mr. Baker: That Answer referred to the whole salary structure of the P.I.B. Pending the P.I.B.'s Report, will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that salary considerations will not inhibit him from appointing the right man to the right job?

Mr. Mason: When vacancies arise I shall certainly do as the hon. Gentleman suggests and suggest the right man for the right job.

Mr. Emery: As there is a vacancy, will the right hon. Gentleman give an

assurance that the salary level will not preclude him from attracting the best man for this job?

Mr. Mason: I am hoping that the salary will not preclude such an appointment. It depends, of course, on who we have in mind for the job.

Domestic Gas Appliances (Safety)

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Minister of Power whether he is satisfied that the safety precautions of the gas boards are adequate when domestic appliances are fitted; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Freeson: Yes, Sir. The high safety standards of the industry were confirmed by a detailed survey by officials last year. My right hon. Friend will examine carefully the findings of the inquiry into the accident at Ronan Point to see if they suggest any improvements are due.

Mr. Goodhart: Is the Minister aware that, on grounds of economy, cut-off points are no longer automatically fitted in each appliance when it is installed and that there is some anxiety about this?

Mr. Freeson: If the hon. Gentleman cares to write to the Department on the subject we will certainly take it up with him.

New Power Stations

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Minister of Power what decision has now been reached about an electricity generating station at Seaton Carew.

Mr. Lubbock: asked the Minister of Power when the Central Electricity Generating Board will be allowed to place orders for the Hartlepool and Heysham stations.

Mr. Mason: No decision has yet been reached. The timing of orders for any new power stations will depend on the outcome of the present capital investment reviews.

Mr. Shinwell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that we have been waiting for a decision for two years, and now that we have a new Minister surely there will be an improvement on his predecessors? If there is not, we will tell him to get out. Is he aware that it would be far better to reach a decision, whatever it is, because


as things are there is a good deal of insecurity?

Mr. Mason: I am aware of my right hon. Friend's views. I noticed that in the Adjournment debate on 11th April he said and he has repeated it today—that what he wanted was a decision, irrespective of whether it was in favour of nuclear power or coal. I hope to be able to give a decision fairly soon.

Mr. Lubbock: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the last order for a generating station was placed by the Central Electricity Generating Board in March, 1967, for Hinckley Point B? How does he think that the electrical manufacturing industry can make progress when it does not get an order in 16 months?

Mr. Mason: I appreciate that one of the great concerns about this delay is the effect on suppliers, and although I appreciate the point that the ordering took place in March, the start was in September, 1967.

Mr. Leadbitter: Is the Minister aware that we have had one excuse after another over the past two years in order to qualify the Government's indecision? We now have before us today a suggestion by my right hon. Friend about capital estimates. Some time ago it was load estimates. Will my right hon. Friend understand that a case has been made out, and that the unemployment position in my area also requires a decision?

Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: Too long. Sit down.

Mr. Leadbitter: Shut up.

Mr. Mason: I assume that my hon. Friend is speaking to an hon. Member opposite. A decision on the Central Electricity Generating Board's investment programme is expected before the autumn, so we shall be able to clear up the matter then.

Mr. Ridley: Though we are in the white heat of the technological revolution the right hon. Gentleman's Department has made no decision of any sort whatever. Will the Minister now undertake to give a decision on this matter before the Summer Recess?

Mr. Mason: No, Sir. I cannot make a decision before the House rises.

Natural Gas (Conversion of Appliances)

Mr. Dempsey: asked the Minister of Power if he will give a general direction to the area gas boards to take steps at their own expense to convert domestic gas appliances for the use of natural gas; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Freeson: No, Sir. The boards are already doing this. Under the Gas Act, 1948, they must meet the cost of converting consumers' appliances to use natural gas.

Mr. Dempsey: Is my hon. Friend therefore giving the House an assurance that the Scottish Gas Board will be responsible for the cost of the total conversion of all gas appliances that will be using this supply of natural gas, in view of the fact that gas prices are much higher in Scotland than in England and Wales?

Mr. Freeson: The Scottish Gas Board is in precisely the same position as every other area gas board, in that it will undertake the conversion and will not charge individual consumers.

Mr. Lubbock: asked the Minister of Power in what areas the gas supply to consumers has been converted to natural gas; and what has been the average cost per consumer in each case.

Mr. Mason: Conservion programmes have been started in six of the gas board areas. Only a very small proportion of consumers have so far been converted, and it is too early to give a realistic average cost per consumer.

Mr. Lubbock: Will the Minister give these figures to me when they become available? Is he aware that the National Board for Prices and Incomes has estimated that it would cost£30 per domestic consumer to convert to natural gas? Does not that seem a very high figure, and will be look at it?

Mr. Mason: Yes, Sir. This figure has been bandied about and may well prove to be true, but I want the hon. Gentleman to realise that in the cost of conversion there are—apart from the conversion of appliances—surveys, administrative costs and associated distribution costs, which have to be taken into consideration.

Generating Plant (Orders)

Mr. Palmer: asked the Minister of Power if he will counteract the reduction of orders for new generating plant due to the present recession in electrical demand by sanctioning an accelerated programme for the replacement of out-of-date plant in order to improve the overall efficiency of the British electricity supply system and to reduce operating costs.

Mr. Mason: I shall take these points into account in considering the electricity industry's capital development programme.

Mr. Palmer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the electrical manufacturing industry is having great difficulty in maintaining export targets because of lack of home orders? Is net this suggestion a very sensible way of getting over the difficulty?

Mr. Mason: I should remind my hon. Friend that the C.E.G.B. already has over 20,000 megawatts of new plant under construction, but I appreciate that some older plants that are labour-intensive could go out, and would be a saving if we embarked on a new building programme, so we will keep that point in mind.

Fuel Policy (Devaluation)

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Minister of Power if he will make a statement on the progress made in modifying the contents of the White Paper on Fuel Policy following devaluation; and whether such modifications will result in slowing down of the rate of pit closures.

Mr. Mason: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him on 6th February by my right hon. Friend, the present Minister of Transport.—[Vol. 758. c. 211.]

Mr. Hamilton: Is it not the case that my right hon. Friend's two predecessors said that there would be no appreciable difference in the content of the White Paper as a consequence of devaluation? Does he himself accept that position? If he does not, will he produce another White Paper, and make sure that it is debated on the Floor of the House?

Mr. Mason: On the latter point, "No, Sir". On the first point, what did come out was that devaluation made British coal cheaper in export markets and although these will increase there will be no dramatic increase.

Mr. Lubbock: Would not one of the effects of devaluation be to alter the order of merit of existing plants of the C.E.G.B. system, and will he say how much coal he expects to be burned in C.E.G.B. stations in 1968–69 as a result of the change?

Mr. Mason: I could not go into that detail without prior notice.

Gas Prices (Scotland)

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: asked the Minister of Power by what percentage the price of gas in Scotland exceeded the average revenue per therm in England and Wales in the latest annual period for which figures are available; and what were the comparable percentage differences in each of the previous four years.

Mr. Freeson: 25 per cent. in 1966–67;the figures for the four preceding years, beginning with 1962–63, were 24 per cent., 19 per cent., 13 per cent., and 17 per cent.

Mr. Taylor: How can the Minister justify a situation in which all people in Scotland pay a quarter more for gas than all people in England and Wales? Does he not realise that this undermines a great deal of the work done by industrial development and otherwise? Will be reconsider the whole question?

Mr. Freeson: As I have tried to point out in answer to previous Questions, it is not correct to say that this compares with all people in England and Wales. One must compare one with another and those in Scotland are not the highest priced in the country.

Oral Answers to Questions — COAL

National Coal Board (Companies)

Mr. J. H. Osborn: asked the Minister of Power if he will undertake to inform the House of all purchases by a nationalised industry for which he is responsible or by its wholly-owned subsidiaries or


any subsidiary in which it has a majority share holding, of shares in any company, together with the cost involved, immediately the purchase or takeover has been completed.

Mr. Ridley: asked the Minister of Power if he will issue a general direction to the National Coal Board to publish in its Annual Report the names, the cost and all details of any further acquisitions of companies made by itself or its subsidiaries.

Mr. Hall-Davis: asked the Minister of Power if he will issue a general direction to the nationalised industries for which he is responsible to publish in their annual report the names, the cost and all details of any further acquisitions made by themselves or their subsidiaries.

Mr. Freeson: Information about companies bought by the industries referred to will be included in their annual Reports and Accounts which are laid before the House. Copies of the accounts of the N.C.B.'s partly-owned subsidiaries will be placed in the Library.

Mr. Osborn: Whilst I welcome the Parliamentary Secretary's reply, may I ask what steps will be taken to inform us as and when these purchases take place rather than waiting for the Annual Report which will be well after the event? Will he ensure that the Report gives details of purchases by each individual subsidiary and that they will not be put under one collective heading, which I think the Parliamentary Secretary will agree has hitherto been the case?

Mr. Freeson: In reply to the first point, as has been said before in reply to similar questions, it is not the policy to announce each individual item. In reply to the second point, I can give an assurance to the hon. Member and to the House that the National Coal Board will in future give in its own accounts information on all the companies owned either by itself or by any of its subsidiaries.

Mr. Hall-Davis: Will the Parliamentary Secretary also give an undertaking that the information will continue for a reasonable period to be given separately with regard to the profitability of these acquisitions, so that their performance

can be judged against the profit criteria laid down for nationalised industries?

Mr. Freeson: I take it that when the information is published in relation to each company owned by the National Coal Board or its subsidiaries it will give the relevant information to which the hon. Member refers.

Mr. Ridley: Will the hon. Gentleman agree that his answer to this question last month, that information was contained in the annual reports of the industries concerned, was misleading because the annual reports only say that a number of companies were acquired? Does he now give an undertaking that the full names, prices, costs and information relating to each company will in future be given in the reports?

Mr. Freeson: I have already answered the main burden of the question. In reply to the first point made by the hon. Member, I would not accept that I was misleading the House on a previous occasion.

Pricing Policy

Mr. J. H. Osborn: asked the Minister of Power what has been the outcome of his discussions with the National Coal Board about pricing policy.

Mr. Speed: asked the Minister of Power what has been the result of his consultations with the National Coal Board on its pricing policies; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Mason: Consultations are continuing.

Mr. Osborn: I welcome the fact that we have a Minister of Power from Yorkshire, because he will be aware that in Yorkshire we have the cheapest pits providing coal to the most modern power stations. Will he take note of the need to provide electricity to users in that area, particularly steel users, at pithead and power station prices and not at average prices?

Mr. Mason: That is a very good constituency Question, and I will take note of what the hon. Gentleman says.

Mr. W. Baxter: When discussing the question of coal prices with the National Coal Board, will my right hon. Friend


have regard to the fact that coal prices in Scotland are much higher than in England and Wales, and will he take steps to see that there are uniform prices throughout Great Britain?

Mr. Mason: I am aware of the concern about industrial coal pricing, and these paints will be taken into consideration in the review.

Mr. Speed: Will the Minister agree that, unless the April, 1966, pricing agreement between the C.E.G.B. and the National Coal Board is modified, many highly efficient collieries with long term reserves such as the Warwickshire coalfields will be out of business in the next two or three years?

Mr. Mason: I am aware of the consequences.

Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is considerable resentment in Scotland over the differential price policy, which, incidentally was started by a Tory Government? This is not a great incentive to industrialists in Scotland to use coal.

Mr. Mason: I am aware of the very strong Scottish views on this, and they will be take a into account.

Mr. Ridley: Can the Minister say whether long-run marginal costing will be employed in determining Coal Board prices in future in accordance with the White Paper on the Nationalised Industries?

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman was chasing me on the Post Office when the N.B.P.I. looked at this. It will be looked at.

Farm Rents

Mr. David Watkins: asked the Minister of Power if the National Coal Board's proposal to impose triennial rent increases on tenant farmers occupying Coal Board farms is in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's policy on prices and incomes.

Mr. Freeson: My right hon. Friend, the Minister of Agriculture has recently written to the National Farmers' Union and the Country Landowners Association and drawn the attention of the N.C.B. to the need for restraint in negotiating farm

rent increases. I am sure the Board will shew this in line with Government policy.

Mr. Watkins: May we take it from that that the National Coal Board will accept further responsibility in the matter of the modernisation of farmsteadings, in view of the proposed increases?

Mr. Freeson: The communication to the National Coal Board was in line with the letters which were written to the other two organisations, that restraint should be shown in this matter in line with the White Paper. It did not deal with the point to which my hon. Friend has referred.

Mr. W. H. K. Baker: Would it not be in the interests of the National Coal Board and, therefore, the nation at large, if the Board go rid of its holdings in agricultural land?

Mr. Freeson: No, Sir.

Output and Manpower

Sir G. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Power if he will state the coal output for the six months to 30th June, 1968;what estimate he has made for the full year 1968;and how many less men were employed in the coal industry at 30th June, 1968, compared with one year earlier.

Mr. Freeson: Up to 29th June, 1968, N.C.B. coal output totalled 84·7 million tons. By the end of the year this figure will rise to 163 million tons. N.C.B. colliery manpower at 29th June, 1968, 347,975 was 55,389 lower than a year ago.

Sir G. Nabarro: Can the hon. Gentleman tell us whether the run-down in the coalmines is now proceeding at the rate envisaged in the fuel White Paper or whether there has been any change in the plans for the run-down in the pits?

Mr. Freeson: We have no reason at this stage to believe, taking the period of the White Paper to which the hon. Gentleman referred, that the average will vary from the original approximate forecast. The figure that I quoted, which is a June to June figure, does not necessarily reflect the comparative figures on a March to March basis, when they come to be published.

Pit Closures (Scotland)

Mr. Eadie: asked the Minister of Power what further consultations have taken place between his Department and the National Coal Board on future pit closures in Scotland; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Mason: I am kept informed by the National Coal Board about the position in Scotland. I understand that the Unions have been informed that three collieries are to close in July.

Mr. Eadie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that future pit closures in Scotland are causing great anxiety amongst miners in view of their effects on future employment? What consideration has he given to the policy of the miners' union, which was to underwrite the present coalmining industry?

Mr. Mason: I shall certainly be taking a fresh look at the coal policy and, as a first step, I shall be receiving the General Secretary and the President of the N.U.M. on Friday morning.

National Coal Board (Profits)

Mr. Crouch: asked the Minister of Power what was the profit made by the National Coal Board for the year 1967–68, after allowing for depreciation and interest; and what has been the percentage return on capital employed.

Mr. Freeson: I would ask the hon. Gentleman to await the Board's annual accounts, which will be published next month.

Mr. Crouch: Can the hon. Gentleman say what element of the N.C.B.'s assets at 31st March, 1968, were represented by stocks on the ground?

Mr. Freeson: Not without notice.

Stocks

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: asked the Minister of Power what directions he has given to the National Coal Board on limiting their stocks of coal.

Mr. Mason: Following consultations with my Department, the National Coal Board is planning to limit undistributed stocks to about 30 million tons, subject to short-term or seasonal fluctuations.

Mr. Wilson: What effect will this have on the pit closure programme in the next four years?

Mr. Mason: It will have no effect at the moment. I am hesitant to say what effect it will have in the next four years. Stocks at present amount to about 29 million tons.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Water Supply Fluoridation

Mr. Dudley Smith: asked the Minister of Health if he will send a circular to local authorities advising them not to institute experiments in the fluoridation of water supplies for particular towns or villages without his prior knowledge, and to notify local communities before beginning such experiments.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Kenneth Robinson): Local health authorities and water undertakings have already been asked to consult my Department and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government before formulating any proposals for fluoridation. Local consultation is a matter for the local health authority concerned.

Mr. Smith: Does not the Minister therefore think that he should get in touch with the South Warwickshire Water Board, which recently carried out an experiment in Leek Wootton in Warwickshire without the consent of the local community and to which the vast majority of the community objected?

Mr. Robinson: I know about this experiment. It is in the nature of equipment trials and the equipment has worked very satisfactorily under laboratory conditions. It is being tested merely to ensure that it will not deliver a dosage less than the required level. It is based on a fail-safe principle. I think there is no reason for the hon. Member's constituents to be concerned about it.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOSPITALS

Guy's Hospital (Resignations)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Minister of Health if he will make a statement on the further resignations at Guy's Hospital.

Mr. K. Robinson: The deputy matron resigned with effect on 30th September; she gave no reasons. The senior assistant matron leaves on 13th July to take up a post for which she applied some months ago. I am satisfied that all the necessary steps are being taken to maintain the nursing services at the hospital.

Dame Irene Ward: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I think Lord Robens has too many jobs he knows nothing about? [Interruption.] He knows nothing technically about running a hospital. For Lord Robens to invite a management consultant group to go into vital hospital administration is absolutely contrary to the principles of good administration in hospitals. Will the Minister carry out a proper inquiry so that we shall really know where we are about this most important position in Guy's Hospital?

Mr. Robinson: I do not think there is any reason for any inquiry of the kind the hon. Lady suggests. Of course I do not accept her remarks about Lord Robens in whom I have full confidence as Chairman of the Board of Governors. I suggest that the hon. Lady might be well advised not to jump to too many conclusions on the basis of incomplete information.

LOCATION OF INDUSTRY

Mr. Sheldon: asked the Prime Minister what plans he has for the unification of location of industry policy.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Present arrangements already ensure the proper co-ordination of Government policy in this field but if my hon. Friend has any particular suggestions to make I would be happy to consider them.

Mr. Sheldon: Since the many successes of Government policy in the regions are largely due to effective use of I.D.C.s and investment grants, would not my right hon. Friend agree that if policy and administration were built around these successes we might be able to encourage rather better movement of industry to those parts of the country where it is most needed?

The Prime Minister: These instruments are important, but they are only part of the much wider responsibility of the economic planning councils whose responsibility goes beyond industrial planning and industrial location and extends to the whole system of social planning, road planning and town and country planning generally. It is for that reason that their work is coordinated by the Department of Economic Affairs.

Mr. Deedes: Is the Prime Minister aware that, at least in the South-East, all too often there arises a conflict between policies of the Board of Trade, the D.E.A. and Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and that it is very difficult to run policy under three masters?

The Prime Minister: I am not aware of any conflict between the Departments, but I was aware of some anxieties in the South-East about the responsibility of the Joint Committee of Local Authorities on the one hand and the work of the Economic Planning Council on the other. I understood it had been pretty well sorted out by now.

MANAGEMENT EDUCATION

Mr. Moonman: asked the Prime Minister if he will take steps to set up a committee of inquiry with a view to co-ordinating the various Departmental responsibilities for, and standards of, management education in the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister: I am not convinced that a committee of inquiry would serve a useful purpose, but if my hon. Friend would care to make a case I would be happy to have it examined.

Mr. Moonman: While recognising the positive attitude adopted by Government and industry in recent years towards matters of training, may I ask my right hon. Friend to reconsider the question in view of some of the anomalies which exist because of the fragmentation of management training in colleges, universities and companies?

The Prime Minister: I understand my hon. Friend's anxieties, but the problem


is that management training goes on in a considerable number of different areas. We have the business schools in London and Manchester. Clearly this should be a matter for the University Grants Committee and education authorities. The powers of industrial training boards bring in the Department of Employment and Productivity. If my hon. Friend will send fuller information about any ways in which he thinks these various jobs can be better co-ordinated, I shall be glad to examine them.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: Will the Prime Minister agree that one of the most important things the Government can do to encourage a high level of management training in Britain is to ensure that the rewards do not fall below what is virtually an international level?

The Prime Minister: That raises very wide questions, but I am sure the hon. Member will agree that under successive Governments there has been a great improvement in getting the best men for the job and seeing that they are adequately trained.

RHODESIA

Mr. Winnick: asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the present position with regard to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the Answers I gave to Questions on 2nd July.—[Vol. 767, c. 1304–5.]

Mr. Winnick: Does my right hon. Friend agree that recent happenings in Salisbury seem to confirm Lord Alport's view that no further progress would be served by negotiating with the illegal régime? Would he confirm that it is, and remains, British policy that there shall be no independence in Rhodesia before majority rule?

The Prime Minister: So far as recent events in Rhodesia are concerned, I think it is too early yet to draw any conclusion from them, whether as a result of the recent article by Lord Alport or in any other direction. In regard to our policy for Rhodesia, this is firmly rooted in the six principles and I have answered many times in this House about our position on Nibmar.

Mr. Heath: As the dismissal of Mr. Harper by Mr. Smith means at least a change in the balance of the men and the administration around Mr. Smith and also implies that Mr. Smith is resisting pressure to move further towards a republican constitution or towards racial discrimination, does not the Prime Minister consider that this is at least some indication that the moment has arrived when he should seriously consider the resumption of negotiations?

The Prime Minister: To the extent that Mr. Smith has now got rid of Mr. Harper I agree that that is a welcome factor. There were a number of men around Mr. Smith who made him a prisoner. Mr. Harper was only one. The right hon. Gentleman will recognise that the "Tiger" agreement was sabotaged by people like Mr. Harper, and there were others. We will recognise that he voted in support of those who sabotaged that agreement.

Mr. Heath: The Prime Minister must not go on repeating a complete distortion of the truth about the debate on the "Tiger" talks. What I am putting to him now is that there is a firm indication that serious consideration should be given by the Prime Minister to the question of a resumption of negotiations. Unless the indications are accepted, the Prime Minister himself is a prisoner of his past.

The Prime Minister: In so far as I or anyone in the House is a prisoner of anything on Rhodesia, it is that we are prisoner of the declarations made by both Governments about the six principles. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman similarly considers himself bound by those principles. On the general point the right hon. Gentleman has made, I agree that, to the extent that any group of men in Rhodesia capable of assuming the responsibilities of Government can show that they will not be pushed about by racialists and can show, as we insisted on the "Tiger", that the immediate future of Rhodesia must be a multi-racial Government, the omens look to that extent more hopeful. I think that that is what the right hon. Gentleman is indicating. On the other point about his vote, perhaps he would go back and study his Motion and the form of his vote.

Mr. Shinwell: Has my right hon. Friend observed that Mr. Smith, like the


Leader of the Opposition here, has lost the support of his Right wing? Does not my right hon. Friend, in certain circumstances which seem to be prevalent, obtain some consolation from that fact?

The Prime Minister: I think that the differences between the two countries and between the two Parliamentary systems are such that it would not be helpful to draw exact comparisons. In so far as my right hon. Friend's interpretation of recent events is correct, I hope it will be true of both these party Leaders that they will free themselves of dependence on their racialists.

HOUSE OF LORDS (REFORM)

Mr. Marten: asked the Prime Minister if he will move to set up a Select Committee to consider the working of the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949.

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Prime Minister what discussions he has had with those concerned on the question of publishing the details of agreements so far reached in the inter-party talks on reform of the House of Lords.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: asked the Prime Minister whether he will give an assurance that, in the light of the Government's policy on wages, prices and incomes, his proposals for the reform of the House of Lords will not include any alteration in the 4½guineas per day tax-free expenses allowances or any further payment either as a salary or in any other form.

The Prime Minister: As to a Select Committee, No, Sir; as to any other aspect of the reform of another place I have as yet nothing to add to the statement I made on 20th June and the Answers I gave to Questions on 25th June and 2nd July.—[Vol. 767, c. 236 and 1301.]

Mr. Marten: Does not the Prime Minister think that such a Select Committee could very usefully discuss the purely hypothetical case where a party has been returned to power with a very large majority and then in, say, the next 18 months has lost a series of by-elections and has therefore clearly lost the

confidence of the country? Would it not be in the national interest, rather than in the party interest, if at that stage a General Election was held? This is a purely hypothetical question.

The Prime Minister: To follow out the implications of that hypothetical case, there would have been a strong case for another place throwing out the Rent Act, 1957. So far as the timing of General Elections relates to the results of by-elections held in the middle of a Parliament, I seem to remember that it was the Government of which the hon. Gentleman was a member that carried on to the last minute allowed under the constitution.

Mr. William Hamilton: Who is opposing the publication of the details of the agreements that were reached before the talks were concluded? Is it my right hon. Friend, the Leader of the Opposition, or the Leader of the Liberal Party? Let us know who it is and then we might get somewhere.

The Prime Minister: We have not yet reached that stage. My hon. Friend would be quite wrong to assume that anyone is opposing publication. It is too early for anyone to give an answer to my hon. Friend's question.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: Will my right hon. Friend categorically deny the statements which have been made in most of the Press that there was a tacit understanding or agreement that£1,500 a year plus the expenses allowance was to be paid? Will he give a further definite undertaking that no such payment will be made or recommended?

The Prime Minister: I can neither confirm nor deny what has been going on in a Committee which has not yet published its findings, but I had not heard of any such suggestion as that to which my hon. Friend has referred.

Mr. Maudling: Can the Prime Minister explain to the House why he considers it preferable in the national interest for the reform of the Upper Chamber to take place on a partisan rather than on an all-party basis?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman had better await the proposals that we put before the House for


dealing with this situation. It is not this side of the House but his own that has used the House of Lords for partisan purposes.

Dr. Winstanley: Is the Prime Minister aware that his statement last week that no consideration was being given to the possibility of any Members of the House of Lords being elected to that place has diminished the enthusiasm of hon. Members on this bench for reform of the Upper Chamber and that we would oppose any extension or perpetuation of the other place's powers in the absence of any proposals for election?

The Prime Minister: I am very sorry that the hon. Gentleman is disappointed, particularly in view of the very objective language he used two or three weeks ago when describing his attitude to another place. I should have thought that there is not much support in any part of the House—I would be very surprised if there was on his own bench—for strengthening the House of Lords or purporting to strengthen it by a system of elections.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY)

Mr. Whitaker: asked the Prime Minister whether he will invite President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin to meet him to review progress on international acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will be glad to know that some 60 States signed the Treaty on 1st July when it was opened for signature, and that more signatures are expected in the near future. We shall, of course, keep the situation under review, but I doubt whether any special steps need be taken yet.

Mr. Whitaker: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that, unless there is multilateral disarmament by the nuclear Powers, there is unlikely to be general acceptance by non-nuclear nations of this Treaty and that we are not likely to get the essential funds for peaceful development of the world? Therefore, what steps is my right hon. Friend taking towards further general disarmament?

The Prime Minister: The point of view expressed by my hon. Friend represents the anxiety felt by many non-nuclear States at earlier stages of the negotiation

of this Treaty. It was for that reason that the statement was made on behalf of the three Powers principally affected in relation to their action under the Security Council if any non-nuclear Powers were subjected to a nuclear attack. It is for that reason also that all of us welcome the new progress envisaged in the declarations by Mr. Kosygin and by President Johnson last week.

Sir C. Osborne: Since this policy cannot succeed unless the Chinese Government become part of it and support it, could the Prime Minister tell the House of any reactions he has received from our charge d'affaires as to the Peking reaction to this proposal?

The Prime Minister: I regret that I cannot see any evidence at all of any change of heart on the part of the Government of China. That is no reason why in the rest of the world outside China we should not do all that we can to get further advances on disarmament. Nor is it any reason why we should support a situation in which there could be a large number of other nuclear States. It is disappointing about China, but the rest of us have a duty to make progress.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Does my right hon. Friend recognise that the fact that France, Brazil, India and China are not signatories to this agreement presents very serious dangers? Will he treat seriously my hon. Friend's proposal that he should turn his mind to constructive work for disarmament?

The Prime Minister: We have been pressing some of the countries concerned very hard. France has made it clear that, while not signing the Treaty, she will follow the general policy enshrined in it. One of the disappointments is India, though one understands her anxieties. It was precisely to deal with those anxieties that the statement was made by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union about what would happen if there were nuclear attacks on countries such as India.

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

Mr. Hastings: asked the Prime Minister whether he will abolish the Central Office of Information.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Mr. Hastings: Is the Prime Minister aware that the budget of the C.O.I. is up by five times since 10 years ago and that the staff has increased by 50 per cent. over the last five years, the total salary bill now being over£2,600,000? Is it not strange that the Prime Minister, who called the profession of public relations degrading, should now head a Government who employ more P.R.O.s than any other in our history?

The Prime Minister: The context in which I made that reference was that of illegal pressure on Members of this House to sign Amendments to the Finance Bill. The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the very great work which is being done by the C.O.I. in relation to exports and of the tributes paid to the C.O.I. by the Chairman of B.E.N.C. I think that the hon. Gentleman is a member of the board of Handley Page. As such he will be aware of the very fulsome tribute paid by the board of Handley Page Ltd. to the C.O.I. for the work that it has done.

Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: rose—

Hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Speaker: I have called the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. The animal noises coming from the other side made it difficult to know whether you had.
What on earth—[Laughter.]—he will laugh on the other side of his "kisser" when I have finished with him—what on earth is the good of maintaining this Department when no one knows better than the Prime Minister himself the old adage that any figures can be made to lie and any liar can figure?

BOOK, "SANS EVERYTHING" (REPORTS OF INQUIRIES)

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. ROEBUCK: 51. Mr. ROEBUCK to ask the Minister of Health whether he will make a further statement on the progress of the inquiries into the allegations of ill-treatment of elderly patients in hospital; and when he expects to announce the results.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Kenneth Robinson): All six committees of inquiry have now made their reports, and their findings and recommendations are published today in a Command Paper which is available in the Vote Office.
These independent committees of inquiry find most of the allegations in "Sans Everything" to be totally unfounded or grossly exaggerated. They make some criticisms of present conditions in the hospitals and suggest how they might be improved, but, in general, they report very favourably on the standard of care provided.
I deeply regret the anxieties which have been caused to patients and their relatives, to hospital staff and to the public generally by the publication, which I believe the whole House will deplore. of so many allegations which are now authoritatively discredited.

Mr. Roebuck: The results of those inquiries will be received with relief by all who have been caused a great deal of anxiety as a result of the publication of the book, "Sans Everything". Would not a great deal of time, distress and public money have been saved if those who made what are now known to be wild and irresponsible allegations had made their complaint in a proper manner, naming names and giving times, dates and places?
Can my right hon. Friend say how much the inquiries have cost the taxpayer, and what co-operation those conducting the inquiries received from those who made the unfounded allegations?

Mr. Robinson: Without notice, I cannot say what the aggregate cost of the inquiries was, but it was not inconsiderable.
I very much agree with what my hon. Friend said in the first part of his supplementary question. Those who produced and published the book were aware, long before publication, that I was very willing and ready to investigate thoroughly any allegations of ill-treatment which they might care to make. I regret to say that, in general, the committees did not have a great deal of co-operation from the authors of the book,

Mr. Dean: We are extremely glad to hear that most of the allegations have


proved to be unfounded, and wish to pay a tribute to the staffs of the hospitals, who have worked in very difficult conditions while the inquiries have been going on.
The right hon. Gentleman has said that most of the allegations are unfounded. Presumably, that means that one or two are founded. Will he reconsider the proposal for an inspectorate, which would ensure that minimum standards are maintained and that good practices in one hospital are speedily passed on to others?

Mr. Robinson: I have an open mind on the question of an inspectorate. This is, perhaps, one of the matters which might be considered in the discussion and consideration of the Green Paper on future structure, which is shortly to be published.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he said about the staffs at the hospitals, which I endorse, as the whole House does. It is true that one or two isolated incidents of ill-treatment were found. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman and the whole House read the White Paper in order to get the matter fully in perspective.

Mr. Pavitt: I join the hon. Member for Somerset, North (Mr. Dean) in paying tribute to the staff, who have been working in very difficult circumstances. Will my right hon. Friend take it from me, as a member of the regional hospital board covering one of the areas concerned, that we are extremely glad that the charges have been found to be completely unfounded?
Will my right hon. Friend do something in regard to the Press to stop the sensational anti-National Health Service stories which gain far too much credence and cause so much distress to staff and patients alike?

Mr. Robinson: I can only say that I wish I could.

Mr. Bessell: I am most grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's statement and, in particular, for the terms in which it was couched. Will the right hon. Gentle-

man agree that the staff at the St. Lawrence's Hospital—medical and nursing staff—are to be congratulated on the way in which they conducted themselves during the inquiry?

Mr. Robinson: Yes, Sir, but a similar tribute should be paid to the staff of the other five hospitals involved.

Dr. Summerskill: What steps does my right hon. Friend feel he can take to prevent publication of another similar book or the publication of exaggerated stories of this kind which could take place on radio or television, giving a distorted impression to the public of conditions in hospitals?

Mr. Robinson: My hon. Friend will appreciate, as we all do, that the existence of free speech allows for the abuse of free speech. I think that the publication of the White Paper should discourage anyone from making at least ill-founded and irresponsible allegations in future.

Mr. Hazell: Although I appreciate that the allegations had to be investigated, as vice-chairman of one of the regional hospital boards affected I know the tremendous strain on the administrative staff which the investigations caused. Will my right hon. Friend convey to the hospital areas concerned the appreciation of the House for the co-operation given?

Mr. Robinson: Yes, Sir, gladly. I appreciate the factors mentioned by my hon. Friend. He will appreciate, equally, that I had no option but thoroughly to investigate these allegations.

SCOTTISH AFFAIRS

Motion made, and Question put,
That the matter of Technical Education related to Further Education in Scotland, being a matter relating exclusively to Scotland, be referred to the Scottish Grand Committee for their consideration.—[Mr. Peart.]

And ten Members having risen in their places and signified their objection thereto, Mr. SPEAKER declared that the Noes had it pursuant to Standing Order No. 64 (Matters relating exclusively to Scotland).

CIGARETTES (HEALTH HAZARDS)

3.38 p.m.

Mr. Laurence Pavitt: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make it illegal to sell packets of cigarettes which are not clearly marked with a warning of the health hazards consequent upon smoking, or which contain gift coupons.
This is a Bill about health, and I wish to make clear at the outset, as I have done on other occasions, that it is not my purpose to be anti-smoking. If the tobacco industry can produce a cancer-free cigarette, I shall be delighted if all hon. Members smoke as frequently as they wish. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Pavitt: If cigars could be 10 a penny, if people would smoke pipes instead of cigarettes, I should be delighted. But I am much concerned by the growing incidence of death and illness—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members may themselves wish to bring in a Bill under the Ten Minute Rule one day. They must listen to the hon. Member who has the privilege today.

Mr. Pavitt: I am increasingly concerned with the health hazards arising from cigarette smoking, and not only the cost to the nation in terms of health, but in economic terms. I tried to persuade my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to reduce the cost of cigars and the incidence of Customs Duty on pipe tobacco, at the expense of an increase on cigarettes but I had very little success. He took an attitude not unlike that of Pontius Pilate, saying that health was not his concern but revenue was, thus washing his hands of the whole project, or, in terms of the Old Testament, saying that finance is the only god and thou shalt have no other.
The hazard to health is twofold. To a striking degree lung cancer and coronary thrombosis are becoming the scourges of the 20th century. Lung cancer is now running at an epidemic rate. During Question Time today four people will have died of lung cancer, and on average 80 people die of lung

cancer every day. If two sightseeing coaches crashed outside in Parliament Square, and 80 people died today, the nation would be appalled and something would be done. If it happened every day for a week, so that at the end of the week 560 people were dead, the nation's conscience would be startled and it would seek to do something. But because so many deaths occur as a result of carcinoma of the lung, each isolated from the other, we do not take as much interest as we should.
The fact that between 1962 and 1964 there was a 12 per cent. increase in deaths from this cause should excite the House to take positive action about it. What should stir us more than the death of the elderly, because at three score years and ten it does not much matter what one dies of—I can say that, not yet having reached that age—is the fact that this week 20 widows will be left with young children because young husbands have died of lung cancer. On average, three people under 45 and six under 50 die from it every day.
Those are just the lung cancer figures. Professor Richard Doll estimates that of the present deaths from coronary thrombosis 10,000 can be attributed to cigarette smoking, and that the death of 15,000 sufferers from the English disease, chronic bronchitis, probably would not occur but for heavy cigarette smoking.
Therefore, I seek to introduce a Bill to do two very simple things. The first is to put a warning on the side of the packet. I sought to do so in 1964, when I brought in a similar Bill. At that time legislation was before the United States Senate, and on 27th July, 1965, this became law in the United States. I have ascertained from the tobacco manufacturing and exporting companies in this country that they are, therefore, already producing cigarette packets for export to America with either a label on the side or a special stamp with this warning.
I am under no illusion that putting this little notice on the side of the packet will make all smokers suddenly throw away their cigarettes, but it could make it clear to the class of people we are anxious to affect, young people starting the habit, that the Government takes this seriously. It would be just as much an


earnest of seriousness as the announcement by the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), when he was Minister of Health, on 7th May, 1956, more than 12 years ago, declaring the Government's policy that they hoped to reduce the incidence of illness by reducing the amount of smoking.
Clause 1 is quite simple. It is a permissive Clause very much following Section 8 of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. It gives my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health carte blanche to do just what he likes in this respect consistent with the best medical advice. It leaves a wide discretion, and provides that it will be an offence for people to sell goods not properly labelled.
Clause 2 is a little more controversial in that it would exclude the promotion of cigarette smoking by means of gift coupons. In 1963, the industry spent£8·75 million on coupon schemes. In1964, this rose to£10·25 million and in1965, which was the year when television advertising of cigarettes was stopped, it went up to nearly£13 million. By 1966, this had nearly doubled to£24½million. I was told this morning by one well-known tobacco firm that the estimate of the value of coupons which it made last October now reaches£32 million a year.
This is promotion on a very heavy scale. I contend that young people, particularly those starting the habit of smoking and getting married and saving for their homes, might well be influenced to keep to the habit by the gift coupons scheme. I hope that the House will acquit me of trying to be a puritan. I think that the moral argument is entirely false. There is nothing good about smoking, and there is nothing bad about it. The only thing is that one is liable to die if one does it. [An HON. MEMBER: "And you die if you do not."] I do not agree with the priggish attitude of, "I do not smoke and, therefore, I am good". That is just as false as saying, "I am more manly and virile if you see me with a cigarette in my mouth".
I hope that the argument will never be based on the question whether smoking is good or bad. We are concerned that the Health Service should save the hundreds of beds occupied by

people coughing their hearts up because of smoking, which is expensive to the Health Service, quite apart from having other economic consequences. I estimate that the cost to the nation is£400 million more than the amount of revenue to the Chancellor of the Exchequer from his tax on cigarette and other tobacco duties.
Not only for the health and happiness of families, but the nation's well-being, should the Bill be well received by the House. It will do a useful job in the progress towards a preventive health service.

3.46 p.m.

Mr. Michael English: I do not particularly have objection to the question of advice being put on the cigarette packet, but I have strong objection to the attempt of my hon. Friend the Member for Willesden, West (Mr. Pavitt) to kill two birds with one stone; to his not dealing with the issue with which he claims to be dealing; and to his raising irrelevant facts.
My hon. Friend discussed at considerable length the lung cancer statistics, and he is quite correct on those statistics. Nobody has the slightest doubt about this, but he refrained from mentioning that the total sales of cigarettes have not been influenced by coupons. Sales are considerably influenced by the price of cigarettes, whether that is affected by an increase or reduction of taxation, or an increase in the manufacturer's price, which is a small part of the cost of cigarettes.
If my hon. Friend looks at the figures of total sales of cigarettes, he will see that coupons have not influenced them particularly. I am sure that my hon. Friend has studied the statistics and that, if he wishes to look at them in detail, he will see that is the case. Therefore, merely to ban coupons would not achieve the object which my hon. Friend has in mind, of reducing the sales of cigarettes. One should inquire why their banning has been raised. There are certain people in the tobacco industry who desire the banning of coupons.
My hon. Friend should realise that there is a little more in this than merely the question of health. He quoted the statistics of the increase in expenditure on coupons. I wonder whether he would care to relate them to the increases in sales of particular companies. I wonder


whether he would care to point out that some of the smallest companies in the industry have expenditures almost as great as the largest and that, although they have such enormous expenditures, they happen to have unsuccessful advertising campaigns. It may well be that the coupons or advertising campaigns shift trade from one company to another, but that the unsuccessful companies do not wish the coupon sort of campaign to continue.
It is quite clear that the total sales of cigarettes have been unaffected, but there has been some shift from one company to another. It is only fair to point out that there is an intra-industry dispute which my hon. Friend has not seen fit to mention.
The point, above all, is that in all this discussion there is no mention of one considerable group of people—those who are dependent upon the industry. Were my hon. Friend's theory right, were it the case that banning coupons would reduce the sales of cigarettes, would it not be right that we should consider the people dependent on the industry? Some of my hon. Friends recently voted for the nationalisation of the steel industry. So did I. We all also voted for compensation for the shareholders in the steel industry at a level which I consider to be rather high. But nobody is suggesting that if these measures were effected any compensation should be paid to shareholders in this industry.
Finally—and I feel this more than most hon. Members perhaps, because I probably have more tobacco industry employees in my constituency than anybody else—nobody is suggesting any measure of compensation to a single employee of the industry who might lose his job. I do not think that my hon. Friend's

Measure would have this result. But if he desires this result, is it not right that he should consider what would happen if his desires were fulfilled?
If, as a country, we are to say that for the sake of the health of the people cigarette advertising should be banned, or that there should be anti-advertising of cigarettes, which may be desirable from the point of view of the country, is it not desirable that we should do as we do with other things and say, "This is in the interests of society as a whole and the particular interests affected should be compensated"? Should not the employee in the industry be compensated? He did not enter it thinking that he would be dealing out, in the words of my hon. Friend, death and destruction. He is simply earning a living. Is it not reasonable that my hon. Friend should consider the possible results of his action? I hope that the House will.

Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business), and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Pavitt, Sir M. Stoddart-Scott, Mr. F. Noel-Baker, Dr. John Dunwoody, Dr. Summerskill, Dr. Miller, Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie, and Sir G. Nabarro.

CIGARETTES (HEALTH HAZARDS)

Bill to make it illegal to sell packets of cigarettes which are not clearly marked with a warning of the health hazards consequent upon smoking, or which contain gift coupons, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 192.]

Orders of the Day — RACE RELATIONS BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Mr. Speaker: I have posted up, as is my custom, the selection of Amendments. We are taking first new Clause 1 with the Amendment thereto, plus Government Amendments Nos. 1, 23, 24 and 53.

New Clause 1

MEANING OF 'DISCRIMINATE'

For the purpose of this Act a person discriminates against another if on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins he treats that other, in any situation to which section 2, 3, 4 or 5 below applies, less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons, and in this Act references to discrimination are references to discrimination on any of those grounds.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

3.55 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. James Callaghan): I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
As you have said, Mr. Speaker, we are discussing, at the same time, the Amendment to the new Clause, in line 1, leave out from 'Act' to end of line 5 and insert:
'"discrimination" means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour or national or ethnic origins and references to discrimination shall be construed accordingly'.
and the following Government Amendments: No. 1, in page 1, line 8, leave out Clause 1.
No. 23, in Clause 6, page 3, line 26, leave out from 'act' to end of line 27 and insert:
'of discrimination, whether or not it'.
No. 24, in Clause 7, page 3, line 37, after 'discriminate', insert 'against any other person'
and No. 53, in Clause 8, page 5, line 2, after 'discriminate', insert 'against any person'.
We had considerable discussion in Committee on this point, when I had pressure brought on me from all sides to

give a rather better definition of "discrimination" than was contained in Clause 1. So the purpose of the new Clause is to substitute a new Clause 1. I think that the old Clause 1 was deficient, and that the new Clause improves the situation. All that old Clause 1 did was to say that discriminate means discriminate, and that hardly seemed to be a particularly useful definition.
The new Clause states the conditions in which a person discriminates—if on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins he treats the other person in any situation to which certain sections of the Act apply less favourably —those are the operative words—than he treats or would treat other persons.
The remaining Amendments are consequential on the new definition. I undertook to consider the possibility of finding a better definition and I indicated to the Committee what I thought it would be. The new definition that I have included is in line with the statement that I made in Committee on the manner in which I would redraft the definition.

Mr. Quintin Hogg: I do not want unduly to take up the time of the House on this matter. I certainly do not wish to oppose the new Clause. Indeed, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, it is in line with one of the criticisms that I levelled at the definition in Committee, when I pointed out that the last definition was not a definition since it used the word "discriminate" to define the word "discriminate" in the Bill.
But I am still disappointed with the definition Clause. I will not go into my conviction, to which I have referred on more occasions than one, that the base of the Bill is too narrow even if its scope is too wide, but I will say one thing by way of criticism which the right hon. Gentleman has not met. Although I did not make the criticism on Clause 1, I made it on several occasions afterwards in Committee. I think that the definition Clause would be better if it recognised that there was a distinction between discriminating in favour of somebody and discriminating against somebody.
This is something that all of us tended to recognise in the course of the Committee discussions—that it was possible


legitimately to favour a particular minority group for which one had a particular affection—the Scots, the Welsh, the Irish, or even that submerged tenth, the English, or any other minority—the effect of which was to discriminate against all other nations when one did it, and that it was possible to do this without incurring the mischiefs of the Bill.
I know that there are difficulties—if I had seen an obvious way out of them I should have moved an Amendment—but I do not believe that it is beyond the wit of man to find one, and I still express; my disappointment that it has not so far been found.

Mr. Ivor Richard: I do not want to seem ungracious—after all, it was my new Clause, withdrawn in Committee, which my right hon. Friend said he would consider—but, unfortunately the new Clause seems to be open to a very large objection. It would leave open to the discriminator the possibility of arguing that what he was doing was providing separate, but, in his view, equal facilities.
We had in the new Clause that I proposed that the person who was discriminating was discriminating not only if he refused or failed to afford like treatment, but if he refused or failed to afford like treatment in like manner and on like terms that he would to other persons in like circumstances. My right hon. Friend said that he would consider that, and now he has produced this new Clause with "discrimination" defined in the words:
if…he treats that other…less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons".
On that wording, it is open to an employer to have separate lavatory accommodation for blacks and whites and say, "It is of equal standard and, therefore, I am not discriminating on the wording of Clause 1.". It seems to me, therefore, that my right hon. Friend has introduced into the English law a doctrine which the Supreme Court of the United States took six years to get off the United States Statute Book—namely, that the provision of separate and equal facilities is not discrimination in English law. I would be very reluctant to believe that that is now the law in England, what it ought to be or, indeed,

that that is what my right hon. Friend intends by the new Clause. I hope, therefore, that to avoid this objection, which is one of substance, my right hon. Friend will say that he does not wish to introduce into the English law the doctrine of separate but equal treatment with the possibility of eventual litigation, which is enormous, because on the wording of the new Clause, it would be open to a discriminator to argue that, having provided separate but equal facilities, he is not discriminating. I cannot believe that apartheid ought to be written into the English law.

4.0 p.m.

Mr. John Hunt: I am sorry that the Home Secretary, in his introductory remarks, did not refer to the Amendment to new Clause 1 tabled in my name and the names of the hon. Members for Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker) and for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose). I was hoping that the right hon. Gentleman would say that, on reflection, having seen my Amendment, he preferred my definition to his own. But that appears not to be so.

Mr. Callaghan: I was hoping to hear the hon. Gentleman's speech, and then perhaps the House will allow me to make a brief reply.

Mr. Hunt: I am glad that there is still hope.
I would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that the definition which I have suggested is supported by the United Kingdom Committee for Human Rights Year and is an appropriate adaptation of the definition of "discrimination" which is given in Article 1 of the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination.
My main objection to the new Clause is that put forward by the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard), namely, that it introduces for the first time into English law the separate but equal concept which, I believe, could establish a very dangerous and undesirable precedent. It also appears to run contrary to the like treatment principle which is the foundation of the other major Clauses of the Bill.
If the new Clause is adopted un-amended, my fear is that all the specific


prohibitions of Clauses 2 to 6 will have to be construed as excluding the provision of separate but equal facilities. In housing and employment, for example, this could encourage practices verging on apartheid in this country.
The hon. Member for Barons Court instanced the example of an employer who provides separate but equal toilet facilities. One could equally instance the provision of canteen facilities, or a local authority which provides a housing estate for coloured tenants only, but provides separate but equal accommodation in an all-white estate.
This new Clause has some real and considerable dangers. It establishes an undesirable principle which should be deplored. The alternative which I suggest to the Home Secretary's proposal embodies a clear and concise definition of "discrimination" and, because its phrasing is similar to that used in the United Nations Convention, it will help to provide an early opportunity for Parliament to ratify that Convention. The Home Secretary knows that the ratification of the United Nations Convention is one of the main objectives of Human Rights Year, to which all parties in the House have given their support.
For the reasons which I have outlined, I hope, even at this late stage, that the Home Secretary will have second thoughts and that, when he returns to the Dispatch Box, he will say that, on balance, he prefers my definition to his own.

Dr. David Kerr: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, you will forgive me if my hearing is terrible, but I understood you to say that we were also considering the Amendment. I have not heard the hon. Gentleman move the Amendment formally. I wondered whether this was in order.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is quite right. He has not heard the hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. Hunt) move the Amendment, because the hon. Member knew that he was not entitled to move it.

Mr. Paul B. Rose: I rise briefly to support the hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. Hunt) in speaking to his Amendment to the new Clause, not merely because it is based

upon the definition of "discrimination" given in Article 1 of the United Nations International Convention, but because I am not convinced that the new Clause proposed by my right hon. Friend meets the practical points made in Committee by various hon. Members, not least by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard).
I should like to see the United Nations form of wording enshrined in a Bill which is particularly appropriate to Human Rights Year. I am concerned about the term "not less favourable treatment", because the doctrine of apartheid, at least in theory though not in practice, is based upon the principle and philosophy of separate but equal. It is a principle which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court said, found favour over many years in the United States Supreme Court. "Like treatment" and "not less favourable treatment" are different, and I cannot understand this sudden lurching off into an unexplored alleyway in the law, an alleyway which is fraught with a great number of dangers. The main danger is that segregated but no less favourable facilities could be provided under this form of wording. Mention has been made of some examples. One might have white and coloured sections in restaurants or canteens, in buses, or in the allocation of housing on a housing estate under this form of wording.
My right hon. Friend seemed persuaded by the strength of the arguments put forward in Committee. He recognised the desirability of a definition Clause. I am sure that my right hon. Friend has done his best to meet the wishes of the Committee, but, unfortunately, he seems to have caused universal dismay to those most concerned with race relations, not least among those whom we are seeking to help by the Bill. I think that my right hon. Friend can put this error right today by accepting the Amendment of the hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. Hunt), which is supported by the United Nations Association Working Committee on Human Rights.
If my right hon. Friend is not prepared at short notice to do this, I would accept an undertaking on his part that when the Bill gets to another place an attempt will be made to find a form of wording which meets the points made in Committee and the point emphasised by


my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court on the great dangers of the separate but equal principle. This raises a point of real difficulty and substance. I hope, therefore, that my right hon. Friend will deal with it accordingly.

Dame Joan Vickers: I am disappointed to see that the word "sex" is not in either the new Clause or my hon Friend's Amendment. It appears now that the only persons who will be discriminated against in the apartheid section are women, who have recently been involved in the trouble over the employment of women bus drivers. A woman recently passed her driving test to become a bus driver, but the trade unions and other members of the local bus association said that they would strike if she was allowed to drive buses. Therefore, in this Year of Human Rights, if we are to discriminate we should not discriminate against women. Apparently women will be the only people now left in the country who will be discriminated against.

Mr. Speaker: Order, we are not debating whom we discriminate against. We are debating two possible ways of defining "discrimination".

Dame Joan Vickers: I am suggesting that neither the new Clause nor the Amendment fulfil what I wish, Mr. Speaker. I suggest that "discrimination" is not adequately described, because it still discriminates against women.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman to reconsider the new Clause and the Amendment and to put in the word "sex" so that women will not be discriminated against in future. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consider this seriously, because it is becoming a major problem. As the right hon. Gentleman knows from the various strikes that have taken place recently, women are becoming very militant.

Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, we are discussing a proposed new Clause, a proposed Amendment thereto, and in neither does the word "sex" appear.

Dame Joan Vickers: That is exactly what I was protesting against, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Eric S. Heftier: If I thought that my right hon. Friend was introducing a Clause which meant

separate but equal treatment I should be the first to vote against it, but I think that some of my hon. Friends, and some hon. Gentlemen opposite, are reading into the Clause far more than exists. The whole idea of the Bill is to do away with racial discrimination. It is, therefore, ludicrous to suggest that my right hon. Friend is introducing a Clause which, while laying down what is meant by discrimination, results in discrimination which does not exist now.
I understand that most hon. Members who are concerned about the Clause are members of the legal profession. I was a member of the Committee which considered the Bill. They were many lengthy debates and arguments, and it was amazing how confused my hon. Friends and others became over the various legal definitions advanced by members of the legal profession. Lay members found it difficult to get to grips with their arguments.
I think that my hon. Friends are overlooking the reference in the Clauses to Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5, which contain the words which my hon. Friends say ought to be in this Clause. For example, Clause 2 contains the phrase:
…to provide him with goods, services or facilities of the like quality, in the like manner and on the like terms…
Clause 3, which deals with employment, refers to:
like terms of employment, the like conditions of work and the like opportunities for training and promotion…
The words "like terms" are used in Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5. If my hon. Friends have not got beyond the definition in the new Clause, I suggest that they go on to read the other parts of the Bill which provide for exactly what my hon. Friends want.
I agree that there is always a danger of some local authorities going out of their way to discriminate in housing and other matters. This is precisely what we must ensure does not happen. It is not happening now. If I believed that we were laying down a principle of "separate but equal", a principle which was adopted in the United States with disastrous consequences, I should oppose the Clause, but I do not believe that is what is being done. I think that my hon. Friends should reconsider this and


not, as I think they are doing on this occasion, see something which is not there, but which perhaps some of them would like to see because they believe that the Government are constantly backtracking in this matter.

4.15 p.m.

Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas: There is only one thing worse than a lack of definition, and that is a misleading and ambiguous one. I fear that the Home Secretary has escaped from one trap only to fall into a worse one. This definition, however unintentional, is clearly capable of being interpreted in a separate but equal manner. That is the interpretation which has been placed on it by leading organisations dealing with race relations, and by distinguished Members of the House.
If the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) says that it is ludicrous to think that the Home Secretary intended to introduce into the Bill such a notion or definition of discriminaion, I say to him that it is not the intention of the Home Secretary that matters, but the words in the Statute.
In that respect, my mind goes back to the Obscene Publications Act, 1859.

Mr. Hogg: Does not my hon. Friend mean 1959?

Mr. St. John-Stevas: No. My mind has gone back further than has my right hon. and learned Friend's.
During the debate on that Act the point was made that the destruction order procedure which was then authorised could be used against works of literature. I believe that it was Lord Lyndhurst who pointed that out, and the then Attorney-General gave a guarantee that it was not his intention; but the Act was used in that manner. The danger is that in future the Bill now before us will be interpreted in the way that my hon. Friend's definition is intended to avoid.
There are two points to be made in reply to what the hon. Member for Walton said about the contrary wording in Clauses 2, 3 and 4. First, the definition in Clause 1 will govern the interpretation of the wording in those Clauses. If there is a conflict, the Interpretation Clause must prevail. But even so, it

surely cannot be a wise move in legislation of this kind to start by introducing what must, at best, be an ambiguity and oreate confusion right from the outset.

Mr. Heffer: Is it not clear that the interpretation in Clause 1 refers to Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5?

Mr. St. John-Stevas: I wish that I could say that that was clear. It may be clear to the hon. Gentleman, but it is not clear to me. In a Measure where there is a great deal of confusion, this is adding a further and gratuitous piece of confusion.
My hon. Friend's Amendment has the great merit of clarity and puts the point beyond doubt. I therefore hope that when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will say that he will reconsider the wording of the Clause, and that if the Bill reaches another place—I shall not say "when", as one hon. Member said—the matter will have been considered by the Home Office so that the appropriate wording can be introduced then.

Sir Barnett Janner: I, too, am worried about the Clause, for reasons similar to those expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard). I do not think that my right hon. Friend intends to define "discrimination" any differently from the definition in the Amendment to the Clause. In my view, the alternative definition suggested by the hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. Hunt) and others has been accepted as being in line with the Declaration of the United Nations.
I have had the unhappy experience of being obstructed time and again over the years whenever I have suggested that the Government should accede to the Genocide Convention. I have always been told that it is necessary to alter the law of our country to enable us to accede to that Convention. Despite the fact that everybody agrees with its terms, the Convention cannot be ratified until the position has been cleared and the red tape of the law has been cut.
I am worried because in this Year of Human Rights a reasonable request will be made to us to accept the Declaration of Human Rights in respect of discrimination. Whatever hon. Members may


want, if we are to have a Measure of this nature its terms should be clear. The Amendment to the new Clause is clear and concise and I hope that my right hon. Friend will accept it and so not only avoid legal disputes elsewhere as to what the Clause means, but also be in a position later to accept the proposal that we should ratify the Declaration of Human Rights.

Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I rise briefly to make it clear that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is not engaged in a, so to speak, lone foray in upholding the layman against the lawyer. There is much substance in the point that he made. It is necessary to see what unlawful acts are committed, and to see that we have to go to specific Clauses, as defined in the new Clause.
For example, Clause 2 refers to discrimination against a person
by refusing or neglecting to provide him with any of them or to provide him with goods, services, or facilities of the like quality, in the like manner and on the like terms in and on which the former normally makes them available to other members of the public.
To constitute an unlawful act, that must be established. No general words can derogate from the precise effect of those special words.
I have many criticisms of the drafting of the Bill, but this is not one of them. I submit that the position is as put by the hon. Member for Walton and that the misgivings which have been expressed are unfounded, although genuine.

Mr. David Weitzman: I am sorry that my right hon. Friend has put down the new Clause. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), I think that it was absolutely unnecessary. I hope that I shall be forgiven, as another lawyer who was not on the Committee, for intervening and expressing a view. I carefully read all the speeches made in Committee on the new Clause moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard). I thought that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made an excellent speech, showing how totally unnecessary the present new Clause was.
What do the new Clause and the Amendment do? The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) talked about "discriminating against" and "discriminating for", but the words in Clauses 1 and 2 are quite clear. The offence is that of discriminating against. There is no doubt about that. In Clause 2(1), we find the grounds on which discrimination may be exercised. What can be clearer than the simple words that are already in the Bill, namely, that the offence here is discrimination against, on the grounds set out? What do the new Clause and the Amendment add to it?
Hon. Members should examine the words of the new Clause and the Amendment. Do they make any difference to the present wording? The danger is that if we include words which are completely unnecessary we are providing scope for arguments being put forward against what the Bill really means. I ask my right hon. Friend to stick to his original view and not be tempted by what has been put forward in an Amendment to his new Clause, which is itself absolutely unnecessary.

Dr. M. P. Winstanley: I am inclined to support the view of those who have said that the fears of the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) and the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) are unjustified. But if it should prove to be the case that the new Clause could have the meaning attributed to it, namely, that it in some way underlines, supports or sanctions segregation, I hope that before we end this discussion we shall hear the right hon. and learned Attorney-General saying that it does not have the meaning attributed to it, or the Home Secretary saying that he will do something about it.
I am one of those who criticised the original definition, and I pay tribute to the Home Secretary for doing something about it. I am inclined to share the view expressed today by the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) and by the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) in Committee that it would have been nice if the Home Secretary had been able to bring forward a definition which embraced religion, sex, and so on, but the Long Title does not permit that to be done.
Nevertheless, we have had the assurance from the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone that he feels so strongly about the matter that if he should ever be in charge of these matters in future he will bring in another Bill. I hope that we may hear from the Home Secretary that he will also consider bringing in another Bill if necessary.
My reason for speaking now is that the discussion which took place in Committee on the question of the definition embraced both Clause 1 and Clause 2. Clause 2 goes on to define unlawful discrimination, while Clause 1 gives the general definition of discrimination. It was inevitable that the general discussion in Committee should embrace both Clauses.
My anxiety in Committee was related to the words "normal" and "normally". I realise that this question may be debated when we reached Amendment No. 6, and I do not want to anticipate that debate, but since it is bound up with the question of definition I hope that the Home Secretary will say something about the new definition either now or later, because the word "normal" is unsatisfactory. What is normal is not necessarily average, and what is average is not necessarily normal. There is much confusion about what is usual or normal. I get this point arising constantly in medical matters. I am asked, "Is this thing normal?" I say, "Yes, it is quite normal, but it is not common." It might be right for me to say that the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone is unusual. He would not object to that, although he might object if I said that he was abnormal.
I hope that the Home Secretary will be able to refer to this point of definition either now or later.

4.30 p.m.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: I support the Amendment. I take issue with my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), who said that a layman can understand the Bill. I would remind him that the words in the Statute will be interpreted by the people whom he calls lawyers. By that time they will be called judges. They will interpret the Measure. They will interpret it not necessarily according to the inten-

tion, but according to the literal interpretation of the Measure.
I am sure that it is not the intention of the Home Secretary to bedevil the issue by loading it up with terms which may be construed in a manner which we would consider to be bad.

Mr. Weitzman: Would my hon. Friend care to say what difference the Amendment would make to the original words of the provision?

Mr. Tuck: The difference is the need to overcome the concept of separate but equal facilities. Although Clauses 2, 3 and 4 seem quite precise, we must make the lead into them more precise. Clause 1, as drafted, which says that
In this Act 'discriminate' means discriminate on…
is not precise enough because it introduces into the definition of the word "discriminate" the word "discriminate".
I appeal to the Home Secretary to give close consideration to the Amendment, which is concise and precise, whereas the definition in the new Clause is somewhat vague.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: No hon. Member who took part in the Committee deliberations can doubt the need for some definition in this matter. It therefore seems hard on the Home Secretary that, having come forward with a definition, he should be condemned for doing so. I find his definition in the new Clause helpful and, while it does not go all the way, I must support the right hon. Gentleman.
The hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) raised a red herring in talking about the whole question of separate but equal. He knows as well as I do that subsequent American judicial decisions discovered that if it was separate, it was not equal. Plainly, if it is not equal it is less favourable.
I am not sure what is the Conservative equivalent of a red herring—unless it is a blue trout or a white sole—but I am satisfied that the phrase "less favourable" has the merit of being understandable to the ordinary person. We all agree that if the Bill is to work it must be understood by the public and be seen to make sense to them. "Less favourable" is clear and we all know what is less favourable.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: I agree that the Measure must be comprehensible to the public. Even more important, it must be interpreted by the judges. Thus, the wording should not be ambiguous and allow for different interpretations being given by different judges.

Mr. Griffiths: My hon. Friend is underlying the point made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). He is suggesting that judges are less capable of understanding the English language than the ordinary citizen. "Less favourable" is satisfactory. It is simple, comprehensible and it places the burden of proof where it should be; on the complainant, who must show that he is being treated worse, less favourably, than someone else on grounds of race or colour.

Mr. R. T. Paget: If, at a wedding, the bride's relations are put on one side and the bridegroom's on the other, that cannot be said to be treating them less favourably, although they are being treated differently. However, if one puts all the blacks on one side and all the whites on the other, would not the same argument apply? This being so, would it not be better merely to refer to "differently"?

Mr. Griffiths: It is reasonable that the House should outlaw acts which are less favourable on grounds of colour, and so on. I would not be in favour of outlawing acts which are different. Acts which are less favourable are those to which I am referring and with which I am mainly concerned.

Mr. Tuck: Would the hon. Gentleman agree to having one section of a bus for blacks and one for whites, or one section of a restaurant for blacks and another for whites, provided that they were equal?

Mr. Griffiths: I thought that I had dealt with that in explaining that it was clearly accepted in the United States—and I imagine that we would follow in this matter—that if it was separate it was not equal and that if it was not equal it was less favourable. That seems to be entirely watertight.
I cannot support the Amendment because it seems unreasonable to say that there should be no different treatment on grounds of preference. I propose to go

on preferring many people on grounds of national or ethnic origin. Preference should not be outlawed in this country and I hope that it never will be. What I wish to see outlawed is less favourable treatment on grounds of race or ethnic origin, but certainly not in connection with preference. I am glad that the Home Secretary has introduced the new Clause which, while it may not go all the way, will be of great help.

Mr. Stanley Orme: Having heard my right hon. Friend introduce the new Clause—which, I understand, is designed to meet certain objections voiced in Committee and to define thet matter more precisely—and having heard the lawyers have a go—they have put three different interpretations on both the Clause and the Amendment—I suggest that it might be better to return to the original definition in the Bill, since that might, after all, specify the later Clauses more clearly.
As drafted, Clause 1 says:
In this Act 'discriminate' means discriminate on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins, and references to discrimination shall be construed accordingly.
While my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) said that that did not define the matter clearly, I suggest that the subsequent Clauses go on to define it. Does not that overcome the objection? My hon. Friend went on to mention the different interpretations which lawyers could place on the phrase "less favourable", but that must be read in the context of the whole provision in which it appears.
The Home Secretary has tried to meet the wishes of the Committee. The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) said that no suitable form of words had yet been found. Presumably he has not found a suitable form of words and I suggest, therefore, that we accept a form of words which is understandable to the general public and in common law.

Sir B. Janner: Would my hon. Friend indicate his objection to the Amendment? He has not dealt with that.

Mr. Orme: I have read the Amendment, which takes the definition further than the original definition in the Bill. I have no objection to that, but if my right hon. Friend is not prepared to


accept it the safest procedure is to drop the new Clause and to return to the original definition.

Mr. Tuck: My hon. Friend described the original definition as precise and clear. Does he not realise that the original definition uses the words which it seeks to define?

Mr. Orme: My hon. Friend is giving another lawyer's interpretation. There is no difference between us on what we want to achieve. It is obvious from what has been said that we shall not get an ideal set of words providing a definition which is acceptable and not open to various interpreations in law. If we are not to get such a clear definition, then I suggest to my right hon. Friend that he would best meet the point by using the original form of words, backed by specific instances in relation to housing and employment, for example.

Mr. Callaghan: We have had a full discussion on this subject, and I do not think that any new points are now being made. I hope that I may say that without it being taken as offensive. We are treading the same ground time and again. It is not my intention to join in the game of hunting the under-privileged lawyers in the House. They rarely agree about the construction of words. Whenever two lawyers are gathered together, one can always get three opinions.
It is my task to make the words clear both for the benefit of the judges who have to interpret the definition and also for the sake of the Race Relations Board and the ordinary citizen. The important part of the Bill is that concerned with the conciliation process and the process of understanding which the ordinary citizen must apply. I trust that the number of cases which judges will have to try, in which they will be interpreting the exact syntax of what the House of Commons laid down, will be infinitesimal.
At one point in the debate I was inclined to agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and to feel that perhaps I should have left it alone. In fact, I was trying to meet the convenience of the Committee, for I was asked whether I would bring in a better definition. I suppose I should have known better than to bring in

another definition for that was to invite a great deal more controversy.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) should know me well enough to realise that if I thought that this was a proposal which would make separate but equal treatment lawful, I should not have brought it forward. I have made sufficient speeches on that subject and my attitude should be sufficiently well known for hon. Members to realise that I would not be in that position. My hon. Friend may argue, "But you are such a simple chap that you do not understand it. Although you have the best will in the world, it is not your intentions which count, but your words, and they create a loophole for the establishment of separate but equal facilities." That is the argument advanced by a number of hon. Members, although others have taken a different view.
My advice is that no loophole is created by the new Clause as drafted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) pointed out, reinforced by other hon. Members, one has to read the Clause in conjunction with the other Clauses. If hon. Members will stop their reading at the new Clause, and do not read on to the other Clauses, then I agree that there might be a problem. If a learned judge were to stop in that way, then I agree that it is just conceivable that in certain circumstances, late on a Friday afternoon, he might construe these words in the manner suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court. But he could not construe them in that way if he read them in conjunction with Clauses 2 to 5, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Walton.
It seemed to me that my hon. Friend was qualifying for elevation very rapidly to the bench by the way in which he seized on the nub of the argument. It is quite clear from the Bill, from Clause after Clause, that it must be "in like manner" and "in like circumstances". The argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court will not support the proposition that the provision of separate facilities would be legal under the Bill.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Richard: I should not dream of suggesting that my right hon. Friend was


either simple or a racialist. But I should like to put a serious point to him which I hope he will consider seriously. If discrimination, as he defines it, might allow for separate but equal treatment, perhaps the Attorney-General, or someone else legally qualified, would consider the situation under Clause 3 (l)(c), dealing with employment. Provided that the employer offers a black man and a white man like terms of employment, under the definition of discrimination which my right hon. Friend is introducing, might he not provide for separate but equal sanitary, toilet and canteen facilities, and might not that be permissible under the Bill? That is a serious point, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will consider it seriously.

Mr. Callaghan: My hon. Friend repeats the argument without adding to it. I have stated the conclusion which I have reached on the matter. It would be so foreign and contrary to the whole spirit of the Bill if such a defence were brought forward, if such a case ever got as far as the courts, that I would expect the courts to reject a defence against a complaint of unlawful discrimination if it were based on those grounds. I would certainly expect the Race Relations Board to do so.
I believe that my hon. Friend is spinning out words which, in fact, do not carry the weight which my hon. Friend is endeavouring to place upon them. But if, by the remotest chance, my hon. Friend proves to be right—and I am willing to have a modest bet with him that he will not—I think that any Government—a Government of right hon. Gentlemen opposite or the present Government—would clearly want to put that situation right. But I do not believe that that is likely to arise, because it is imperative to read the other Clauses in conjunction with this Clause.
May I take up the point made by the hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. Hunt), my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) and others in relation to the Human Rights Convention? Our definition is based on the terms of the then draft of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination. The original draft in the Human Rights Convention is the same as our definition, and it was that definition which was

carried into the 1965 Act. Subsequently, the definition in the Convention of 7th March, 1966, on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination was altered. What we have decided is to carry forward the definition which was used in the 1965 Act, based, as it was, on the original United Nations Convention, rather than to introduce the new definition agreed by the United Nations Convention.
The important point is whether the words which we use would prevent us from ratifying the United Nations Convention. These, again, are like the words we have been discussing. This is a drafting provision to give a different definition to the word "discrimination", but I assure the House that it will have no effect, in our view, on the ability of the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention.
The decision on ratification was deferred only until the form of this legislation had been agreed, and, once the Bill is passed, ratification will be reconsidered. There are still some difficulties which lie outside the scope of the Bill in relation to some overseas territory, but it would not be proper for me to go into them now. But as far as United Kingdom legislation is concerned, the Bill opens the way to ratification as soon as possible, subject to those other difficulties being removed.
On these counts, I hope that the House is inclined to agree that I have tried to meet the case for an expanded definition. Although hon. Members may hold the view that, drafted in a different way, it might be even better, I hope that they will allow me to have the definition and move on.

Mr. Paget: If, to consider what the definition means, one has to look at the Clause, what is the point of having a definition? When the object of the definition is to tell one what the Clause is, surely one is better without one or the other.

Mr. Callaghan: The one is stated in general and the rest are stated in particular in relation to the various aspects covered by the Bill—provision of goods, employment, trade unions, employers' organisations, housing accommodation, advertisements and notices. Clauses 2


to 6 spell out Clause 1. That does not seem to me to be a bad thing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

CHARITIES AND ACTS DONE FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES

(1) Nothing in this Part of this Act shall—

(a) be construed as affecting any future charitable instrument having as its main object the conferring of benefits on persons of a particular race, particular descent or particular ethnic or national origins; or
(b) render unlawful an act which is done in order to comply with the provisions of any such instrument or of any existing charitable instrument of any description.

(2) In this section 'charitable instrument' means an enactment passed or instrument made for purposes which are exclusively charitable according to the law of England and Wales and 'future instrument' and 'existing instrument' mean respectively an instrument taking effect after, and an instrument taking effect before, the commencement of this Act.—[The Attorney-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
The purpose of this Clause, which is in substitution for Clause 9 of the Bill, is to extend the protection afforded by that Clause to certain charitable dispositions taking effect in future as well as in the past. The House will see that the existing Clause 9 provides that nothing in Part 1 of the Bill is to render unlawful an act done in order to comply with the provisions of any enactment passed or other instrument made for charitable purposes and taking effect before the passing of the Bill.
I recall to the House the reason for the Clause. There are many charitable trusts which restrict the dispositions which can be made under them to beneficiaries of a particular category, whether by reference to residence, nationality, country of origin, or in some other way as scholarships for the sons of Welsh clergymen, for instance, or almshouses for elderly Scotsmen. To comply with the terms of the trust, it is inevitable that the trustees should have to refuse

application from persons who do not fall within the specified category, and it could mean that they would be contravening the provisions of the Bill by turning away people on grounds that, because of race, they were ineligible under the terms of the trust instrument.
My right hon. Friend and I decided that it would be unreasonable to put a person in the position of having to choose between acting unlawfully and in a way contrary to the terms of the trust or other instrument which had been made and which had come into effect before the Bill was passed. But we took the view that, for the future, instruments setting up charitable trusts should be drawn in such a way, as not to require persons acting in pursuance of them to discriminate between one group and another.
For this reason, the protection afforded by the Clause was restricted to instruments made and taking effect before the passing of the Bill. But this, of course, left no protection for future charitable dispositions of a kind which most people would consider to be deserving of protection.
One example mentioned in Committee was the establishment by a rich Pakistani of a school for Pakistani children. Although in terms in favour of one group, its effect would be to discriminate against all other groups and the head teacher of such a school who turned away an English child would be liable to the charge that he was discriminating on ground of race. The matter was discussed in Committee on the basis of an Amendment put forward by the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton), who sought to extend the protection to acts done in fulfilment of the objectives of any organisation established for charitable purposes whether the organisation was established before or after the coming into force of the Bill.
Since that date we have, as we undertook, given further thought to the matter. I agree that the Clause 9 is unsatisfactory as it stands. But, in my view, we should not go as far as the right hon. and learned Gentleman proposed. As I see it, his Amendment would have had the effect of protecting a charitable disposition drawn up for the benefit of all


persons save, say, those coloured or of a particular nationality, and I am sure that he would not find that position attractive and that he would seek to avoid it.
But ray right hon. Friend and I are certainly sympathetic to the view that, in seeking to outlaw discrimination in charitable activities for the future, we should not in doing so inhibit the setting up of charities which, although they may have a discriminatory element, nevertheless are for the benefit of sections of the community deserving of benefit and for purposes deserving of encouragement.
Accordingly, the new Clause, while reproducing the effect of the present Clause 9, goes further in that, with respect to charitable instruments taking effect after the commencement of the Act, it protects such instruments and acts done in order to comply with them if they are instruments having as their main objective the conferring of benefits on persons of a particular race, particular descent or of particular ethnic or national origin.
This will, I hope, cover cases of the kind referred to in Committee—for instance, schools for the education of Frenchmen, homes for elderly Jews, trusts in favour of future immigrants from Pakistan. But it will not protect instruments intended to exclude particular sections of the community on the grounds of race, colour and so on. I hope that the House, and, in particular, the right hon. and learned Gentleman, will feel that the Government have gone the whole way to meet the substance of the criticisms of the Clause as it stands and that new Clause 2 will be accepted in substitution.

Sir David Renton: I express my gratitude to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General not only for the clear explanation he has given, but for the great amount of thought and consideration he has given to the matter in reaching the conclusion which is contained in new Clause 2. What it comes to is that, in future charitable instruments;, it would be legitimate to discriminate in favour but not legitimate to discriminate against. That is a wise and satisfactory solution, and I am grateful for it.

Sir B. Janner: I, too, congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General on the manner in which he has been able to devise a very useful Clause to meet what appeared to many of us as a serious objection to the original Clause. A large number of organisations will now be able to continue their activities—or, rather, to create new activities—in a manner similar to the methods used before.
In addition, if new Clause 2 had not been introduced there would have been a disincentive to many people who are charitably disposed. They might have been dissuaded from introducing charitable provisions for the benefit of a large number of people. We are grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend and thank him very much.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE

(1) Whereby virtue of the provisions of section 14, 15 or 16 of, or Schedule 2 to, this Act, an investigation is being carried out by the Board or by a conciliation committee or by any body of persons to whom such investigation has been referred, any person who willfully and unreasonably refuses or neglects to provide any material information or to answer any material question or to disclose any material document upon being requested in writing so to do either by the Board or by a conciliation committee or by any such body as aforesaid with the authority in writing of the Board shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

(2) Any person who in the course or for the purpose of any such investigation as aforesaid wilfully gives false information to either the Board or a concilation committee of any such body as aforesaid shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

(3) Any person who wilfully and unreasonably obstructs or threatens to obstruct or does any act calculated to obstruct either any investigation by the Board or by a conciliation committee or by any such body as aforesaid or the provision by any person in the course of any such investigation of any material information or the answering of any material question or the disclosure of any material document shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

(4) The penalty for an offence under this section shall be a fine not exceeding£100 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months, or both; or, in the case of a second or subsequent offence, a fine not exceeding £250


or imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months, or both.—[Mr. Alexander W. Lyon.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
I understand that with this Clause we are to discuss new Clause 3—"Enlarged definition of discrimination".

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): That is so.

Mr. Lyon: I am grateful to Mr. Speaker for reversing his original selection, because, although the two Clauses apply to different problems, that to which Clause 4 relates is far more important. It relates to one of the principal weaknesses of the Bill which has been widely commented upon and upon which we had a good deal of discussion in Committee. Varous ways of trying to improve the Bill to remedy this weakness were suggested in Committee.
The weakness to which I refer is that in fulfilling its obligations to investigate an alleged act of discrimination the Race Relations Board will have no power under the Bill to compel anyone to give evidence to it, to produce papers, or to furnish information upon which to make any rational judgment about whether discrimination has taken place. In Committee, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and, even more, the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) made great play with the comparison of the police investigating serious offences, even murder, being unable to compel witnesses to give information if the witnesses refused to do so.
This analogy was always wrong. The Board will not be in the position of a policeman in the exercise of its functions. Of course, it is an enforcement agency, but it is more. In the nature of most cases of discrimination, the Board will be a court itself. It will have to decide whether there has been discrimination and to do so it will have to take evidence from both parties involved about the alleged act of discrimination.
It is true that by later Amendments in Committee my right hon. Friend changed the phrase from "making a determina-

tion" to simply "forming an opinion", and it will, therefore, be possible for the Board simply to reach a prima facie opinion that discrimination has occurred. That would not in any sense be a final determination of the matter. But to do that it will have to have the necessary information, and the weakness of the Bill as it stands is not that it denies the Board powers which the police do not have, but that it will mean that inevitably the Board will have to send more cases to court.
I thought that we were all agreed that the fewer the cases which went to court, the better. The object of the procedure is to conciliate and not to enforce. Therefore we are all trying to create conditions in which fewer cases will go to court. But if the Board cannot obtain the evidence to determine whether there has been discrimination and the only evidence before it is a complaint by the person who is alleged to have been discriminated against, the Board must form a prime facie opinion that there has been discrimination and it must send the case to court.
Therefore, the objective, which was eschewed by my right hon. Friend in Committee, of bringing enforcement too much into the proceedings will be achieved by this weakness in the Bill. The only way of conciliating in the end will be to take the acrimonious parties to court. I would not want that and I do not think that the Home Secretary would, and I therefore ask him again to consider this weakness.
The new Clause was devised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), who, unfortunately, cannot be here to move it today. It is a new device from those suggested in Committee and from those urged by the Board. It creates a criminal offence. I would have preferred the Amendment which I moved in Committee, but, that having now passed, I hope that the Government will accept the new Clause.
I do not think that there is any secret about the fact that one of my right hon. Friend's concerns at that stage was that if his concession were made on a matter thought by the Board to be important, that would in some way militate against


the acceptance of the Bill by the Opposition. We have now reached the stage when the Opposition have clearly determined not to support the Third Reading. Surely we should now determine to get the best Bill possible with the support of this side of the House.
I therefore hope that my right hon. Friend will be less intransigent about this matter than he was in Committee. If he feels that the Clause is not the right way in which to deal with the weakness, I would be happy to accept an assurance that the matter would be dealt with before the Bill reached another place. However, I hope that in response to all the criticism from all informed sources about race relations, not least the Board, and in view of the experience in America, where this weakness has been proved over and over again in those States which have no power to get witnesses or documents before a similar conciliation committee, my right hon. Friend will yield.

Mr. Paget: I regarded on Second Reading, and I still regard, this proposal as possibly the most important if the Bill is to be effective. In Committee, my right hon. Friend took the view that the Race Relations Board could not be given powers which were not given to the courts even in cases of the most serious crimes. That is a misunderstanding of the situation. It is a very ancient tradition—we might have to consider it, but it is none the less very ancient—that no man should be compelled to incriminate himself; that is to say, he should not be compelled to give evidence which would show that he had committed a crime, or, though this is subject to considerable limitations, to produce documents which incriminate him. He can decline to do so on that ground.
But we have not created a crime here. We have not said in the Bill that discrimination is a crime. We have expressly declined to do so. When one is not dealing with crime, any man may be compelled to give evidence against himself. In any civil proceedings, for libel or otherwise, one may call one's opponent and put him in the witness box, where he is bound to answer any questions dealing with the case.
Equally, by the process of discovery, one can compel him to produce all the relevant documents. It is not only in a

court of law that one can do this. Under the Arbitration Act an arbitrator can do it. Why, then, not the Board? The Board is considering matters which are expressly not criminal, which are to be dealt with in a civil fashion. Why deny it the procedures and facilities which are usual in the investigation of civil matters?
So much for what seem to be the main argument advanced against this proposal. Now to the argument for it, which is based on something else. I will not go into this at any length, but I do not think that the injunction system will work. This is very largely because the courts will be very loath to make injunctions, the performance of which they are not in a position to supervise. This has always been the tradition of the courts—very loath to grant injunctions which are enforced by committal to prison unless the definition can be complete, unless the performance can be supervised by court.
That will mean that the cases become far more constricted than we would wish. Secondly, I do not believe that a procedure for damages in which damages are paid to an injured party, but the complaint can only be brought by someone else, is a system which will work very satisfactorily in practice. The real sanction to this discrimination legislation will not be the result of an inquiry, but the inquiry itself. One has to carry public opinion, and on the whole one does. People may be against foreigners coming here, against coloured people, but they feel that if they do come here it is decent to treat them equally. That is the general feeling, and people do not like being exposed for not doing so.
They do not want to be put in the witness box and have questions put to them, questions showing them to have been rather mean, perhaps prevaricating and lying fellows. They do not like that, and least of all do they like people going into their business, going through their business and investigating how it is conducted. That is the effective sanction.
The main purpose of the Board is conciliation, but behind that there must be the ultimate sanction. The effective sanction to my mind is stage 2—"If we cannot agree we will have to have an investigation.…if you will not answer these questions and discuss it sensibly you will have to answer it in the witness box, with the Press there and everyone


else…we will have to look at your books." This seems to be the most effective sanction, and that is why I hope that my right hon. Friend will look favourably at this new Clause.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. Hogg: I must make it clear that whoever else is against this new Clause, I am against it. I hope that my hon. Friends will be as firmly against it as I am. I regard it as wholly illogical—it is the ultimate lunacy to which the extreme enthusiasts of this Bill would seek to lead us. It would destroy any hope that the Board would command the support of the public.
Let me deal first with the speech of the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon). He began by seeking to show that the Race Relations Board is a court. That is exactly what it is not. It is not designed as a court. If it were a court, it would be acting and proceeding at every stage contrary to natural justice, and the proposal to arm it with the capacity to create a criminal offence is to turn it into an inquisition. That is exactly what the worst enemy of the Bill would wish to do if he wanted to discredit it with the public. We must clearly understand what the Bill envisages to be the function of the Race Relations Board. There can be no doubt about this under the Bill as it stands.
Whether one agrees with the Bill, or opposes it, or whether one tries to examine it, as I tried to do, in an objective way, it is clear that its functions are twofold. The first is conciliation and that, by consent, is the result that one most desires to achieve, if the Bill becomes law. The second function is to be an enforcement body. It achieves the first function by conversations and seeking to obtain assurances, and by obtaining voluntarily information from the parties. Its value very largely depends upon its capacity to acquire information voluntarily, and its functions as an enforcement body depend upon its capacity to bring proceedings for enforcement before a properly constituted court in public.
This is the logical point at which I must confess a wide degree of surprise at the extraordinary arguments adduced in favour of the new Clause by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). No man, he said, should

be compelled to incriminate himself, but, he adds, we have not created a crime. That is precisely what the Clause does. It arms the Race Relations Board with the capacity to create an offence. I would accept as a matter of fact, in some ways I was surprised that the hon. and learned Gentleman did not make the point, that there are certain authorities with that capacity. In social security legislation, an inspector of the Ministry can demand information under this precise type of penalty, although I have not investigated the penalty clause. The Minister under whose authority he acts is answerable to this House. The supporters of the Bill, the more extreme supporters particularly, have all along decided to eliminate the one answerable Minister from the proceedings of the Race Relations Board—the Attorney-General.
As the Bill stands, as the intention of the Government stands, as the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite has said, the Attorney-General is eliminated. What one is doing is to create a body not responsible to this House, with the capacity to create a criminal offence by demanding information and then reporting to a criminal court. I find that utterly and completely deplorable. The hon. and learned Gentleman went on to argue that in civil proceedings a man was bound to incriminate himself, and these were civil proceedings. What he failed to understand completely was the logical conclusion of his argument, because under the Bill there will be civil proceedings if the Race Relations Board is not satisfied with the result of its voluntary inquiry. In those proceedings the person accused of discrimination will have to give evidence if he is subpoenaed. The full power of subpoena exists in those civil proceedings. What the hon. Gentleman is arguing is wholly unnecessary.
The hon. and learned Gentleman goes on to say that there must be discovery of documents and that people are bound to discover documents in civil proceedings. Again, if the Board, as a result of its conciliation procedure, which is basically voluntary under the Bill, does not succeed in obtaining satisfaction under Clauses 18 and 19, this is precisely what will happen under the Bill. The proceedings will be begun and, under the proper authority of a judicial officer—a judge, or a registrar of a county court—


there will be discovery of documents. In other words, the real sanction of which the hon. and learned Gentleman made so much will be there and what he proposes is wholly and absolutely unnecessary.
I take that argument a stage further, because I think I can claim to have a legitimate point of view on this. I realise that the Board has always felt that it needs further powers. I am sure that it does not. To act at all it must have some information to the effect that some contravention of the Act has occurred. It does not investigate in vacuo. If it did, it would be making itself ridiculous. It asks the target against whom the allegation is made, "Is there any truth in it?" He can say one of three things. He can say, "Yes, it is true", "No, it is false", or, "I am not going to give you any information."
If he says the third at any stage of the proceedings, the information in the hands of the Board, coupled with his attitude, evidence of which can be given in the county court, if the county court is the tribunal which will ultimately decide upon the matter, will be available to the civil court for the purposes of evidence. Even if he is not subpoenaed to give evidence, which very likely will not be the case, for the value of a subpoena can be grossly exaggerated, that evidence, on the balance of probabilities, wall hold the field, because it is a civil court and not a criminal one.
I would hope that this is something on which all parties can unite. This is a proposal which is illogical in its conception, unnecessary in its application, and inconsistent in its demands. If it were introduced, it would be oppressive. For those who oppose the Bill it would make the Bill totally offensive. For those who support that Bill, it would destroy and undermine any confidence they might have.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes it the main point of his argument that he would not give to a body which was not under the control of a Minister and answerable to the House powers to demand information on pain of legal penalties. In fact, his Government—I believe that he was intimately concerned with the matter—produced the Restrictice Practices Court with a Registrar of

Restrictive Practices, which is the inforcement agency and who can demand information. A refusal to give information in the way requested in the Clause is, under that legislation, an offence.

Mr. Hogg: The hon. Gentleman is giving his own case away. The Restrictive Practices Court is a court constituted at law, operating at law, and the Registrar is an officer of the court. This is the whole point I was making. The hon. Gentleman's reference to the Restrictive Practices Procedure leads me to make another point which passed through my mind when the hon. and learned Member for Northampton was speaking. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in expressing doubts about the injunction procedure and about the procedure provided by the Bill for hearing in the county court—as the House knows, the county court is not my preferred tribunal—overlooks the large range of judicial proceedings which recent Parliaments, under successive Governments, have introduced, whereby this is the very sanction selected by Parliament and which on the whole has proved, or the threat of it has proved, to be a wholly effective means of enforcement without the criminal law being invoked and without, in nine cases out of 10, the injunction being imposed.
For all these reasons, I am against the Amendment.

Mr. Richard: I am not surprised that the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) is against the Clause, because I remember the speeches he made in Committee. The analogy made by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) with the restrictive trade practices law is quite apt, for this reason. Section 15 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which is a piece of legislation the primary responsibility for which must rest on the other side of the House, as it was passed in 1956, provides for the examination of any witness before the High Court at the request of the Registrar. That request precedes any suggestion of court proceedings. Indeed, it can be totally independent of court proceedings.
As I understand the position, it is an apt analogy, for this reason. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will take this into account, because I know that he has strong views on this


matter. Nevertheless, this is a strong point on the other side of the argument. Under the restrictive practices and monopolies legislation, just as under this legislation, the recourse to court proceedings is the end of the ladder: it is the last link in the chain. The very last thing that is desired in race relations legislation, as in restrictive practices and monopolies legislation, is to get to court.
That is why it is right for the Registrar to be given the power, when he is investigating certain agreements, to go to the court and ask for a witness to be examined before the court. It is right in that case and it is right in this case, for very much the same reason, namely, that we do not want a multiplicity of court actions and we do not want the Board to have to chase off to court every time somebody says, "I am not going to answer any questions". Therefore, the analogy is apt.
The second point which is underestimated by the right hon. and learned Gentleman—and by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, I fear, if his attitude tonight is to be the same as it was in Committee—is the uniqueness of the legislation and of this problem. After all, we have not created a criminal offence, but we are not in the realm of purely civil law. What we have done, if anything, is to create something analgous to a statutory tort, and we have gone on to provide a statutory form of enforcement of that tort, leading to eventual court proceedings.
In these circumstances, it is logical to ask those on whom the burden of enforcement is to be placed, who are themselves the most expert and informed in this matter, whether they believe that they have the necessary powers. Those who are expert in this field, and who are charged by the Government with the responsibility of trying to enforce the legislation, are overwhelmingly of the opinion that they have not sufficient powers, because there is no form of investigatory procedure which they can call in aid before they have to go to the trouble of launching court proceedings.
If the object of the exercise of the Bill is to conciliate, there must be some procedure for dealing with the total non-co-operator. Somewhere along the line,

before going to the trouble of launching a county court action, seeking an injunction, and asking for the whole panoply of the law to be brought into play, the Board should be entitled to step in and say, "You have refused to answer our questions. Now we shall ask you to answer them by virtue of the statutory authority that we have been given under the Bill".
I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that the real sanction will be the publicity. If the Board say to a man, "If you do not answer our questions at this stage, you may have to undergo a public examination", the threat of the public examination will be almost as effective as the threat of the court action and of the eventual injunction.
I rest my case upon the uniqueness of the situation, the uniqueness of the problem, and the unique way in which the Bill, fully supported by the Tory Party, has tried to deal with the problem of creating a statutory tort and an enforcement machinery. There is the further point that those charged with enforcement say that they believe that they will be inhibited. There is the final point that both right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench said in Committee that, if they are inhibited, we must try to do something about it. I prefer to deal with that possibility now. I see no danger in not conceding in general terms some form of investigatory procedure before going to court.
5.30 p.m.
The precise form of the new Clause, in creating a criminal offence with a fine of£100 or imprisonment not exceeding three months, is not wholly acceptable to me. What we argued in Committee was not whether a man should be fined£100 or sent to prison for a period not exceeding three months, but whether he might suffer the ultimate indignity of being fined£10 because he was in breach of a county court subpoena issued by a county court judge.
I would prefer to see that that type of civil procedure where the Board could apply to a county court, get a subpoena and have the man examined. If the only sanction is a£10 fine, I would prefer that to the massive criminal penalty


expressed in the new Clause. Although without much hope of success or without much faith in my plea, I ask my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary at least to consider the views of the Race Relations Board and look at the matter again.

Mr. Callaghan: It is right that we should have this discussion again, because it goes to the nub of the problem of the powers of the Race Relations Board. That is basically what we are discussing. There is here a fundamental clash of opinion. I take a different view from that of my hon. Friends the Members for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) and for Barons Court (Mr. Richard).
It is true that the Race Relations Board would like these powers to be conferred upon it. I am asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court to agree that because the Board wants the power conferred upon it, therefore the House should confer that power upon the Board. That is not a wholly persuasive argument for me. There must be rather better reasons than that.
The one thing which I regret about the justifiable campaign which has taken place—I do not complain about it; people are entitled to say that they want the Board to exercise the powers—is that in their enthusiasm some hon. Members and some interests outside the House have said that the Bill will be valueless unless the Board gets these powers. That seems to me to be not only destructive of the usefulness of the Bill, but also wholly untrue.
Let me make the point clear. It is not true to say that the Bill is wide in scope, but lacks teeth. I may rouse some antagonism elsewhere on this matter, but let us get the facts straight. The Bill has teeth. The question is: who is to bite? Is it the Race Relations Board or the courts? That is what we are discussing.
I ask those who say that they are in favour of legislation, but who then go on to attack it the whole time on the ground that the Board is not getting the powers, to stop that kind of argument, because the powers exist. It is important that everybody should recognise this. The question is: by whom are they to be exercised? My hon. Friend the Member for York said that one of the weaknesses of the Bill is that the Board has

no power to compel anyone to appear before it or to produce papers; it is not a policeman, it is not a court. That is what my hon. Friend says. That, however, is not the concept in the Bill. It is not the concept on which I believe that the Board is best likely to build up its standing with the public.
In that aspect, I entirely agree with the view of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that it is essential that this legislation and the Race Relations Board should carry public opinion with them. In my view, it is more likely that the Board will carry public opinion with it if it has to have recourse to the courts in respect of matters in which it believes that an offence has been committed than if it has the power itself. I believe that I am a better friend of the Race Relations Board in this regard in the attempt to build up that state of public opinion than are those who would themselves at this stage arm the Board with the important powers and liabilities that the Bill conveys. That is my view about that.
My hon. Friend the Member for York then said that the inevitable result would be to send more cases to the courts. I do not agree. Why should that be? As my hon. Friend developed his argument, I said to myself, as I did in Committee, that what my hon. Friend presupposes is that innocent people will not co-operate with the Board. In saying that more cases will go to the courts, he is presupposing that those who have committed no offence but against whom an offence has been alleged refuse to reply to the Board when it makes its inquiries.
I said in Committee that I could well understand that somebody might exercise his god-given rights as an Englishman and say that he did not propose to answer, but the number of cases of that nature—and I hope that I can assess opinion about this as well as my hon. Friend or anybody else—are likely to be extremely small. I do not accept my hon. Friend's view that the consequences would be to send more cases to the court, unless I must deduce from that that those who have not committed an offence will refuse to co-operate with the Board. That seems to me to be an unlikely conclusion.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I do not for one moment suggest that the increase in


the number of cases will come from innocent people. To be able to conciliate, however, the Board has to be clear that there has been an act of racial discrimination. I am saying that guilty people, who are under no compulsion to provide the information to the Board, might prefer to refuse to give information and, therefore, the Board would be inclined to send more cases to the courts. That is the argument.

Mr. Callaghan: I do not follow that, either. What my hon. Friend now says is that a guilty person—at least, someone who is presumed to be guilty and is not denying his guilt—goes before the Board and refuses to answer the questions, and that if the Board has the powers it will not send the case to court. That is not likely either. How can one conciliate a guilty man who is determined to persist in his guilt? One cannot have it both ways. Either this is a conciliatory body or it is a court. In my view and in the view of the Government—and that is why we bring the matter forward in this way—the Board is a conciliatory body, and one cannot compel people to be conciliated if they themselves refuse to conciliate. I will return to the point later.
I have looked up the points raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton about arbitrators because it is important in considering what powers should be given to the Board in this regard. If the analogy were close, it might be worthwhile thinking about it again, but the analogies which I have found do not persuade me that I would be right to give these powers.
The function of the Monopolies Commission, for example, is confined to reaching findings and making recommendations. It is the ultimate tribunal. I understand that there is no appeal from it. Nor does the Commission initiate inquiries. It operates only when a case is referred to it by a Minister of the Crown. Therefore, that analogy is not complete. No one would argue that the Race Relations Board should operate only on the basis of a case referred to it by a Minister of the Crown. There is, therefore, an entirely different set of circumstances.
The Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, to which my hon. Friend

the Member for Barons Court referred, is the closest approach that I can find to the kind of power that I would like to give to the Race Relations Board. Here again, however, the failure to comply with the notice is a criminal offence punishable by a fine of up to£100. I do not believe that it is right that we should arm the Race Relations Board with powers and penalties of that sort.
The power of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements to issue a notice is in relation to the narrow question of a restrictive trade agreement. What is more—and, here again, I must come back to where I started from at 3.30—the Registrar, whom my hon. Friend quoted, has no conciliatory function. He is not a conciliator. He is, as the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) said, an officer of the court in one sense. Therefore, I do not accept the view which has been put forward that these powers are given to other people.
I come back to my main argument which can be summed up in this way. The Board's primary function is to secure conciliation by agreement. That is what the Government want it to do and, as it emerged from Committee, that is what the Committee wanted it to do. I believe that it is right and sensible, in the present state of development of the Board and the necessity to carry public opinion with it, that we should ensure that the Race Relations Board does not reach too far yet. Whatever may be the development in the future, and I cannot foretell it either way, their principal rôle is that of conciliation.
My second main argument against adopting the new Clause is that there would have to be a criminal sanction against failure to comply with the orders of the Board, and this would be contrary to the whole concept of the Bill as it has been discussed. Compulsory attendance before the Board would inevitably require appropriate safeguards to maintain the principle that nobody should be compelled to incriminate himself. The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone answered that point admirably, and there is no need for me to pursue it. That, clearly, is a very important argument against it. A fully effective safeguard for a man who was


compelled to appear before the Race Relations Board in practice would enable him to remain silent in proceedings before the Beard. Such proceedings would be of no practical value unless the principle that no one should be compelled to incriminate himself is breached.
I think that the last sentence of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton added up to complete support for the line we are taking. He said if a person appeared in front of the Race Relations Board mute and silent, the Board would say to him, "If you do not answer you will have to produce your papers in front of the court if we form the opinion that an offence has been committed." Exactly. That is exactly the procedure that is laid down and it seems to me to be the right procedure.
I am certain that we are right to divide these powers. I emphasise that it does not weaken the Bill in any sense. It is a division of powers rather than an aggregation of powers, and, therefore, I regret that I cannot accept the Clause.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I will not keep the House for more than two minutes at the most, and I should not have added anything to the admirable speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) were it not for the praying in aid of the precedent of the Restrictive Practices Court. An hon. Member opposite said that my right hon. and learned Friend was a member of the Government who passed that Act. I was not only a member of the Government; I was one of the Ministers directly responsible for formulating the provisions of the Act and taking charge of its conduct through the House. I say, with respect, that it is wrong to press the analogy of that Act as a precedent for these powers. It is true that there is a power in the Registrar to get the information as to the restrictive agreements which there is a statutory duty to register, but that is a necessary power. It is not an oppressive or inquisitorial power, because if the restrictive agreement exists it is simply a matter of fact and it must be registered. In every respect basically the procedure of the Act is judicial, and it was on that basis that we put it before the House. I do not want to go into far off things and battles long ago. It was because it was

judicial that it was voted against by the other side.

Mr. Richard: Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that one reason why power was given to the Registrar was so as to avoid the ultimate sanction of having to go in front of the courts? If they were given the limited power multiplicity of action would be avoided.

5.45 p.m.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: It was confined to the registration of the agreement. The agreement had to be registered, and it was in the interests of the parties that it should be registered, since it was only by so doing that they could displace the onus that it was against the public interest. The hon. Gentleman must appreciate that it was in an entirely different climate. Under that Act the sort of parties engaged are very substantial indeed and equipped and aided from the start by solicitors, counsel and the like who are able to look after themselves.

Dr. Winstanley: I am sorry to delay the House, but I regret that I cannot advise my right hon. and hon. Friends how to proceed on this matter, whether to give their support to the Home Secretary or to withhold it.
I cannot advise them until I have an answer to a question to which I endeavoured to get an answer in Committee and which has not been answered this time either. The Home Secretary told us that the number of cases in which people would refuse to give information would in his view be "infinitesimal". This was the word he used. I suggest to him that this would depend on what such people think is likely to happen if they do not answer the questions, and this is precisely what this discussion has been about.
The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) in his interesting and convincing speech said that the person could behave in three ways. If, for example, a representative of the Board or of the conciliation committee visits a public house to find out whether or not the public house refused to serve someone and asks questions, (a) they can say "Yes, it is true", (b) they can say, "No, it is not true", or (c) they can decline to answer.


Surely there is a fourth possibility. They may very well say, and would do so, I imagine, "What happens if I do not answer?" What is then said? Is the Race Relations Board representative then to say that nothing happens, in which case I would suggest that they might not answer; or will the Race Relations Board representative say, "Of course, if you do not answer, this is a matter that we will take into consideration in deciding whether or not to refer the matter for civil proceedings before the court."
The Home Secretary will recollect that this is precisely the solution on the Order Paper as a way in which we might proceed. In other words, it is suggested that rather than adopt this formula we should make it clear that, where a person fails to respond either reasonably or at all to inquiries made of him, this should be in itself a reason, if the Race Relations Board so determines, to refer the case for civil proceedings. If the Home Secretary will state quite clearly that the Board has this power and can proceed in this way, I would advise my hon. Friends to support him, since it would seem that the point about which we are worried is answered. I agree that these powers must be given. I agree that it would not be right that the rô le of the Board should be frustrated merely by people declining to co-operate, but I take the point, and I accept the force of the argument, that it should not be given powers which would be more suitable or more appropriate to the courts and which should not be vested in a body of that kind.
If the Home Secretary can say unequivocally that the Board has the power, that, where a person refuses to answer, this, ipso facto, can be a reason for the Race Relations Board referring the case to the country court which could then issue subpoenas and so on, I would be satisfied.

Mr. Callaghan: I would just say quite shortly that if I were a member of the Race Relations Board and were faced by somebody asking what would happen to him if he did not answer, I would say that it depends on the opinion that I form on the papers that are in front of me, and if I feel on the basis of the allegation that has been made and any other evidence that I have that it should go before the court, then I will take it

before the court. I suppose, if I was a member of the Race Relations Board, I would have to try to judge whether his failure to answer was in itself another factor in forming my opinion, but I imagine that the Race Relatons Board in considering the matter would base its opinion primarily upon the evidence it had in front of it and only secondarily on the attitude of anybody who appeared in front of it.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Before I beg leave to withdraw the new Clause, may I say that, if the argument of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is right, I am surprised that the experience in the United States should be that those States which have these powers for their conciliation committees have proved to be more effective than those which do not. I hope that that will not be the case in this country, but I am quite willing to accept the greater wisdom of the majority of the House.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

EDUCATION, TRAINING, ETC., FACILITIES FOR MINORITY COMMUNITIES

It shall not constitute any offence under this Act to advertise, offer or provide special facilities for education, instruction or training primarily or solely for the members of a minority community resident in the United Kingdom, provided that the provision of such facilities is restricted to the members of such a minority community.—[Mr. Gower.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Raymond Gower: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It is suggested that with this new Clause we should discuss New Clause 6 (Banking, insurance, & c, facilities for minority communities), New Clause 7 (Welsh proprietor of hotel, & c.,), New Clause 8 (Jewish proprietor of hotel, & c), New Clause 9 (Scottish proprietor of hotel, & c), New Clause 10 (Mohammedan proprietor of hotel, & c), New Clause 11 (Hindu proprietor of hotel, & c), and New Clause 12 (Irish proprietor of hotel, &c).

Mr. Gower: These new Clauses deal with certain marginal albeit difficult aspects of the legislation. It may be that the fears which have been expressed to me are exaggerated, but I hope that the Government will acknowledge that difficulties may arise.
In the case of new Clause 5, for example, it is possible that a school or college might be opened in London for the benefit of the relatively small commercial Japanese community in London. In such circumstances, it would be reasonable and in no way objectionable if entry to it were limited partially or even completely to the children of that community. After all, there have been many instances in the past of schools in foreign countries for the benefit of the resident British minority communities there. One has only to think of British communities in countries like the Argentine in the past.
A glance through the London classified telephone directory or the classified directory of any other large city in the United Kingdom will reveal details of various forms of lycée, certain kinds of convent schools, Jewish kindergartens or day schools and schools for other specified groups. One can realise some of the problems which may arise if this Clause or something like it is not inserted in the Bill.
Let me turn briefly to the matters referred to in New Clause 6. Under the Bill as it stands, I apprehend that it would be an offence for a Malta-born resident in London to organise special credit facilities for the benefit of members of the fairly large Anglo-Maltese community in this country. What might otherwise be regarded as a beneficent and enlightened action in some circumstances could infringe the provisions of the Bill. In the same way, it appears that it might be an offence for an Indian-born resident in the United Kingdom to make mortgage advances or credit facilities available only to Indians.
In the case of the new Clauses which deal with hotels, perhaps I might cite the example of the many small Welsh hotels which one finds in the Bloomsbury and Paddington areas of London. Seldom, if ever, are they restricted to Welsh visitors, but, quite naturally, some of their proprietors have confessed their anxieties to me about the possible conse-

quences of the Bill. In most cases, the vast majority of their visitors come from the Principality, and, at busy times of the year, it is quite natural for the proprietors to tend to make special efforts to accommodate them. Confronted with two or three would-be guests, they tend to give some kind of priority to a late arrival from Wales. This is not to be construed as racialism, but they fear that in these marginal cases of difficulty they may be exposed in some way to the provisions of the Bill.
It is obvious that the position could be even more serious in the cases of the many Jewish hotels in Bournemouth, for example, where they provide in addition kosher food for orthodox Jews. In most cases, their proprietors would be the last persons in the world to exclude someone who was non-Jewish, but I know that some of them feel a little anxious about the Bill in its present form. The Bill should not be left unamended so that it could conceivably be employed to oblige the proprietor of an establishment advertised as kosher to accept visitors who might require different kinds of food.
These are some of the problems on which I think it is right to comment. Here we have a rather difficult and perhaps marginal aspect of the Bill, but I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will feel that these are valid observations and that there are real cases for examination in which it may be wise either to seek to adopt the suggested wording in the new Clauses or something similar in order to prevent these cases being brought entirely within the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Evelyn King: I rise briefly to support the new Clauses and, if possible, to extend the philosophy behind them. At first sight, these may seem to be minor matters, but I believe that they affect the whole philosophy behind the Bill, because we strike here a contrast between those who wish to assimilate and those who wish to integrate, and the new Clauses bring out the dilemma.
It is not a bad idea to project oneself a decade or two ahead and try to visualise the sort of society which will bring happiness in the situation that we face. There are those who visualise some kind


of neutered, grey Englishman in a certain number of generations, in whom all races will be completely assimilated—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are on Report. We cannot discuss the philosophy behind the Bill. We can only discuss the new Clauses at the moment.

Mr. King: Then I will move to them. I had intended to argue from that that any community, as a community, has rights and that the new Clauses seek to confer upon a community the rights which it ought to have. I think that that is within the ambit of the new Clauses.
A Pakistani arriving in this country for the first time naturally will seek to go to a Pakistani lodging house. It would be extraordinary to promote a Bill which, if I read it correctly, would make it illegal for a Pakistani lodging house to restrict its clientele to Pakistanis. Indeed, it would not be sensible to do that, because it in no way contributes to the solution of the problem that we all wish to solve.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) has dealt with the Welsh, Jewish and various other communities, but the spirit which I have tried to describe seems to run right through the Bill, and it will be a bad Bill if we do not recognise the rights not only of an individual but of a community. I believe that communities will thrive as communities, and that is relevant to these Clauses. If the Clauses or something similar are not incorporated in the Bill, we shall deprive the different communities in this country of the rights that they should have.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Ennals): I do not know whether it is any consolation to the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) but, initially, the Government had some sympathy with the matters which concern him. When the Bill was submitted orginially to the House and to the Standing Committee, Clause 2(3) said that nothing in the Clause would
…render unlawful anything which is done in good faith for the benefit of a particular section of the public which has the effect of promoting the integration of members of that section of the public into the community.
In Standing Committee, I argued that there would be some advantage in having

this sort of protection for the efforts which might naturally be made in the interests of minority groups.
6.0 p.m.
The matter was fully debated in Committee, but the views which I then argued were not shared by hon. Members. The arguments adduced against putting in such a protection were three-fold. The first was the feeling that such a protection was not necessary. There was a recognition of activities specifically designed to assist minority groups, such as Pakistanis, Italians and Japanese. We thought that it was extremely unlikely that such an activity would be open to criticism or be brought before the Race Relations Board. It was aruged in Committee that there was nothing wrong in discriminating in favour of a minority group, since we are concerned with discriminating against.
It was argued, secondly, that such a provision might open the door to various forms of abuse. Some hon. Members feared that it might lead to the sort of "separate but equal" argument which we debated earlier.
The third argument—and this is the essence of the matter, particularly in relation to new Clauses 5 and 6—was that it was best to rely on the good sense of the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees. This, I believe, is the soundest argument of all. It is unlikely that the Board or the conciliation committees would consider the sort of activities referred to by the hon. Member for Barry as being in any way in breach of the spirit or letter of the Bill. The Board is a responsible body and the conciliation committees are equally responsible.
The other new Clauses, Nos. 7 to 12, deal with hotels and slightly different principles apply. As I understand it, the hon. Member for Barry is not seeking to allow proprietors of hotels to operate their premises exclusively for their co-nationals or co-religionists but only primarily for that purpose. It is fair to say that hotels which are known to cater for certain types of residents will probably attract that type of resident.

Mr.Gower: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it would be extremely expensive for, for example, a Jewish hotel which caters for orthodox people, who require a


special diet, to provide an alternative diet for other visitors?

Mr. Ennals: It is unlikely that someone who does not wish to partake of the diet offered would seek to go to that hotel. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman need worry because hotels already come within the scope of the 1965 Act. He said that certain hoteliers were worried about the Bill. The evidence in the three years since the 1965 Act was passed is that no such cases have arisen. The matter has not been brought before the Board and since the provisions in the Bill for hotels are almost identical to the 1965 Act, the hon. Gentleman's fears seem unfounded.
In any event, one could add to the list he gave. One can think of Italian, English, Welsh, Scottish and other hotels. It is at this point that the question of evasion arises. I hope that, with these assurances, the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to press the new Clause.

Mr. A. P. Costain: Hotels in areas like Folkestone do a lot of catering for conferences. Does the hon. Gentleman see any possibility of an hotelier who wishes to fill up his hotel with a community, so to speak, forming a conference would be guilty of an offence under the Bill?

Mr. Ennals: No. Not at all. An hotel which sets aside its accommodation for a conference would refuse to take others because it would not have other accommodation. However, if it were to say, "This conference includes some Pakistanis or West Indians and therefore we are not prepared to accommodate that conference ", then that would be a form of discrimination and would be covered by the Bill.

Sir D. Renton: I have much sympathy for my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) in this matter. I acknowledge, however, that it would be difficult to fit into the framework of the Bill the new Clauses which he has tabled.
Difficulties arise when we legislate in this way. Hard cases make bad law and my hon. Friend referred to potentially hard cases. The crux of the matter is that my hon. Friend is trying to make it possible for people to discriminate in

favour of certain ethnic groups without falling foul of what will become the law by avoiding any sort of discrimination against. The principle of the new Clause is worthy of further consideration.
The Under-Secretary took refuge in the original Clause 2(3) and said, in effect, that that would have met the difficulties to which my hon. Friend referred, but I do not think that it would have done. There were many reasons why hon. Members on both sides of the Committee threw out that subsection. It would not have met the point made by my hon. Friend because it was cast in somewhat restrictive terms. Besides being in favour of a particular ethnic group, it insisted that what was done was done to integrate that group with members of the public at large. It cannot be said that a Welsh or Italian hotel proprietor catering mainly for people of Welsh or Italian origin is helping to integrate them with members of the public. For this reason that original subsection would not have done the trick.
The Government should consider this matter further so as to make it abundantly clear in the Bill that when there is a genuine attempt to discriminate in favour of an ethnic group in a way which is not contrary—I speak in broad terms—to public policy, then that should be within the law.
The Under-Secretary considers that this matter is best left to the good sense of the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees. I do not deny that they will have good sense, but it is better that we should spell out in the Bill just what we are getting at, instead of leaving it to the Board and the conciliation committees virtually to exercise a dispensing power, because that is what we are in danger of doing. That is why my hon. Friend the Member for Barry is to be congratulated for raising this matter, and I hope that we have not heard the last word on it.

Mr. Ben Whitaker: I wish to raise an additional item which supports the comments of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. The analagous provision which was removed in Committee stipulated that such an activity should be to the benefit of the minority community concerned. No such words appear in any of the new Clauses


tabled by the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower). Although I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman's intention, the wording he has suggested would leave it open to maliciously minded persons to provide separate and worse facilities in, for example, banking and insurance for the very minority groups whom he wishes to assist. Although his intention is otherwise, his proposals would leave the Bill open for a coach and horses to be driven through it.

Mr. W. F. Deedes: I, too, have considerable sympathy with what my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) is trying to do, particularly when I remember that the only conclusion we reached in an argument in Committee on Clause 2(3) was that these matters should be left to the discretion of the Race Relations Board. The Undersecretary has re-echoed that view.
It follows, notwithstanding what has been said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton), that over a period we shall build up a loose system of what might be termed case law arising from decisions reached by the Board. It follows, again, that it will be very important for the Board to report adequately what decisions it has reached in certain cases, and its reasons for reaching them. I only wish to put on record my belief that in getting the right answers to the point which troubles my hon. Friend we shall eventually depend heavily on a sort of case law built up by the Board.

Mr. Percy Grieve: These new Clauses have drawn attention to one of the anomalies in the legislation, which is that we are putting race relations into a straitjacket. The Clauses are not, in principle, unlike the matter with which we dealt in Committee when we discussed an Amendment of mine to exclude from the scope of Clause 6 advertisements by restaurants or places of entertainments dependent for their appeal on a national or regional atmosphere, for staff of that region or nation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) has now drawn attention to another anomaly. Clause 6 deals with every kind of advertisement where race enters into its spirit. Such advertisements may be bad, and we therefore support

Clause 6 when it deals with them—the vile street corner advertisement, "No coloureds need apply". That is what Clause 6 envisages. But I ask the Government to consider between now and when this Bill goes to another place, the restrictive aspects of the legislation, and to see whether some means can be devised to give effect to the improvements proposed by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Whitaker: It might assist the hon. and learned Gentleman were he to look at Government Amendment No. 64, which attempts to meet his point.

Mr. Grieve: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I have seen and studied the Amendment to which he refers, and I am grateful to the Government for their concession. In that case, they have excluded from the scope of the Bill—and it is in accordance with their assurance in Committee, on which our Amendments there were withdrawn—employment by such institutions as I have in mind of a national or a particlar type if it is designed to give effect to a national or regional atmosphere. Amendment No. 64 clearly meets that point, but not the advertisement difficulty or the practical difficulty referred to by my hon. Friend.

6.15 p.m.

Sir Douglas Glover: I have a good deal of sympathy for the new Clauses standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Mr. Gower). I was not very convinced by the interjection of the hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. Whitaker), who said that such a provision might be used for affording inferior facilities, inferior hire-purchase companies or inferior loan associations. I understand that a number of the new communities in the country already have their own hire-purchase and loan associations.
There is nothing compulsory about the proposal. It does not say that a Pakistani will only get his hire-purchase or his building society loan from a certain organisation. It merely says that it would be in order for a minority to have a special organisation for the provision of education, loans or other facilities. Incidentally, I am surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Sir C. Black) is not present. Had this Bill already been on the Statute Book, what would have happened to the Temperance


Building Society when it started? I assume that, in that case, the Society would have been held to be discriminating against part of the population.
My view is that the Clauses would be accepted were it not for the problem presented by the English. The Government would be perfectly prepared to allow the Welsh to advertise their hotels as having a special welcome for the Welsh, and for Scottish hotels to advertise their hotels as having a special welcome for the Scots, but they could not include the English, because to do so would be to produce a wall of discrimination against anyone else. That is the difficulty which my hon. Friend faces. One can bring in Amendments to deal with all the minority groups, but not to cover the major groups.
The Government are right, in my view, not to accept the Clauses, but, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) has said, my hon. Friend has drawn attention to a sufficiently important problem. I therefore hope that, before the Bill is enacted, the Government will look again at this matter, because my hon. Friend has shown quite clearly that, in a desire to have no discrimination, we can produce, in a strange sort of way, more discrimination than we are stopping.

Mr. Gower: As I am given to understand that something will be done in this respect, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1

MEANING OF "DISCRIMINATE"

Amendment made: No. 1, in page 1, line 8, leave out Clause 1.—[Mr. Ennals.]

Clause 2

PROVISION OF GOODS, FACILITIES AND SERVICES

Sir D. Renton: I beg to move Amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 14, leave out 'any goods' and insert 'the'.

Mr. Speaker: With this Amendment, I have suggested that we take the following Amendments.

Amendment No. 4, in page 1, line 14 after 'services', insert 'referred to in the following subsection'.

Amendment No. 11, in page 2, line 5 leave out 'instruction or training'.

Amendment No. 12, in line 8, leave out 'business, profession or trade or'.

Sir D. Renton: Amendment No. 3 is a paving Amendment to the three that you have mentioned, Mr. Speaker. I should mention that Amendment No. 7, in page 1, leave out lines 21 and 22 and insert:
'Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, it shall be unlawful to practice discrimination as there described in the provision of the following facilities and services:'
which is an important drafting Amendment which has been selected for discussion on its own, is also essential to these Amendments, and I should be glad if that fact could borne in mind.
The purpose of the Amendments taken together is to limit the scope of the Bill to what may, by any stretch of the imagination, be called desirable to ensure racial harmony, and to prevent the Bill from remaining so wide in its application that it would frustrate its own purpose or, to use the current jargon, be counter-productive.
The British people are about the most tolerant in the world. In spite of well-known stresses in some areas and in spite of aggressive attitudes, alas, on the part of extremist minorities, there is a high degree of racial harmony in this country, for which we can be thankful. Legislation is not the only way to achieve racial harmony. Other ways can be more effective—by good will, good example, "good cricket", and even indifferent cricket—than any kind of statutory investigation. Although legislation can help in certain ways, it can do more harm than good if it is cast too wide as this Clause is cast.
The Clause governs the whole Bill. When legislating we should confine ourselves to what may be helpful. We should avoid casting our net so wide that the legislation is unacceptable to the community at large and so wide that it is virtually unenforceable. This general declaratory Clause, Clause 2, has already been eloquently criticised by my right


hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) both on Second Reading and in Committee. The Clause applies to the provision
of any goods, facilities or services".
As an example it refers to
the services of any business, profession or trade".
To legislate in such wide terms is to assume, and to assume quite wrongly, that there is likely to be widespread discrimination. In fact, that is not likely to be the case. Besides being unnecessary and possibly dangerous to do so, it is uncomplimentary to all the people of this country, immigrants as well as the indigenous people. Inevitably, although paradoxically, it may limit the freedom which many of them hoped to enjoy when they came here.
I put forward these Amendments to overcome, I hope to a reasonable and modest extent, that great defect of principle. Especially is this done by Amendment No. 12 which would eliminate the words "business, profession or trade". It is far too sweeping to include every business, profession or trade. It is not necessary and it is certainly unenforceable. By leaving out the words "instruction or training" the word "education" would be left in. It is arguable that even that is not necessary because public authorities are not allowed to discriminate in education and there is no evidence that there is discrimination in education.
The words "instruction or training" cover all kinds of small operators, including those who give driving lessons, dancing lessons and judo lessons, and advertise them to the public. Very often instruction or training involve rather close personal relationships. The need for preventing discrimination in this part of the field has never been put forward, so far as I know, in any of the inquiries concerned. The Street Report is silent on this. I suggest that we are best without it.
I accept the need for some extension of the present scope of legislation. The House will note that even if my Amendments were accepted the Bill would still be cast in very wide terms. I need not read the whole of subsection (2), but,

leaving out the words "instruction or training" and the words "business, profession or trade" would still leave in a vast range of activities. By any stretch of the imagination it is hard to see that the legislation should go any further than it would if the Amendments were accepted.
These Amendments, taken together, would mean that subsection (1) would be limited by the terms of subsection (2). Surely that is right. By having a general declaratory provision in subsection (1) and then giving examples of it in subsection (2), we are creating a legislative monstrosity and giving the Race Relations Board and the courts an extremely difficult task of interpretation. In my opinion, this is the most important matter we shall discuss today. Both the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary have shown laudable open-mindedness about many of the lesser defects of the Bill to which we drew attention in Committee.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will either say that he accepts these Amendments or that he will consider them with a view to amending the Bill in another place. Alas, in these days we often hear of the gulf between Parliament and people. On these Amendments the Government have a chance of preventing that gulf getting wider. Incidentally—I hope this will appeal to the hon. Gentleman—he also has a chance of bringing the two sides of the House closer together.

Mr. Heffer: I urge my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary not to accept these Amendments. I am sure he will not do so because, if they were accepted, in essence the Bill would be emasculated. The right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdon (Sir D. Renton) is going much too far. He will agree that I showed laudable open-mindedness in Committee in the same way as did my hon. Friend on the Front Bench, but I cannot relate that open-mindedness to these Amendments.
An example was given of the services of someone training a person to drive. Why should an immigrant not have the right to call upon all those who do the service of teaching people to drive? Why should an immigrant not have the services of any business, profession or trade?


It seems perfectly logical that any immigrant should have these services available to him as much as to any other citizen.
I believe that every open-minded hon. Member agrees that inevitably there are problems. No one is trying to force on to the general public something which they do not want, but if these Amendments were accepted we would be working in reverse. Some citizens who came from other countries would be excluded from the services of professions and trades which other citizens are able to get, by the mere fact that they were born in this country. I agree that this Clause is one of the most important in the Bill. Because of its importance I ask my hon. Friend not to accept any of these Amendments, but to resist them to the utmost.

6.30 p.m.

Dr. M. S. Miller: I counsel my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State to resist the Amendments. We have had a clear indication from the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) that there is a big gulf in respect of not only what he was referring to but the Bill's aim, which is the complete elimination of discrimination. If we take out of the Bill certain aspects and points which are of vital importance to it, it becomes emasculated and no longer serves its purpose.
Often the members of the public look not for conscious bridging of gulfs, as was suggested by the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire, but a bold approach and a clear indication of willingness by a governing body to take certain steps to make them clear. If we were to remove from the Clause the words which the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggested should be removed, it would have the effect of making it obvious not only to the immigrant community but to the host community, the indigenous population, that we were not serious about what we are attempting to do.
For example, to remove the words "instruction or training" would be very dangerous. The removal of the words "business, profession or trade" would take out of the Bill many of the essential points in the minds of hon. Members on this side of the House when the Bill's

concept was agreed to on Second Reading and in Committee. Many hon. Members on this side would strenuously oppose any attempt to take these words out of the Bill.

Mr. Grieve: I give my wholehearted support to the Amendment because the Clause, as it stands, will present the courts with an extraordinarily difficult problem of interpretation. It would have been very much better if subsection (2) had not appeared in it at all. What will happen when a judicial interpretation has to be put on the Clause? There is a well known principle of the interpretation of statutes to be found in any text book which is in the form of a Latin tag—expresso unius est exclusio alterius. The mere fact of citing a number of examples of what comes within the purpose of the Clause is likely to make judicial interpretation of it difficult. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) seeks to do away with that difficulty.
There are hon. Members on both sides of the House who see merit in this legislation and, whether they see merit in it or not, who desire that once it is on the Statute book it should be feasible legislation which is not just a derision but is enforceable, because it is appalling to put on the Statute Book legislation which cannot be properly interpreted and which, to a large extent, cannot be enforced. The Amendment is a distinct improvement on the Bill.
I turn to the second limb of the Amendments which involves omitting the words "instruction or training" and "business, profession or trade". Again, I give my right hon. and learned Friend my support, although I think that this is a much less important aspect of the Amendments than the first. When it comes to "instruction and training" and the carrying on of a "business, profession or trade", the ordinary commercial considerations which guide ordinary commercial enterprises will prevail. It is most unlikely that people, however racialist they may be, who run, for instance, driving instruction concerns or carry on various businesses, professions or trades in this country, which is supposed to be a nation of shopkeepers, will allow any prejudice which they may have


to override their ordinary commercial and business interests. For that reason, I support the second limb of the Amendments.

Mr. Heffer: If the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) was not certain about the question of limitation, he should have tabled an Amendment to eliminate subsection (2).

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot discuss Amendments which an hon. Member thinks should have been moved.

Mr. Heffer: The hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) was supporting his colleague's argument. If the Opposition are concerned about the question of limitation, they should have proposed the elimination of subsection (2). With the elimination of these words, there would be a further limitation.

Mr. Grieve: I may be out of order if I reply to the hon. Gentleman, but, in my view, the Clause would have been better without subsection (2).

Sir Spencer Summers: I was not present during the earlier stages of the Bill, but I have made it my business to read the report of the whole of the Committee proceedings. I regret that I am unable to support the Amendments.
I can go along with the proposition that if the Bill were drawn too wide or was too severe it would not attract the cooperation of the public which we would all wish to attract. In so far as the Amendment seeks to limit the Bill's scope, I think that it is misconceived. I can understand the case for the small operator being eliminated, but we are not concerned with him. We are concerned with services listed among the examples which it is suggested shall be subject to the provisions of the Bill. I cannot help thinking that the prejudice of some professional and business people will override their commercial considerations.
I am no lawyer, but I can understand the view that the way in which this matter is dealt with, with a preamble and a list of examples, is complete nonsense. Perhaps one does not have to be a lawyer to realise that it is presented in a stupid form. I do not in the least wish to defend the form in which the proposition is put

forward in the Bill or to criticise the attempts made to put it in a more intelligent, more palatable form. All that I wish to do is to record my concern at what appears to be the other additional outcome of the Amendment, namely, to limit the Bill's scope. I cannot see my way to supporting the Amendment.

Mr. Ennals: In moving the Amendment, the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) said that, if I were to accept it, it would contribute to bringing the House closer together. I am grateful for the speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers), which proved that that was not entirely so.
In Committee, my right hon. Friend and I sought to be open-minded, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman was kind enough to say, in trying to improve the Bill as we went along. I think that that is what we did. On this occasion, I have little doubt that acceptance of the Amendment would do serious damage to the Bill. It would substantially limit its scope and seriously impair its effectiveness.
I agree that this is one of the most important parts of the Bill, and the present debate is one of our important debates. One of the defects of the 1965 Act, apart from omitting provisions against discrimination in employment and housing, was that its definition of public place was too narrow. On the Second Reading of the Bill in 1965, I said precisely that and urged that it be extended to include credit facilities, banking, insurance and so on. I am glad that the present Bill does that.
It would be wrong, having now recognised some of the weaknesses in the corresponding Section of the 1965 Act, were we intentionally to limit the Bill once again.

Sir D. Renton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I think that the hon. Gentleman has failed to realise that the Amendment dealing with banking facilities has not been selected.

Mr. Ennals: But the point I make is sound none the less. The 1965 Act was much too limited in terms of services and facilities. The intention is that this Bill should be broader. It has deliberately been drawn widely.
In reply to the criticism about listing examples;, I assure the House that these examples are not exclusive. I am sure that no court would have any difficulty in recognising that. Neither is this form in any way exceptional. There are other pieces of legislation in which examples are given.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are not debating the Clause. The hon. Gentleman must come to the Amendments.

Mr. Ennals: The Amendments would limit the field in which discrimination would be a civil offence, but, more than that, they would limit the field in which the good offices of the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees could help to bring about conciliation and help to remove situations of discrimination. For example, the reference to shops would be omitted. The shop is a most important form of service, and in it all sections of the community are entitled to receive equal and fair treatment. I see no reason why we should exclude shops.
Next, instruction and training. Equal opportunities for apprenticeship and industrial training are essential if we are to avoid creating a section of second-class citizens with few skills to offer to industry. We must consider here, not just for this year but for the years to come, the situation which the words in the Clause would cover. In our schools today, there are about 185,000 boys and girls, either immigrants or the sons and daughters of immigrants—coloured "kids"—who will be coming on to the labour market and going forward as young Britons entitled to all the services available to any other section of society, regardless of colour. A vital aspect of this situation is that they should have equal opportunities in industrial training and apprenticeship so that they will not be second-class citizens as they seek to work their way up the industrial ladder.

Mr. Orme: I agree very much with what my hon. Friend has said about industrial training. One of the problems in the United States is that the exclusion of the negro community from many of the artisan and skilled jobs has been one of the results of the divisions existing there which the Americans are now

trying to overcome within their own society.

Mr. Ennals: I agree with everything my hon. Friend says and, equally, with what was said by the hon. Member for Aylesbury about business, professional and trading facilities. The point is not that people should have opportunities at the lower levels of industry. They should have opportunities in all sectors of industrial and commercial activity. This applies no less to insurance and credit facilities, in regard to which there is a good deal of evidence of discrimination which, I am sure, all right hon. and hon. Members would wish to remove.
Professor Street, Mr. Geoffrey Bindman and Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., a former Member of the House, said in their Report that they were in favour of extending the field of facilities, recommending that the Bill should cover
all places…offering accommodation, goods, services or facilities to the public.
Nothing in the part of the Clause to which the Amendments are directed would in any way undermine the right of anyone involved to make a normal commercial judgment, Whether in insurance, credit, housing, lodging houses or any of the matters covered by the Bill. In motor insurance, for example, it would be appropriate to require a recent immigrant, whatever his race or colour, to pay a higher premium when his inexperience might be a factor affecting the risk. Equally, linguistic shortcomings might be factors to be taken into consideration. What the Clause provides is that colour and race should not themselves be determining factors in all the fields which are open to other sections of the general public.
The Bill is about equality, neither more nor less. Once we start defining narrow areas to be covered by it, we might give the impression that it was perfectly all right to discriminate in those fields which the House had removed from the Bill, and, equally, we should remove the opportunity for the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees to bring about conciliation in situations where discrimination now exists.
I assure my hon. Friends that I shall resist the Amendments.

6.45 p.m.

Mr. Hogg: I hope that the Undersecretary of State has not spoken his last word on this matter. We all want to approach it in an objective way. I am quite sure that, when the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) says that that is what he did in Committee, he says no more than the truth. Disconcertingly, I often found myself able not only to agree with what the hon. Gentleman said but to support him with my vote in Divisions—disconcertingly, because I had never thought, until we had our experience in Committee together, that I should find myself so often in agreement with him on both the tone and the content of what he said. But one can be pleased as well as disconcerted, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not take it amiss that I confess to a certain surprise.
I do not, however, agree with the hon. Member for Walton on this matter, and neither do I altogether agree with the Under-Secretary of State. Although it is unnecessary to do so, I remind the House that I am caught by this Clause, as are all members of my profession. I do not mind that. I do not mind it for a particular reason. If the Amendments were adopted, they would eliminate my being caught by the Clause because they would omit the professions from the list under discussion. I am strictly in order, therefore, in referring to this matter.
It is important that we have the point clear. The professions in this country do not discriminate. A member of my profession who discriminates on the ground of race, or of religion or ethnic origin, for that matter, commits a breach of professional etiquette. I should be sorry if anything done in this Bill cast doubt upon that honourable duty not to discriminate which we all undertake. We do not discriminate. Furthermore, it should be said—

Dr. Miller: Dr. Miller rose—

Mr. Hogg: I shall give way in a moment or two, but I wish to finish this point. Let us suppose that an hon. Member introduced a Bill against corruption and in it he put a Clause forbidding judges to take bribes. I can understand some judges being offended by such a Clause, not because they want to take bribes but because they object to the suggestion that they need a Clause telling them not to. I do not need a Clause

to tell me that I must not discriminate, nor does a doctor, nor does a priest.

Dr. Miller: Dr. Miller rose—

Mr. Hogg: I shall give way, but the hon. Gentleman must contain himself for a moment. We shall discriminate neither more nor less, and we shall not discriminate at all, whether or not the Clause is passed. But some of us slightly object to the suggestion that we need legislation to tell us that we must not do so.
In the past six weeks I have received about 50 offensive letters complaining that I appeared for 11 Pakistanis. Where the correspondents were good enough to give their name and address, which was by no means always, I replied proudly that I belong to a profession like that of the doctor and priest which does not discriminate on grounds of religion, race or colour. Why do we need a Clause for that when I am bound by the honour of my profession?

Dr. Miller: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. I always listen to him very attentively, and I am not in the slightest disconcerted by often agreeing with him, but I dispute his contention that all professions do not discriminate. I cannot answer for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's profession, but I can say something about my own. It is obvious to me that there exist and always have existed all kinds of discriminatory practices in the medical profession.

Mr. Hogg: I cannot speak for the medical profession, but the hon. Gentleman absolutely appals me. I decline to believe without strong evidence that a doctor faced with a sick patient would say that he would not treat him because he is a Roman Catholic, a Jew or a Pakistani. It seems to me utterly repugnant that he should do so. I decline to believe that it is necessary to insert Clauses in Bills to make a doctor, lawyer, priest or member of any other profession—an architect or an accountant, for example—do what I believe every honourable man and every honourable member of one of the learned professions would do without compulsion.

Dr. Miller: That is not the kind of discrimination I meant. It is not the


only kind of discrimination that exists. There are many other forms of discrimination in the provision of services. It might well be that a doctor who has in his power the ability to provide a particular service to a coloured person could discriminate against him.

Mr. Hogg: The kind of discrimination we are talking about in discussing the Amendment, which is the only discrimination with which I can be concerned at present, or I should get into trouble, is precisely the discrimination I was talking about and not the kind of discrimination the hon. Gentleman wished to talk about. I am appalled, and I do not believe that the great professions of this country discriminate or require legislation to prevent it.
I have always complained, and I complain now, that the Clause, unamended by my right hon. and learned Friend's Amendments, makes no distinction between cases where discrimination carries its own financial penalty and those where, as I have always conceded, though not to the entire satisfaction of my hon. Friends, discrimination can have its own internal dynamic. I have always conceded that in the latter example there is a case for legislation, but in the former case I consider legislation unnecessary.
I agreed with the Under-Secretary of State when he said that he wanted shops covered by the Clause. We have had several examples in our discussions already of how difficult it is to be absolutely sure with these referential Amendments exactly where we should get if an Amendment were carried. I understand that a shop is a place to which the public have access. It has always been so held, as far as I know. Therefore, it would be caught by the Clause, whether or not the Amendment were carried. I agree that on that ground a shop qua shop should be inside the Clause.
I have always thought, as I said in Committee, that one cannot deal with industrial apprenticeships and instructional training on a discriminatory basis, and if we are to deal with employment at all—and I have conceded that that is right—we must include some form of instructional training. If and in so far as my right hon. and learned Friend's Amendment would cut out industrial apprentice-

ship or training, I would agree that it went a great deal too far.
But that leaves me with a residue of cases where ordinary competition in an industrial society between small businesses will impose a penalty on discrimination and tend to eliminate it. I regard legislation here as unnecessary, and the Under-Secretary of State regards it as an important part of the Bill. That is a point of difference between us. I do not think that we need to try to impute motives at one another or to start getting excited about it. We are all entitled to take an objective view, and I have tried to do so.
I was much reassured, although I am not sure that I accept the legal advice the hon. Gentleman has received, to hear from him that his legal advice is that the normal commercial judgment of an insurer would not be impaired even if the Amendment were rejected. However, as he knows from the long discussions we had in Committee, that was not the view I should have formed unaided by Government legal advice.
I absolutely accept that the shop must be in the Bill, and I absolutely accept from the hon. Gentleman that industrial apprenticeship and industrial training cannot be excluded, so long as we deal with employment, which I am happy to do.
But on the two narrow points that I have mentioned—that our great professions do not require legislation, and that there are a large number of businesses where discrimination carries its own economic penalty and legislation is unnecessary—we should have a division of opinion in the House.

Mr. Ennals: I was glad to hear what the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) said about apprenticeship and industrial training. On the question of shops, I think that my reading of Amendment No. 3, which would have removed "goods", might certainly have left in question whether shops were included.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman was perhaps a little over-sensitive on his main point. I am not here to argue whether certain professions practise discrimination. The right hon. and learned Gentleman says that the legal profession does not, and I have no reason to believe otherwise. My hon. Friend the


Member for Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller) said that there are certain examples in the medical profession. I do not know whether that is true. It would be an impossible situation if the Government produced a list of the groups which discriminated and those which did not, and said that we need not include those which did not practise discrimination and that we must include those which did. We are saying that all the facilities should be open to people regardless of race and colour.
If it is true that certain professions do not discriminate, even though they are covered by the Bill, they will not be bitten by the Bill. To argue that because they are pure they should be excluded is an argument we cannot accept. It is best that the definition should be drawn as widely as it can be. That is what the Government have sought to do, and therefore the Clause will catch any who discriminate, which is as it should be.

Sir D. Renton: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment. We have had a very valuable discussion, and we respect the views we have heard from both sides of the House. If it be the fact that industrial apprenticeship and training needs to be specially covered, I suggest that the Government should have it specially covered and not let the broad phrase "training and instruction" apply to all kinds of small operators, where it may not be appropriate.
On the question of shops, the Government themselves left out the word "goods" in subsection (2). Therefore, I think that the point that the Under-Sec-retary made against me was not quite right. But if shops need to be covered, let them be covered, instead of the incredibly wide words that we have:
any business, profession or trade".
I am prepared to leave it to the hon. Gentleman to consider these points. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, but I still tell him that if he wishes the Bill to be acceptable and enforceable it would be well worth considering the wide scope of Clause 2.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. Speaker: We come to Amendment 5, with which I suggest we take the following Amendments:
Amendment No. 14, in Clause 3, page 2, line 14, leave out from beginning to 'him' and insert—
'or deliberately omitting to employ'.
Amendment No. 15, in line 18, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.
Amendment No. 17, in Clause 4, page 2, line 39, leave out 'neglecting' and insert' deliberately omitting'.
Amendment No. 18, in page 3, line 2, leave out' neglecting' and insert' deliberately omitting'.
Amendment No. 20, in Clause 5, page 3, line 16, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.
Amendment No. 22, in line 20, after 'by', insert 'deliberately'.

Mr. Ennals: I beg to move, Amendment No. 5, in page 1, line 16, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.
The Amendments listed here deal with a question which was considerably debated in Standing Committee—the use of the word "neglecting" in relation to the providing of goods, services or facilities, including other facilities listed in Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5.
In discussion in Committee, the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) questioned whether the word "neglecting" was the right one. I gave an assurance and undertook to consider whether we could find another word which would make clear that "neglecting" would not include mere omission or forgetfulness. The Amendment gives effect to this undertaking.
It also meets the point of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the word "neglecting" cannot refer to any deliberate act because a deliberate act is not an act of neglect. I hope he will feel that the words "deliberately omitting" cover both points. Incidentally, the words will also cover the undertaking given by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government that the question of "tactical discrimination" in the field of housing was covered.
We hope that "deliberately omitting" will cover all the points which raised some concern in Committee.

Mr. Hogg: I think that this is an improvement, and I thank the Under-Sec-retary for taking notice of what was said to him in Committee.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Hogg: I beg to move Amendment No. 6, in page 1, line 19, leave out 'normally' and insert 'in like circumstances'.
We had an undertaking from the Government to consider this matter. An hon. Friend of mine referred to it in an earlier discussion. I do not know what is meant by "normally". As the hon. Member for Cheadle (Dr. Winstanley) said, I should rather object to being called in some ways an abnormal person, but I understand what I mean by "like circumstances". Although what is "like circumstances" may be difficult to apply in practice, the meaning of the phrase is at least clear.
In Committee the Under-Secretary said that he would look at this again. I know him well enough to know that he has looked at it again, but he has turned me down flat, and I want to know the reason why he has turned me down flat.

Mr. Ennals: We seriously looked at the point made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but we had to reject it for the same reasons as I gave him in Standing Committee.
Although the wording "in like circumstances" might be thought to be more appropriate for insurance and credit transactions, the use of that qualification could, as I sought to explain in Committee, provide a loophole in that it would allow insurance companies to treat certain sections of the public differently from other sections. It might be that they would treat Pakistanis in the same way as they would treat other Pakistanis, or West Indians in the same way as they would treat other West Indians.
The term "normal" could be spelt out. We could write a longer Clause which would define what "normally" means. Whether it would be helpful, I should have thought that the intention was clear—that in normal circumstances like treatment would be offered and like facilities would be given. I am afraid that when we looked at the points made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman we felt that the term "in like circumstances" would not suit and that the term

"normally" would be effectively understood.

Mr. Hogg: I cannot pretend that I am wholly satisfied with that explanation, but if I were to divide the House on it, I think I should incur the just displeasure of one and all. So, though wholly dissatisfied, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Hogg: I beg to move Amendment No. 7, in page 1, leave out lines 21 and 22 and insert:
'Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, it shall be unlawful to practice discrimination as there described in the provision of the following facilities and services:'.
This Amendment is rather like the last one, except that I have rather more conviction behind it. I had some undertaking—I cannot recall the terms—from the Under-Secreary or one of his colleagues in Committee.
I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) when he rather jumped the gun in an earlier discussion and said that the words of subsection (2) are a nonsense. I think he said "a monstrosity". Although the expression "a monstrosity" is strong language, I think that "a nonsense" is not too strong a phrase to use of the form in which the draftsmen have chosen to cast this subsection.
There are two ways in which one can cast one's net wide as a matter of legal draftsmanship. At least, I have always supposed that there were only two ways. One can use words with the widest possible application. For instance, when we give independence to a country, we give is legislature power for the "peace, order and good government" of the country, and that is held to cover anything that the legislature can possibly do. Sometimes when the wide words need amplification or need at the periphery the removal of doubt, one uses the wide words in one's legislation and then adds the expression "services"—or whatever it may be—"shall include", and then one states the places to which the public have access in order to leave no manner of doubt about it.
One way of doing that is to add after or in the course of one's wide words specific things specifically enumerated, a series of individual cases, and then to


add the words "or any other" and so on, in order to complete the large class that one wishes to denominate. That seems to me to be the traditional draftsmanship to which those whose duty it is to write and understand Acts of Parliament are accustomed. But for some reason which I have never understood and which has never been explained properly to us either in Committee or now, the Government have chosen to eschew the traditional methods of draftsmanship and to introduce a totally new method of their own. They use wide words, and then they say, "The following are examples of the wide words". If the examples are not intended to be exclusive or limitative in any way—and this at any rate I understand is not the intention of the Government—but the words are themselves wide enough to embrace the examples, I cannot think what useful purpose they serve.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: In my right hon. and learned Friend's great experience, has he seen this form of words before?

Mr. Hogg: I never have. I have corresponded with the Home Secretary about this and he has told me that there are precedents but has not said what they are. I have never seen precedents for these words. If, on the other hand, these words are not intended to be limitative but to remove any possible doubt, I cannot think why the Home Secretary does not use something like the form of words in the Amendment, which clearly, at any rate, has the merit of following traditional custom which, even in these permissive and radical days, has some advantage if one wants other people to understand what one means by human language. After all, we cannot all be Humpty Dumpties in a matter of language. We cannot just make words mean what we want them to mean and expect judges to understand what we want them to do.
I do not think that it is particularly part of my task on this Bill to supplement the labours of the Parliamentary draftsmen or even to assist the Government to improve their own Bill except where matters of principle and policy are involved. But I was so perplexed in Committee as to why they had done this extraordinary thing that, when I discovered that they were sticking to it on Report, I thought

it worthwhile to ask for a more lucid explanation of what they think they are about.

Mr. Ennals: Happily, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said, there is no matter of principle or policy involved here, except for one small point. If we were to accept the Amendment, it would limit the facilities and services to those which are listed in the Clause as it stands. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] That certainly is a possibility.

Mr. Hogg: Surely I must be right about this. My Amendment says:
Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection…
Surely, therefore, it does not limit.

Mr. Ennals: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right. I ask his forgiveness. The subsection as it stands sets out a list of examples of what is meant by facilities and services for the purpose of subsection (1). This approach has been suggested as fairly novel, but it is not entirely new since there is something on these lines in Section 2(2) and (4) of the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, introduced when the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself was a member of the Government.
This was also suggested as a means of handling the problem by the authors of the Street Report. The fact that it is novel does not mean that it is wrong. It is a useful method of explaining subsection (1). It was realised early on that it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive list of facilities and services. Without subsection (2), subsection (1) would be much more difficult to understand, and we would not have had this debate if we had not sought to indicate the sort of services which are covered. But there is no reason why such an example could be read as limited, and it is simply a matter of draftsmanship—whether it be the work of the Parliamentary draftsmen or that of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I suggest that there is no significant point of issue here, and I hope that he will not press the Amendment.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. Angus Maude: Like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), I find it difficult to see why the Government want to take this line, because it is an unusual course and it is


not the logical course. It is all very well for the Under-Secretary of State to say that this a useful way of illustrating the principles he is trying to put into the subsection, but the Statute Book is not the place to give useful examples of principles one is trying to illustrate. They should go into the explanatory memoranda, White Papers or handbooks for the guidance of those who are going to have to carry out the law. That is where we put useful examples of principles. We do not enshrine them in legislation.
Surely legislation must state in the clearest possible terms for the courts to interpret exactly what we are including and exactly what we are excluding. There is no question of putting in useful examples, and it would be ultimately for the great benefit of clarity and administration if the hon. Gentleman were to use the form of words suggested in the Amendment and leave his useful examples for proper publication.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: The Undersecretary of State has not told us any reason for pursuing his novel form of words. Nor has he given any convincing reason for rejecting the conventional form of words suggested in the Amendment. Both are designed to secure the same objective, but there can be no doubt that the words of the Amendment achieve it whereas, despite what the hon. Gentleman has said, there must be doubt as to whether his words achieve it because they are virtually untried and they are in danger of the difficulty which my right hon. and learned Friend pointed out on another Amendment—that, owing to the rule of construction, the expression of the one implies the exclusion of the other.
The hon. Gentleman has produced one precedent, a somewhat tenuous one. I do not suppose that any of us has the provisions of the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, exactly in our minds. But we must have gone 600 or 700 years without finding it necessary to use this form of words. We have used it once in this not very important or fundamental Statute and have never used it again for the next 11 years. That seems the extent of the precedent and authority on which the hon. Gentleman relies and it is a tenuous base for a novel concept which appears to

do no good and may, in fact, achieve some harm.
Would not the hon. Gentleman think it prudent, after consultation with the Law Officers—who do not seem to be favouring us with their advice and assistance at the moment but, no doubt, are readily at hand—to consider amending this provision in another place?

Mr. Rees-Davies: I have the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, here and I say categorically that this form of words is a complete nonsense. There is no precedent for it in the law. I say that categorically and I shall be very surprised if I am stated in any sense to be wrong. Section 2(2) of the 1957 Act states:
The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.
That lays down categorically a standard of duty applicable to the Act, but it cannot possibly be relevant to the brief given to the Under-Secretary of State on this Bill.
The Under-Secretary also referred to Section 2(4) of that Act, which merely says:
In determining whether the occupier of premises has discharged the common duty of care to a visitor, regard is to be had to all the circumstances…
and the circumstances are then set out. That is the common duty of care subject to the relevant circumstances to be applied under that Act, and I therefore repeat that it can in no sense be used as a precedent here.
It is singularly unfortunate that these words should be used, because once a precedent is obtained, it is carried on in future Acts. Here it is said that the following are "examples" and the word which is the monstrosity is the word "examples" which has never been used in Parliamentary language hitherto—
…examples of the facilities and services mentioned
—and some are set out.
It is the duty of the courts to construe the general intention of Parliament, and if Parliament makes a general statement that the Bill is to cover all the professions, all the trades and all the services mentioned earlier, if it is set out so widely,


Parliament gives very wide powers which shall not be taken away. But if we seek to impose some form of circular, which is all this wording is, giving examples and particulars of some of the cases which will be applicable, Parliament will make a nonsense of itself and a nonsense of the authority of the courts.
I invite the Government to withdraw this wording and at least to give us a firm undertaking that it will be discussed in another place when the lawyers there on that occasion I am perfectly certain will back, for once at any rate, what I say.

Mr. Ennals: As has already been said, no question of principle or policy is here involved. I give the assurance that I will discuss with the Law Officers whether there would be any further advantage in what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has proposed. I give no assurance about what will happen in another place, but certainly I will look at the matter.

Mr. Hogg: I do not want to be unkind. On that assurance, not quite adequate, but certainly more forthcoming than the Under-Secretary's first speech, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Hogg: I beg to move Amendment No. 9, in page 2, line 2, after 'establishment', insert:
'with sleeping accommodation for more than 10 persons'.

Mr. Speaker: With this I have suggested that we should discuss Amendment No. 13, in page 2, line 9, at end insert:
(3) During the two years beginning with the commencement of this Act, this section shall not apply to any hotel, boarding house or other similar establishment with sleeping accommodation for less than 10 persons, unless the establishment is an hotel within the meaning of the Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 or would be such an hotel apart from such discrimination as is described in subsection 1 of this section.

Mr. Hogg: I want to move this Amendment almost formally because several of my hon. Friends wish to speak on its merits. I suggested a rather similar Amendment in Committee and thought, no doubt wrongly—because the Home Secretary has been very honourable about discharging his obligations—that I had received an undertaking that

something would be given to me on Report. In the circumstances in which I drafted my original Amendment, I did not have time to consult those who knew the situation better than I did about the appropriate limitation for the exemption figure which I selected, and I agreed that it was too high, as several hon. Members on either side of the Committee pointed out to me. For that reason I was at fault. I originally chose the exemption limit of 20, which the Undersecretary said was too high, a view which was the consensus of the Committee.
However, I understood the Government to agree to give me something on Report and, as far as I can see, they have given me nothing. I have therefore moved this Amendment which exactly halves the figure which I first thought of. All exemption limits must have some kind of element of the arbitrary about them, and I am not in the least wedded to any particular figure. However, I feel that the Government ought to have given us something.
The essence of the purpose behind the Amendment is as follows. I have always conceded and I concede, whatever my draftsmanship may occasionally achieve, that the common inn is bound not to discriminate. It is bound not to discriminate at common law and I have no complaint that it should be caught into the Statute, now that the Statute is seeking to catch up with the common law.
But a different series of considerations applies to private boarding houses, some of which cater for very small groups of people, sometimes groups of people emanating from particular sources. Some cater for particular religious communities. Some of my hon. Friends who represent constituencies by the seaside, which I do not have the honour to do, have constituents who feel strongly about this issue. The provision of temporary accommodation of this kind is not well dealt with in the accommodation provisions, to which we shall come later. The provision of temporary accommodation requires separate treatment which this Amendment and its consort, Amendment No. 13, attempts to give it.
However, there is one consideration which is relevant to this Amendment


and to the later discussion. I have always conceded that when dealing with mass factors and large operators, managements must be expected to conform with the law as laid down by the Bill. Large managements can easily do so, because they can switch employees or guests from one position to another; they cart find room in unusual places and can exercise the ordinary business of management if for any reason the persons for whom they are catering do not get on with one another.
But with very small operators, very small employers, very small landlords, or very small boarding house keepers, there may be human situations which, whether reprehensible or not—and they sometimes arise through nobody's fault—drive the very small management to exercise what must in the end often be an arbitrary judgment. For the small management when it has to operate in this way, perhaps very much against its will, to be subjected to the elaborate process of the Bill is likely to be oppressive. I leave it to my hon. Friends who are better qualified than I to give examples. However, because I got some kind of undertaking which I do not think has been fulfilled, I move the Amendment.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I support what has been said so well by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg). "Boarding house" is a very wide term of which there is no statutory definition and it follows that if there is no quantitative restriction expressed, as would be the effect of the Amendment, the Clause will apply to all boarding houses, including those run on a very small family basis.
For more than 100 years, ever since Mrs. Dancy sued a Mrs. Richardson in 1854 for loss of her baggage in a boarding house, the law of England has distinguished between the position of a boarding house on the one hand and hotels on the other hand to which the full innkeeper's liability attaches. In that case one can see the sort of characteristics of a boarding house in that Mrs. Dancy had the use of sitting room, drawing and dining rooms in common with others, her own bedroom, her board and—and now we depart from topicality —the attendance of the servants, among

whom were a butler and page who, when required, went errands for the guests and carried their luggage to and from their rooms when they arrived and departed, all of which she got, incidentally, for a sum of between£2 and£3 a week, which gives a rather nostalgic impression today.
7.30 p.m.
The basic distinction in law between boarding houses and hotels is now enshrined in the Statute referred to in Amendment No. 13, the Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956. That Act confines innkeepers' liability to establishments
…held out by the proprietor as offering food, drink and, if so required, sleeping accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller with some qualifications…".
The essence of the distinction is the words "without special contract" and "to any traveller". There is, in the case of boarding houses, a special contract and an implied selectivity which derives therefrom. That is obviously because of the more personal, intimate and generally smaller nature of the undertaking.
The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of "board" as:
to be supplied with food or food and lodging at a fixed price, to live with a family as one of its members for a stipulated charge.
It is clear that the character of these small boarding houses is very different from that of an hotel, as is their position in law. I submit that the same principle as preserves boarding houses from full innkeepers' liability should preserve them from the full rigour of the law in this respect. That does not derogate from the intention of the Bill, but would avoid the imposition of complication and difficulty in respect of these very small establishments.

Mr. David Winnick: As these boarding houses, in the main, are in seaside areas offering inexpensive accommodation for people staying for a week or a fortnight, is there not a danger that, if they are to be excluded, the poorer types of person will be penalised, because they may be discriminated against as a result of the colour of their skin? They would only be able to go to an hotel, which they could not afford.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: That is not the case. Under the Amendment it will be only the very small boarding houes to


which this will apply. It is more relevant in the context of the permanent or quasi-permanent accommodation, than to the sort of accommodation the hon. Member has in mind.

Mr. John Hynd: I do not rise to oppose or support the Amendment, but to question as to whether the Amendment meets the situation in the way envisaged by its movers. I should like the Minister to consider a case which occurred in my own constituency. In a private house where I was for some time a guest, there lived a man who was a training engineer at one of the pits, his wife and his mother of 90. His mother used to sit in the stone-flagged kitchen, reading—with the aid of her spectacles—for most of the day.
An Indian mining engineering student arrived in the village, found some difficulty in getting accommodation, and my host, who was very non-racialist in his attitude, invited him warmly to come and live in his house, which the Indian did. He was a very cultured gentleman, and everything went on swimmingly—everyone was very happy about the Indian. As he was to be here for some time he brought his wife over from India. His wife was a charming lady, as many Indian ladies are, who wore a sari and had the habit of wandering about the house without any shoes.
She insisted upon cooking the food for her husband to which he had been accustomed in India, which gave rise to odours to which the normal inhabitants of the house were not accustomed, and to which the old lady strongly objected. Furthermore, the old lady was from time to time very startled when what appeared to be a ghostly figure, making no noise, moved past her when she was reading. Eventually they had to ask this Indian to look for further accommodation. Under the Clause as it stands I would have thought that the owner of this house, who acted with the highest possible non-racial motives, would be subject to a penalty, not because he acted because of racialism, but simply because of the impossibility of these two different groups of habits, odours and customs mingling.
I do not think that the Amendment meets this point. It is an intimate problem which arises in this context, and

I raise it in order that the Minister can tell us how he would consider such a problem could be met without bringing within the Act someone who is behaving with the very highest possible motives in mind, and who cannot under any conditions be regarded as being a racialist.

Mr. Costain: As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) said, this is a matter which affects seaside constituences very much, and in particular the small seaside boarding house. The hon. Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick) raised a point that, if the Amendment were accepted, cheaper accommodation would not be available to certain people. I think that he is exaggerating. The small boarding houses at seaside resorts are usually run by husband and wife or by a widow. They feel that in their own accommodation, which is really a large private house, they must be entitled to have some ability to select guests.
I will quote a case, not in my constituency, but of which I know, of a couple who came back from Kenya, having had one of their children murdered by their own servant during the Mau Mau riots. As a result they cannot bear to have anyone from Africa in the house with their remaining child. Who can blame them? However much they want to, they cannot do it, because it brings back all the memories. Unless we accept this Amendment, these people would have to give up their business, and I am sure that no one wants to see this happen. These are the sort of cases which the Amendment would help.

Mr. Evelyn King: I rise also as a representative of a seaside constituency, although I am not particularly influenced in what I am about to say by that fact. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) drew a legal distinction between an hotel and what we may call a rooming house. There is a practical distinction too. If one owns an hotel, one presumably has one's doors open, anyone can go into it—and many of us do to buy a drink—and then go out again. I concede that such a public place must be open to everyone and that discrimination in such a place should cease.
When we come to what I will call a rooming house;for want of a better word,


one finds the situation where the front door is closed and, where, to get in, one has to knock or ring a bell. I should have thought that that was the definition of a private house. When I say "private house" I do not use the conventional phrase. I emphasise the adjective. If that phrase has any meaning at all, it must mean that it is the one area in one's life which is private, which is one's own, and about which one has absolute discretion as to whom one invites inside. That is a principle worth establishing.
What this Bill is saying to a landlady, and I will put it as fairly as I can, is that if someone seeks to come to her house, a person of her own nationality, she has absolute discretion to accept that person or to reject him. If that person does not suit her, she has an absolute right to say that he should make other arrangements. If the Bill becomes law, and if an immigrant seeks admission to that private house, where people probably take private meals together and almost certainly use of the bathroom and the lavatory is shared, that absolute discretion is removed, and there will be an obligation on the landlady to take someone whom she might wish to reject.
I draw attention to another example which is almost as important. A person may take in a lodger who, after he has been admitted, does not fit in with the close establishment living together. Perhaps he is noisy and does not get on with the other guests. Such a landlady must in the course of nature sometimes wish to reject such a person, but, because he is coloured, the likelihood of a complaint being made clearly puts her in a very difficult position, because one will not always be able to satisfy the Race Relations Board or the court.
The majority of people who run this sort of house are middle-aged women, someone may even argue, and, though I should resent it I will accept it for the sake of argument, that they are stupid women. Because they are elderly and have been brought up in a different tradition—perhaps they are widows of petty officers in the Navy or of warrant officers in the Army—they may be nervous. But because they are nervous, we cannot disregard their nerves. In the majority of cases, there is no difficulty and such people as the hon. Member for Croydon,

South (Mr. Winnick) has in mind will be willingly received. In the odd case that will not be so.
I should speak on this matter with less certainty if it were the fact within the Bill that an immigrant having a complaint to make to the Race Relations Board had himself to make and sign it. That is not the case. In Committee, I moved an Amendment to make it the case. Any immigrant organisation, or any organisation or body, could go to landladies and other places and make a complaint when there was none. It is fair to add that there are about 1,000 organisations devoted to the problems of race. Many of them are highly responsible and are doing excellent work and have the blessing of every hon. Member. It is fair to add, however, that there is a small proportion—perhaps devoted to the Black Power movement—cf troublemakers, and a Clause of this sort is an invitation to them to do more harm than good. If I thought for a moment that this Clause would ease the problems we seek to ease, I should be in favour of it. Because I sense a danger that it may arouse resentment and may cause a row between a landlady and a lodger which gets in the newspapers and may damage the very cause which hon. Members have at heart, I urge that the Amendment, or something like it, should be accepted.

7.45 p.m.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I intervene only because my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. John Hynd) raised a case which goes to the root of the misconception which is being aired on the benches opposite, namely, the fact that an owner of a house felt it necessary to expel an Indian lady who had lived in the house for some time because her habits were such that she could not easily get on with the other boarders might bring the case within the Bill.
It is true that the Indian lady might complain to the Race Relations Board. But I cannot believe that the Board, after the very preliminary investigation which would be necessary, would take the matter further when it realised that the discrimination was not on the ground of colour or race, but simply because this lady, by reason of her habits, could not get on with the other lodgers.

Mr. Evelyn King: I concede that the Board would behave reasonably. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would concede that, if a landlady were threatened that if she did not do this or that she would be taken before the Race Relations Board and would finally be landed in court, that would be a very intimidating threat.

Mr. Lyon: The answer to that lies in the way in which the Board carries out the tasks assigned to it under the Bill. Gradually it will build up the measure of good will necessary to show that it takes a sensible view of disputes like that. There is nothing unlawful under the Bill in doing what the landlord of the house to which my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe referred was doing. It is not unlawful to discriminate against people because they cook in a particular way or because they are the sore thumb in a closely knit community. If people cannot get on, it is possible to discriminate. But it is not right to discriminate against people as a group, and that is where the error is creeping in to this discussion.
That is the error which the dockers who came to support the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) made when they stood outside the House and cursed the Nigerian High Commissioner and Sir Learie Constan-tine as they came into the House because they disliked coloured people who were neghbours or workers in their area. Their conception was that because a man is black he is the same. That is the abhorrent part of racial discrimination.
With the greatest respect to those hon. Members who represent landladies in seaside resorts, it is no answer to their concern to say that because they have had unpleasant experiences with one coloured man they should be entitled to exclude all others. The hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) referred to the Mau Mau murders. Is it to be said that the Moors murders were so abhorrent to most of us that landladies should exclude all white men from their establishments? Of course not. We would not dream of making such a stupid assertion. Should we go on to say that, because in a particular part of Africa at a particular point in the development of that area, and because of the activities of a particular section of the coloured

people living in Kenya where the Mau Mau incidents took place, we in this country should be able to discriminate against coloured people from that locality ad infinitum? I cannot accept that we should.
I concede that there will be occasions when landladies will feel grave concern about taking in coloured people, but I hope that the conciliation part of the Bill will help to explain to them why it is desirable that they should do so and that after the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees have done their work they will be prepared to take in reasonable, honest, sober guests who happen to be coloured and that thereby we shall achieve the integration which we all honourably desire.

Sir S. Summers: I have considerable sympathy with the notions underlying the Amendment, but I hope that before we dispose of it a little more will be said to help us in deciding where to draw the line. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) made it clear that he was primarily concerned that there should be an area below which the Bill would not apply, but that he was not particularly concerned about whether 10 was the magic figure or whether some other figure should be preferred.
An incident was brought to my notice only two days ago concerning a highly educated West Indian couple who were lunching with a friend of mine. They were, incidentally, both independently employed in responsible positions by a public authority. In the course of conversation they disclosed that in previous years they had had such difficulty in finding accommodation of the character about which we are speaking that they thought it would be necessary to take their next holiday in a tent.
Here is a situation which cannot be ignored. Neither can we ignore the feelings of those who have a small private house in which they legitimately claim that considerations should be allowed to prevail for themselves which do not apply even to the small hotels. Where, therefore, do we draw the line?
I hope that before we conclude this debate, somebody with a great deal more experience than I have of these matters will say that I am right in thinking that


probably eight or six would not be more likely to exclude the small private house with which we are primarily concerned without, at the same time, damaging the holiday prospects of such a couple as I have referred to.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColl): I should like to respond to the invitation to try to put before the House some of the points at issue. Although we are at odds, there is not nearly as much difference between us as the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) implied. I would not like him to think that we have not studied carefully what he and his hon. Friends and hon. Members on this side said in Committee about this matter. The difference, however, is partly a matter of drafting.
The right hon. and learned Member dismissed Clause 7 as not being the essence of the problem. Clause 7 deals with this problem because it is the exception Clause to Clause 2 as well as to Clause 5. That is clear from subsection (1). Subsection (3) of Clause 7 defines "residential accommodation" in a wide way to cover
a hotel, boarding house or other similar establishment".
The main argument about where we should draw the line arises on the Amendments to Clause 7 and I would get into difficulty with Mr. Deputy Speaker if I dealt with the detail of that now. That, however, is our answer to the point which has been made.
The main difference between us is not, I suspect, so much in terms of the numbers of people involved as to whether it is 10, 8 or 6. The difference is the test of the exception for the sharing of accommodation. It is clear from Clause 7 that one of the criteria is that there should be shared accommodation.
The best place to distinguish the intimate personal relationship such as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. John Hynd) referred to of people moving in and out of shared facilities from the person who has a cutoff apartment and no direct contact with the people living in the accommodation is on Clause 7. That is why we have not put down anything to Clause 2. In our view, that would be the wrong place for an exception.
The answer to the query by my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe about the Indian lady is that if she were living as close as that—just one or two people sharing the kitchen with the nice, kind couple—there would be exemption under Clause 7 from the provisions of the Bill.
I would make this comment about the tragic case concerning the victim of Mau Mau. I would not challenge the intimate and personal nature of that sort of experience. If, however, an Indian or an African immigrant knocked at the door and was refused accommodation, perhaps brusquely and bitterly, is it better to say there must be no kind of attempt to get them to see each other's point of view or is it better to say that a conciliation officer should call, see them both, and say to the African, "I am sure that you will understand this special difficulty. You can understand what these people feel like", and try to bring them together, but not necessarily to live in the same house but to understand their points of view. That is why the Bill is called a Race Relations Bill, because it deals with attempts to improve people's race relations.

Mr. John Lee: Is my hon. Friend resisting the Amendment?

Mr. MacColl: What I said about the Amendment being in the wrong place from a drafting viewpoint was intended to mean that it would be unwise to put it where it is proposed.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am extremely sorry that although the Home Secretary rather intimated that he would not do so, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary has spoken to this matter before he has had the opportunity, either in Committee or on the Floor of the House, to hear this matter fully put for the first time.
My hon. Friends who have spoken to some aspects of the matter have covered certain important aspects, but I venture to point out a number of things which have never been mentioned, either upstairs or on the Floor of the House, which go both to the important question of the original drafting of the Clause and to the position which obtains in the practice of the class of accommodation in question. I am sure that the Minister will be kind enough to pay heed to these matters which have been culled from


experience of having to consider the question through a number of associations and organisations which have not hitherto had the opportunity of any expression.
In Committee upstairs, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) probed this matter with his usual delightful phraseology. He asked the Home Secretary, who was then present,
Could he give us a little more indication as to what it is that he will consider favourably? Can he say what is in his mind that he will consider favourably? At the moment we have no indication at all.
The Home Secretary replied:
Because this is a sensitive area…I do not think that I should go into figures at this moment. All I say is that I think that, having listened to the arguments, there is a case for something more than before.
None has been given today.
There is a case, in my view, for something very much less than 20. The right hon. Gentleman will have to see where we pitch on this",
which cannot mean anything else than "where we will pitch mathematically".
All of us ought to consider it seriously, and I ought not to produce numbers, like a juggler out of a hat on this.
To this my right hon. and learned Friend replied:
In the light of that rather obscure and Delphic utterance, to which…I shall hold the right hon. Gentleman as strictly as the obscurity of his words permits…".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee B, 14th May, 1968;c. 159.]
My right hon. and learned Friend has again nobly risen to the occasion and put the case.
I want to put a case which has not been put by anybody. First, let us look at the words set out in the Bill. It has not been looked at carefully enough. It states that
accommodation in a hotel, boarding house or other similar establishment
shall be the subject of discrimination proceedings at large. The first question which has to be considered by a conciliation committee or by the courts is what is meant by "other similar establishments". If that is construed ejusdem generis, as the courts may contrue it but not necessarily will construe it, it will mean something which is ejusdem generis with a boarding house.
8.0 p.m.
Let me tell hon. Gentlemen, as they have not considered this at all yet, that there is a third category of accommodation in this country which is extremely common and growing, and that is paying-guest accommodation, which is not truly boarding-house accommodation. If hon. Gentlemen will look at their trade union papers they will see that it is common these days to have a particular type of guest house accommodation which is for trade union members only. In the Isle of Thanet we have had some difficulties and at one time I had to write to the father of one of the present Ministers, Mr. Morgan Phillips, because discrimination was shown in boarding houses in the Isle of Thanet, in that they were being reserved for trade union members of the Labour Party only. This hurt the feelings of other ladies in my constituency. They felt that they, too, should be able to entertain members of the Labour Party in my constituency. Therefore, I had to turn my hat round and try to persuade Mr. Morgan Phillips to take a wider view and not to permit discrimination. True to his proper Socialist convictions, he agreed with me that there should be no discrimination.
In point of fact there is discrimination. There are certain boarding houses or guest houses, namely always with fewer than 10 bedrooms but not always—not accommodation for 10 persons but 10 bedrooms—which are Jewish, and they are kept open to enable people who are Jews to be able to come to stay. They seldom, if ever, accept other people. There are those which provide for Roman Catholics. There are those which have a firm arrangement by which they take five or six couples from old-age pensioner establishments in Birmingham or Manchester, and their affiliated branches, at certain times of the year. We have an arrangement in the Isle of Thanet, for example, whereby old-age pensioners have off-season special rates and have almost exclusive control of one or more houses, usually small ones.
I see nothing wrong in discrimination in this sense, because I am assuming that there are certain cases where discrimination is the very thing which that type of accommodation seeks. I want the House to realise what has not yet been the subject of any discussion, that they will be


going into a hornet's nest if they imagine that the Bill as it is at the moment is either explicit or provides for what I would call the private class of case where accommodation is limited to a class of people, namely those whom it is wished to serve.

Mr. James Dempsey: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's argument. Will he say whether Conservative clubs discriminate against persons because they do not hold Conservative views?

Mr. Rees-Davies: They do not, in fact. In the main, Conservatives have their own clubs in different parts of the country with limited accommodation and, from my knowledge of Conservative clubs, they are rather better at snooker than anything else.

Mr. Richard: I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree that being a Conservative or a Socialist is not a matter of
…colour, race or ethnic or national origin".
In all the instances he has cited the discrimination is not caught by the Bill. Of course, Conservatives are entitled to discriminate against Socialists. If the hon. Gentleman will look at Clause 1 of the Bill which, as I have said, I do not like, he will see that what is caught is not the man who discriminates against Socialists; it is not the man who discriminates in favour of old-age pensioners, nor a person discriminating in favour of anyone coming from Birmingham or Scotland. It is discrimination on the ground of colour, race or ethnic origin. Does not the hon. Gentleman think that his argument has gone?

Mr. Rees-Davies: I certainly do not. In the first place, I mentioned the Jewish race which is covered by it. The discrimination arises in this way. If a coloured person wishes to stay in a boarding house and he is not a member of the trade union or whatever it is, none the less, if it is a smaller establishment, he is entitled to stay. The difficulty of the argument is this. If one discriminates de facto against either Jewish persons or coloured persons, if one discriminates in the manner which is indicated in the original Clause 1, that is to say either on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins, one is caught.

Mr. Richard: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that one is perfectly entitled to discriminate against a black Conservative on a purported ground, namely, that he is a Conservative, but not on the ground that he is black?

Mr. Rees-Davies: I dare say one can try to do that, but I have no doubt that, in practice, one would have to tell that to the marines.
If I may now continue with the argument, although there was very wide discussion in Committee upstairs, there is one topic which was not the subject of full discussion upstairs and that is the position which arises with regard to hotels, boarding houses and other similar establishments. Under the wording "smaller establishments", if it is only to cover boarding houses and it is to exclude—and I think it is meant to exclude—the really small type of establishment, with only about 8 to 10 persons, then I think it ought to be clarified, and in the event this Amendment would clarify it along the lines that the Government undertook so to do. They undertook so to do in Clause 2, not in Clause 7, as I have indicated from col. 159.

Mr. Richard: Mr. Richard indicated dissent.

Mr. Rees-Davies: The hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) indicates his dissent, but if he will look at col. 159 of the proceedings in Committee of 14th May, he will see that the Home Secretary was quite specific in his undertaking to give a figure after discussion which would be applicable. I submit that the figure that has been inserted is a minimum one of 10 persons. That is the sort of case where an establishment with a man and his wife running it, which is two persons, and possibly a couple of children, making four, would have three or perhaps four bedrooms for paying guest letting. I deliberately use the term "paying guests" rather than a boarding house.
The genuine boarding house nowadays, although it has a different liability at law from a hotel, none the less holds itself out to accept everybody, and it has the limitations that I have mentioned of certain classes only about particular times of the year, when it may refuse to have anybody other than a particular class, and that may include ethnic origin; it


may wish to have Irish, Welsh, Jewish; it may wish to have Sassenachs; it may wish to have international hockey players.
It has also been overlooked that there has been a tradition in relation to different classes of coloured people which is very much the same as the tradition in relation to different classes of white people. With the utmost respect, if the band of dockers who came to the House the other day had then diverted their attention to Claridges and asked for accommodation, I suspect that they probably would have been turned down. On the other hand, we found in the Isle of Thanet that the Americans when they were based at Manston used to insist that their own coloured population went to Ramsgate, the N.C.O.s went to Margate and the officers went to Broadstairs. It has worked out extremely well. That is the situation, and, when one gets to the realities of life in small paying-guest establishments, it is idle to say that there is no discrimination. I am not trying to argue that it does not exist. I am arguing that it is one of the facts of life. It is manifest that it exists.
I go much further, because it is an act of policy by many small establishments which have only three or four double bedrooms, can afford to be choosy and have only a limited season of four or five months, to seek to get the bookings of a specific class of persons whom they find suit each other. In Broadstairs, we get a very good type of middle class persons coming from the Midlands and the North. They include a number of hon. Members opposite and their families who are regular visitors and whom we accept as being suitable for that class of accommodation. They attend regularly, and we find them admirable. It is well known that Margate is extremely popular as a conference place for the Labour Party.
However, there are some establishments in different parts of my constituency who would say, "We do not accept coloured persons, not because we dislike them, not because we have any personal axe to grind against them, but simply because our clientele happens to be of a different nature". They like to meet people with whom they can converse and make friends in their own

premises. If they were satisfied that a coloured person who was coming was a friend of the other people, I am sure that that person would be acceptable. But I do not want to see people forced into a position which will affect their businesses in the way that it undoubtedly will if this Clause covers that class of case, as I think that it does. If it does, it will cause trouble in exactly the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Evelyn King) has indicated, not because a coloured person will lay a complaint but because one of those awful informers who are permitted and encouraged under the Bill will inform and cause trouble. Such people will inform not because the case will be passed and accepted by the Race Relations Board, because probably it will not in the outcome, but because it is a good way of getting some dirty, rotten publicity at the expense of the boarding house keeper.

8.15 p.m.

Mr. John Lee: In spite of the hon. Gentleman's ingenious arguments, is he not missing the whole point of the Bill? He is saying that we must make concession after concession to the less pleasant aspects of human nature. If this Amendment is allowed in its present form, that is exactly what will happen.

Mr. Rees-Davies: With respect, I think that the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. John Lee) is in cloud-cuckooland. If he goes on holiday with or in the hope of meeting a group of friends in a small paying guest establishment in which there are only three other bedrooms, one bathroom and one lavatory, does he really think that his wife and family will want to share accommodation if in the outcome he finds staying there a black Zambian of the lower class and a Polynesian—[HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] Do not say "Shame" and such tosh. For once, let us have a little honesty on these matters. The fact is that the hon. Gentleman will want to mix with his friends. It so happens that I can say these things because I have a great many friends from all parts of the world who are themselves coloured. If I went with one of my friends to a similar establishment, do hon. Members imagine that he would want to find there someone of a totally different type, character, class and everything else, any more than I would?


That is quite unrealistic, and it is what I cavil at in this part of the Bill.
I have tried to bring into the open some of the further arguments which my right hon. Friend hinted at when he gave us the opportunity to indicate these aspects of this important matter. As I see it, on Clause 2, if the Bill is to work, it is essential to lay down in real terms either by clarification or by proviso what is meant by the words "other similar establishment", whether it is done here or in another place. If it is decided that it will not be defined as such—and I can see that it is very difficult—there should be an exclusion along the lines suggested by my right hon. Friend in terms of numbers to indicate that the small paying guest establishment is not included within the class.
That is one aspect. If it is not to be done on Clause 2, it will be necessary later to have much more fundamental exemptions in Clause 7. Ft is all very well for hon. Members to try and argue, as did the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) by way of intervention, that certain classes such as trade unions and others can discriminate. But that is only drawing it on ethnic grounds. Where there is a whole practice of deliberate discrimination in the running of small establishments, if one wants to make the Bill an effective instrument, it would be more easy and satisfactory to exclude all this aspect.
It is an understood fact that a hotel as such must not and cannot discriminate as a matter of ordinary common law. It owes its duty to the public at large and in that sense it is covered, although in practice we all know that certain types of person, not in relation to their colour or ethnic origin but in relation to their habits and practices, may be excluded from certain restaurants and hotels. As I indicated to the hon. Gentleman just now, that can be dressed up so easily as being discrimination on the grounds of race and colour.
That is the practical side of it. It is because we are concerned with the practical aspects that I hope that the matter will be looked at carefully and that the Home Secretary will carry out the undertaking given to my right hon. Friend in Committee upstairs.

Mr. Richard: I am grateful to the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) for making that speech because it revealed more clearly than anything I have heard so far or have read in the Press how little many people have understood the Bill. The hon. Gentleman could not have read the Bill properly and made that speech.
It is clear from Clause 1 exactly what is caught by the Bill. What is made unlawful is discrimination on the grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins. If in his constituency he has a cosy little boarding house being run by one of these mythical widows about whom we hear so much from hon. Gentlemen opposite, and if she desires to publish in her brochure, "Only upper"—or it could be "medium" or "lower"—"class people need apply", she is entitled to do so. I disapprove of her going further—I trust that the hon. Gentleman takes the same view—and turning away a man whose skin happens to be black. That action is caught by the Bill. Being a lawyer —the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet will know what I mean by that—the hon. Gentleman should read the Bill again and not make such a speech until he has done so.

Mr. Grieve: The House should be grateful for the breath of fresh air and common sense which my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) introduced. In contrast, the reply of the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) showed how much, in their anxiety, which I respect, to improve race relations, he and those who think like him ignore the realities of the situation in which this legislation is being introduced.
The hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) referred to a seaside landlady who, for good and legitimate reasons, turned away a person of a different ethnic origin or colour from herself. He said that when the matter was brought to the attention of the Race Relations Board, everything would be put right, so that the landlady would have no cause for complaint or alarm. That ignores the character and often the education of many of those who run small boarding houses and similar establishments. Many of them are scared out of their wits at the mere sight of a document, and the thought of being taken


before a board or court fills them with fear.
The authors of the Street Report, when considering the possible exemptions to the legislation which they advocated, suggested the application of the principle of personal, intimate proximity. It is against that test that one must consider restricting the number of boarders to 10 in this type of boarding establishment. We should be doing a grave disservice to the cause of race relations if we tried to import legislative sanctions into the ordinary private home of the individual.
I agree with the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing that it is not easy to see where the line should be drawn. In Committee I tabled an Amendment suggesting that the figure should be 20, although I held no special briefs for that number. That it should be drawn at ten or a little over goes absolutely against common sense, because that figure brings us into the realm of those who are not providing facilities on a large scale. These people are merely supplementing their incomes by taking people into their ordinary private homes. It is from the zone of the private home that this legislation should be excluded and I pray in aid the principle on which the authors of the Street Report made their proposals and suggest that the Government act in the same way.
Another reason why we should be careful to exclude legislative sanctions in this realm is because of the type of person who runs this type of establishment. The hon. Member for Barons Court referred to the "mythical widow". If anything showed the lack of common sense which he and his like are bringing to this problem, the sneer inherent in that expression revealed it. The great bulk of small boarding houses are run by widows who are augmenting their incomes. If there is one class of the community of whom we in this House should take care it is the widow, and I am not ashamed of saying so.

Dr. Winstanley: So that I understand precisely what is in the hon. and learned Gentleman's mind, would he comment on this example: if a widow—a real one and not a mythical one—running an intimate establishment takes in eight students, would he regard it as reason-

able if she said that she would not take in a Pakistani student as one of the eight?

Mr. Grieve: What I regard as reasonable is that that widow should have complete and absolute control over whom she wishes to have under her own roof. That principle is enshrined in every freedom we respect, and to the extent that this legislation is cutting in and reducing that freedom, I am against it.

Mr. Hogg: I can speak again only by leave of the House, but I hope that if I promise to be reasonably short I may have that leave.
The only difference of principle between me and the Under-Secretary is a rather curious one, but I think that we on this side are probably right on that solitary difference. The Under-Secretary shook me at first by suggesting, and it may well turn out to be true, that whilst he would agree that there should be an exemption limit—whether for reasons of principle or whether for reasons of convenience does not matter—it was already adequately dealt with under Clause 7 rather than under this Clause. He said—and I thought that it was a very truthful remark, and I agree with it—that though we are at difference about this matter, the difference is not as much as people might think. We are at difference about it, and I think that we are now in a position to come to a conclusion by way of a Division—without, I hope, much ill feeling on either side.
I would only add that the debate has ranged rather more widely than that between the two Front Benches, and I have been very glad of the way in which it has developed, because it has ventilated a certain amount of feeling. But I would, on the whole, side in this matter with my hon. Friends. Obviously, when dealing with very small operators in this field we have to draw some kind of a line somewhere between convenience and individual liberty on the one hand and principle and dislike of discrimination on the other.
Perhaps when we discuss the next Amendment—and certainly on Third Reading—we will be able to go into that matter in a little more detail with profit to all of us, but whilst I am speaking simply on the question of boarding


houses in the kind of situation that has been developed I would only say this. There is only one freedom ever worth having by anybody, and that is the freedom to do wrong. I hasten to change my language to something which is more theologically acceptable, and say freedom to do what other people think is wrong, because if one only does what other people think is right one is not free at all.
I would therefore say to hon. Members opposite who have tended to get a little excitable about this Amendment and, in particular, a little excitable about my hon., gallant but not always very theological Friend the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies), that he

was theologically more correct than they were.

One must, in the end, distinguish between what is morally reprehensible and what creates important social consequences. What creates important social consequences is something about which Parliament ought to legislate. What is morally reprehensible but does not so create, is something we should ignore. Therefore, I shall advise my hon. Friends, for one reason or another, to join me in dividing on the Amendment.

Question put, That the Amendment be made: —

The House divided: Ayes 151, Noes 234.

Division No. 271.]
AYES
[8.30 p.m.


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Gresham Cooke, R.
Onslow, Crantey


Astor, John
Grieve, Percy
Osborn, John (Hatlam)


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)


Awdry, Daniel
Gurden, Harold
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Baker, Kenneth (Acton)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Peel, John


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Percival, Ian


Biffen, John
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Pounder, Rafton


Biggs-Davison, John
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch


Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Pym, Fancis


Black, Sir Cyril
Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Higglns, Terence L.
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Body, Richard
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David


Bossom, Sir Clive
Holland, Philip
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Brewis, John
Hordern, Peter
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Hornby, Richard
Ridsdale, Julian


Bryan, Paul
Howell, David (Guildford)
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Royle, Anthony


Bullus, Sir Eric
Iremonger, T. L.
Russell, Sir Ronald


Burden, F. A.
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.


Campbell, B. (Oldham, West)
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Scott-Hopkins, James


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Sharpies, Richard


Carlisle, Mark
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Silvester, Frederick


Chichester-Clark, R.
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith
Smith, Dudley (W'wick &amp;L'mington)


Cordle, John
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Speed, Keith


Corfield, F. V.
Kirk, Peter
Stainton, Keith


Costain, A. P.
Kitson, Timothy
Summers, Sir Spencer


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Sir Oliver
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Temple, John M.


Crouch, David
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Currie, G. B. H.
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Dance, James
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)
McAdden, 8ir Stephen
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Vickers, Dame Joan


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Macleod, Rt. Hn. lain
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Maddan, Martin
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Drayson, G. B.
Maginnis, John E.
ward, Dame Irene


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Marten, Neil
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Elliott.R.W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)
Maude, Angus
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Emery, Peter
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C
Williams, Donald (Dudley)


Errington, Sir Eric
Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)
wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Eyre, Reginald
Mortro, Hector
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Montgomery, Fergus
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Fortescue, Tim
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Wood, Rt Hn Richard


Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Mott-Radcryffe, Sir Charles
Woodnutt, Mark


Gibson-Watt, David
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Worsley, Marcus


Glover, Sir Douglas
Murton, Oscar
Younger, Hn. George


Goodhart, Philip
Nabarro, Sir Cerald



Goodhew, Victor
Neave, Airey
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Cower, Raymond
NichollS, Sir Harmar
Mr. Jasper More and


Grant, Anthony
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Mr. Bernard Weatherill.


Grant-Ferris, R.
Nott, John





NOES


Abse, Leo
Freeson, Reginald
Miller, Dr. M. S.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Galpern, Sir Myer
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Alldritt, Walter
Gardner, Tony
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)


Anderson, Donald
Ginsburg, David
Molloy, William


Archer, Peter
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)


Armstrong, Ernest
Gregory, Arnold
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Grey, Charles (Durham)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Morris, John (Aberavon)


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)
Moyle, Roland


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Griffiths, Will (Exchange)
Murray, Albert


Barnes, Michael
Hamilton, James (Botthwell)
Neal, Harold


Barnett, Joel
Hamling, William
Newens, Stan


Baxter, William
Harman, William
Ogden, Eric


Beaney, Alan
Harper, Joseph
Orbach, Maurice


Bence, Cyril
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Orme, Stanley


Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgeton)
 Haseldine, Norman
Oswald, Thomas


Besell, Peter
Hattersley, Roy
Owen, will (Morpeth)


Bidwell, Sydney
Hazell, Bert
Paget, R. T.


Blackburn, F.
Heffer, Eric S.
Palmer, Arthur


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Henig, Stanley
Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles


Boardman, H. (Leigh)
Hilton, W. S.
Park, Trevor


Booth Albert
Hooley, Frank
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Boston, Terence
Horner, John
Pavitt, Laurence


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)


Boyden, James
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Pentland, Norman


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Howie, W.
Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Hoy, James
Randall, Harry


Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)
Huckfield, Leslie
Rankin, John


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey) 
Rhodes, Geoffrey


Buchan, Norman
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)
Richard, Ivor


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn) 
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Hunter, Adam
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Hynd, John
Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth(St.P'c'as)


Cant, R. B.
Janner, Sir Barnett
Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow,E.)


Carmichael, Neil
Jeger,Mrs.Lena(H'b'n &amp;St.P'cras,S.) 
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Chapman, Donald
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Rose, Paul


Coleman, Donald
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechlord)
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Concannon, J. D.
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.) 
Shaw, Arnold (llford, S.)


Conlan, Bernard
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Sheldon, Robert


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.) 
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)


Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Short,Rt.Hn.Edward(N'c'tle-u-Tyne)


Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Judd, Frank
Short, Mrs. Renée(W'hampton,N.E.)


Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Kelley, Richard
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Dalyed, Tarn
Kenyon, Clifford
Silverman, Julius


Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central) 
 Skeffington, Arthur


Davidson, Arthur (Accrlngton)
Lawson, George
Slater, Joseph


Davidson, James(Aberdeenshire,W.) 
 Ledger, Ron
Small, William


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Spriggs, Leslie


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Lee, John (Reading)
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Lestor, Miss Joan
Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)


Davies, S. 0. (Merythr)
Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)
Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John


Dell, Edmund
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Swain, Thomas


Dempsey, James
Lomas, Kenneth
Taverne, Dick


Dewar, Donald
Luard, Evan
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Lubbock, Eric
Thornton, Ernest


Dickens, James
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Urwin, T. W.


Dobson, Ray
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Varley, Eric G.


Doig, Peter
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Dunn, James A.
McBride, Neil
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Dunnett, Jack.
MacColl, James
Walden, Brian (All Saints)


Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter) 
Macdonald, A. H.
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp;C'b'e) 
 McGuire, Michael
Watkins, David (Consett)


Eadie, Alex
McKay, Mrs. Margaret
Weitzman, David


Edelman, Maurice
Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross &amp; Crom'ty) 
Wellbeloved, James


Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Whitaker, Ben


Ellis. John
Mackintosh, John P.
White, Mrs. Eirene


Ennals, David
Maclennan, Robert
Whitlock, William


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Wilkins, W. A.


Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)
McNamara, J. Kevin
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Faulds, Andrew
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Fernyhough, E.
Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Williams, Clifford (Abertitlery)


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Mallalieu,J.P.W.(HudderSfield,E.)
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Fletcher, Raymond (Ilketton)
Manuel, Archie
Winnick, David


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marquand, David
Winstanley, Dr. M. P.


Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy
Yates, Victor


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Maxwell, Robert



Ford, Ben
Mendelson, J. J.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Forrester, John
Mlkardo, Ian
Mr. John McCann and


Fraier, John (Norwood)
Millan, Bruce
Mr. loan L. Evans.

Clause 3

EMPLOYMENT

Amendments made: No. 14, in page 2, line 14, leave out from beginning to 'him' and insert:
'or deliberately omitting to employ'.

No. 15, in page 2, line 18, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.—[Mr. Hattersley.]

The Under-Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity (Mr. Roy Hattersley): I beg to move Amendment No. 16, in page 2, line 22 after 'persons', insert 'of the like qualifications'.
This Amendment stems from a fear expressed in Committee, or, at least, expressed by some members of the Committee, that the Clause as it stands would give rise to danger in a situation in which an employer chose applicant A rather than applicant B because applicant B lacked the talent, education, experience or aptitude of applicant A.
As it stands, the Clause makes no reference to the qualifications of two rival applicants for a job. I advised the Committee that the phrase "in like circumstances" met the point and that the man who chose one candidate rather than another because of character or qualifications could not be subject to the penalties under the Bill. However, the Committee asked me to be more specific, and I agreed. This Amendment meets that concern.

Sir D. Renton: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I think that he has met the point, and I advise the House to accept the Amendment.

Mr. Gower: I regard the Amendment as a big improvement, but I have one question. The term "qualifications" is a rather special one having a definite connotation. Does it embrace the wider matters of character or other qualities which also might be important?

Mr. Hattersley: Yes, it does. I tried to list the sort of attributes covered. Aptitude, character and experience are as much included as any formal qualifications.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 4

TRADE UNIONS, AND EMPLOYERS' AND TRADE ORGANISATIONS

Amendments made: No. 17, in page 2, line 39, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.

No. 18, in page 3, line 2, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.—[Mr. Hattersley.]

Mr. Hattersley: I beg to move Amendment No. 19, in page 3, line 8, leave out from 'organisations' to end of line 9 and insert—
'concerned with the carrying on of trades, businesses, professions or occupations'.
This Amendment also is designed to meet a concern expressed in Committee, concern that the words
organisations of persons engaged in any trade, business, profession or occupation
might include not only trade unions, trade associations and employers' associations, as was intended, but also social clubs or recreational clubs which might be organisations of such people, that is, people of a certain trade, business or profession.
Irrespective of the view of the House on discrimination in private places—mine is simple and unequivocal—it is not the Government's intention that the Bill should cover such discrimination. The Amendment is designed, therefore, to narrow the scope of the Clause in a precise and specific way so that it relates to the function of the organisation rather than to the sort of person who is a member of the organisation. Thus, the ambiguity is removed and the intention is made clear, that is, to avoid discrimination in trade unions, employers' associations, trade associations and the like, and not private clubs which might be composed of such people.

Sir D. Renton: The point is a very fine one, but I agree that the Amendment makes an improvement and I welcome it.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5

HOUSING ACCOMMODATION, AND BUSINESS AND OTHER PREMISES

Amendment made: No. 20, in page 3, line 16, leave out 'neglecting' and insert 'deliberately omitting'.—[Mr. MacColl]

8.45 p.m.

Mr. MacColl: I beg to move Amendment No. 21, in line 18, at end insert:
(b) against any person occupying any such accommodation, premises or other land, by deliberately treating him differently from other such occupiers in the like circumstances; or
The Amendment arose from a discussion in Committee in which my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) in particular made the point that it was not enough to deal with the actual disposal of an interest in a house, but that the Clause should also apply to any consequential management which might take place after letting. He said that it might be possible for a landlord to make more severe terms for the payment of rent to try to make life unpleasant for the immigrant, and that that should be covered.
I said in reply that I thought that most of the matters which would arise would come under either harassment or unlawful eviction and that probably it would not be necessary to include them, but I also said, correcting myself, that as the object of the Bill was to have a conciliation rather than criminal proceedings, it might be appropriate to do something about it.
The Amendment would deal with cases coming under the Rent Act, but would also deal with the kind of case to which my hon. Friend referred, which would not quite come under the Act, cases like discrimination in the terms of the rent, its payment and so on. I think that the Amendment will be a help to tenants.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 22, in line 20, after 'by', insert 'deliberately'. —[Mr. Ennals.]

Clause 6

ADVERTISEMENTS AND NOTICES

Amendment made: No. 23, in page 3, line 26, leave out from 'act' to end of line 27 and insert 'of discrimination, whether or not it'.—[Mr. Ennals.]

Clause 7

EXCEPTION IN THE CASE OF RESIDENTIAL ACCOMMODATION

Amendment made: No. 24, in page 3, line 37, after 'discriminate', insert 'against any other person'.—[Mr. Ennals.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): The next Amendment is Government Amendment No. 25, with which we may discuss Government Amendment No. 26, Amendment No. 27, in page 3, line 40, leave out from 'premises' to end of line 12 on page 4.

Government Amendments No. 29 and No. 31, Amendment No. 32, in page 4, line 10, after 'access', insert:
'but limited to water closet, kitchen or cooking facilities, bathroom or washing facilities, and any living room'.

Government Amendment No. 33, in page 4, line 12, at end insert:
(2) Premises shall be treated for the purposes of subsection (1) above as small premises if—

(a) in the case of premises comprising residential accommodation for one or more households (under separate letting or similar agreements) in addition to the accommodation occupied by the landlord, there is not normally residential accommodation for more than two such households and only the landlord and any member of his household reside in the accommodation occupied by him;
(b) in the case of premises not falling within paragraph (a) above, there is not normally residential accommodation on the premises for more than six persons in addition to the landlord and any members of his household.


(3) During the two years beginning with the commencement of this Act, subsection (2)(b) above shall have effect as if for the reference to six persons there were substituted a reference to twelve persons';
and the Amendments to it in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), in subsection (2,b) leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve', and to leave out subsection (3);and Government Amendments No. 34 and No. 37.

Mr. MacColl: I beg to move Amendment No. 25, in page 3, line 38, at end insert:
'at the time of the disposal—
(a) the premises are treated for the purposes of this subsection as small premises; and'.


This is an important group of Amendments. They are the Amendments to which I referred in the debate on Clause 2 in which we have tried to meet the undertaking we gave to look at the various points made in our discussions about accommodation shared by more than one household, or where there was more than one family. We have also taken advantage of this to make some improvements in the presentation of the Clause which make it rather easier to follow.
The Amendment introduces a term of art in the Clause—"small premises" Amendment No. 33 discusses what the term means. Instead of merely saying that the landlord "resides", Amendment No. 26 says "resides and intends to continue to reside". This is to meet a point made in Committee that it might be possible for a landlord to claim exemption from the Bill because he was residing at the time and subsequently to sell the property. This makes it clear that it is intended that he would be exempted only if he intended to stay on and live in the premises as his own home.
The next point is that there are two distinctions, and it is made clear that these are alternatives and not supplementary to each other. These come in the new subsection (2), which makes clear the two tests, one or other of which must be fulfilled, in addition to the landlord's living on the property. One test is that in addition to the accommodation occupied by the landlord, there is not normally residential accommodation for more than two other households, and that the landlord and members of his household are the only other people residing in that piece of the accommodation which is occupied by him.
The alternative for exceptions is that there is not normal residential accommodation on the premises for more than six persons in addition to the landlord and any member of his household. That is an increase from the figure which is in the Bill at the moment, and it is designed to meet the point.
Subsection (3) introduces phasing. I was rather sorry—I put it no stronger than that—to find that the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), who first suggested that we ought to include phasing in this side of the Bill as well

as the employment side, had put his name to an Amendment to get phasing out of the Bill. I thought we were meeting his point. The phasing that we propose is that for two years there should be 12, instead of six persons. As in the case of employment, the point is that where these provisions will come as a shock to people living in small households, they will have two years in which to accustom themselves to what the Bill means. It will also make it easier to explain to people the idea. There are parts of the Bill which deal with education. It gives people more time before the full impact comes.
Then we deal with some other points in the Clause which describe and define what is meant by "small premises". They are defined in subsection (2) in the way in which I have described.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: This is the first time that I have spoken in any of the discussions on the Bill. I believe that we are now on the most important Clause in it. It is the one Clause which, as it stands, would tempt me to vote against the Third Reading of the Bill, although on balance I do not intend to do so.
I object to the part of the Clause and the Amendments to it which still retain as a necessary part of exception for any persons letting any accommodation the fact that they have to share part of the living accommodation of the house with the person to whom they are letting.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government said just now that there were two alternatives for exception. One was where there were two households or less, where the premises were let as separate dwellings, or where there were not normally more than six people residing there, and the persons were, presumably, lodgers taken into the house. What the hon. Gentleman failed to say was that the Amendments still require as a qualification for exemption the fact that they must share part of the living accommodation.
The Amendments do not cover what I regard as a very important case—that of the person who lets part of his house as a self-contained dwelling. I should express an interest here, since I live in a house the top floor of which is let as a


self-contained flat. The flat has, although I do not think it matters for the purpose of the Bill, a separate entrance and the people who live in it and the rest of us in the house do not share accommodation. However, in letting that flat, we are letting it to people who live in very close proximity to us.
While I hope and believe that I am completely free of colour prejudice, and while I should be willing and happy to have as tenants in the flat people from any part of the world, nevertheless, I believe that there is a principle here in that the owner of property should have the choice of who his tenants are to be in his own house, and I would fight for that right. Where we are concerned with extremely limited accommodation of this kind, it is unfortunate that the Government have not attempted to exempt from the provisions of the Bill the position of a person who has, say, one self-contained flat in his house.
Probably I have put the point badly but I believe that a principle is involved here. Indeed, this is a clash, and an extremely difficult clash, of principles. On the one hand, most of us would say that not only do we regret any form of discrimination but we believe that the law has a part to play in creating a structure which would discourage prejudice; on the other hand, I believe that the individual owner of property has a right to dispose of his own property or part of it in the way he wishes and that, however irresponsible his prejudice may be—whether or not he likes persons with red hair or long hair, for instance—he is, when letting his own premises, entitled to express that prejudice in deciding who he should have in that accommodation when the tenant will be living in close proximity to him.
I do not think, therefore, that the Amendments go far enough. I regret that the Government have not seen fit to exclude the prejudice of the individual when letting part of his own premises as against prejudice which may be expressed from a business point of view when letting a block of flats, for example. I will not vote against Third Reading but if there is anything in the Bill which tempts me to do so it is the fact that the Government have not given way on this point and have not brought in an

Amendment to permit the individual living in his own premises to express prejudices, however ridiculous they may be, when letting part of his own house. This should apply irrespective of whether or not he and the tenant happen to have to share a bathroom or a dining room or anything else.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. Paul B. Rose: I have known the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) for a long time and I know that everything he says is said with the greatest sincerity. He is caught by this dilemma of personal freedom in the disposal and use of one's property and another freedom. It is this other freedom which tends to be underrated and perhaps underestimated by certain hon. Members. It is the freedom from discrimination. Just as one upholds freedom from libel or slander as against freedom of speech, so there is the hon. Member's dilemma. I take issue with him, because he fails to distinguish between intimate contact when facilities are shared and when contact is far more remote, when the premises are self-contained and separate. When they are self-contained and separate, there is a different principle.
I wish to address myself to Amendment No. 32 which stands in my name. I have suggested it because, as the Clause stands, it could provide a serious loophole by which its legitimate and reasonable purpose could be defeated and which might permit a whole number of new exemptions which were not envisaged in the wording suggested by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary. In my view, it is not unreasonable to define with which shared facilities we are concerned, but there is no attempt, either in the Clause as it stands or as it would be amended, to define what we mean by shared accommodation. The only attempt at that at one time was to deal with means of access. If we can go so far as to talk about means of access as something different from shared accommodation, we could be much more specific and say exactly what we mean by shared facilities.

Mr. MacColl: I draw my hon. Friend's attention to the Government Amendments No. 31 and No. 32 which will deal with that.

Mr. Rose: I have seen those Amendments which deal with storage accommodation and means of access and use the phrase "relevant accommodation". That does not meet the point which I am about to make, because, notwithstanding the wording suggested by the Amendments, it would be possible for a landlord to provide what he might call a common room, lounge, or parlour to which, he said, he gave access to all persons on the premises. He could establish a sort of legal fiction that a room was not part of the premises let to a particular tenant and he could then say that the tenants shared it.
That is why I suggest in my Amendment that we define precisely what we mean by shared premises. I refer to water closet, kitchen or cooking facilities, bathroom or washing facilities and not a living-room. That goes wide enough, because those are the places where in normal living one would come into contact with other people resident in the same premises. It would be going far too wide if, for example, we exempted a room where people got together for a talk in the evening.

Mr. Gower: Would the hon. Gentleman extend that classification to include in certain circumstances houses where a common entrance was unavoidable?

Mr. Rose: I think that the hon. Gentleman is missing my point. There is a reasonable exemption for shared facilities or shared accommodation. I am saying that it is a reasonable objection in the facilities which I have mentioned, but it would not be reasonable just because access happened to be shared, or because there was a common room, or a sort of lounge, which was shared. I accept that it is reasonable where one would have to share a bathroom and that is why I am trying to make the definition more specific. I do not criticise the Government for making the concession contained in their Amendments, but I believe that the definition is now even more important.
It is perfectly reasonable to ask my hon. Friends on the Front Bench if, before this matter is dealt with in another place, they will look at it again to see whether the definition of shared accommodation can be written into the Bill. Without it, it will be only too easy for

someone intent upon driving a coach and horses through the Bill to create the sort of legal fiction where, by saying that a certain room is at the disposal of all the people in the premises, the whole purpose of the Bill will be defeated. I ask my hon. Friend to comment on this, and to undertake that he will look at it further.

Mr. Grieve: I am sure that the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) will forgive me if I do not attempt to follow him in the matters which he has discussed. I cannot help feeling, if I am to comment on them briefly, that he is straining after a gnat. I would not wish for one moment to see the definition of "shared accommodation" whittled down—quite the contrary. I wish to follow a point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). I am deeply grateful to him for taking it up.
I took it up in Committee and tabled Amendments designed to exclude from the scope of the Bill houses subdivided into two or three, but not more, units. I entirely share my hon. Friend's disappointment that the Government have not seen fit, on reconsideration, although we divided on this in Committee, to think again about this problem. If one applies the test of initimate personal proximity, what could come more clearly within the scope of that test than the small terraced, semi-detached or even detached house in which the householder, in order to augment his or her income, has subdivided it into two or possibly three units? In the majority of cases, the house is divided into two.
To say that if the kitchen, bathroom and lavatory, because they are the most ordinary examples of shared accommodation, are not shared, then one has entirely separate households, and not intimate personal proximity, seems to me an absolute nonsense of the application of this principle to the legislation. I do not have the personal experience of my hon. Friend because I do not live in a house divided in that way. In Committee I spoke on behalf of those who had converted such houses, and earlier this evening I spoke on behalf of widows.
I hope that I will not bore the House by returning to this cause again. The type of person most likely to have converted her house is the widow, who finds that the


accommodation left to her by her husband is too great, and who serves an extremely useful social purpose in subdividing her house, perhaps providing accommodation for a young couple. It is a shocking thing that the State should now intervene and seek to exercise control, however remote, over the choice of the person living in the other part of the accommodation.
When the people of this country realise what is being done to them by this part of this legislation—I think a great many of them do already—it is then that the legislation is most likely to defeat the ends of those bringing it forward. Instead of improving race relations it is likely to embitter them. What could more embitter someone than that, when they should have part of their house on the market, the hitherto irrefutable right to exercise their choice as to its tenant should be challenged? Someone could, possibly quite wrongly, say that they were being discriminated against and the person who had let the accommodation would have to go before the Race Relations Board, and explain their case, with all the inadequacies of the power of explanation which such people often have. It cannot improve the cause of good relations; it can only harm it. I ask the Government to think again about this.

Mr. Rose: To denigrate this merely because the complainant may fail and be wrong is entirely illogical. On the same basis one would say that the whole machinery of our civil law should be abandoned because frequently plaintiffs fail in their case.

Mr. Grieve: The hon. Gentleman fails to realise that for the first time the Legislature is interfering with what has hitherto been regarded as the fundamental right of our people to say who they shall have under their roof. The burden on those who seek to do that, however good their reason for doing it, it very great; it is enormous. I find the interference in the private household, whether the kitchen, lavatory and bathroom are shared or not, absolutely intolerable. I think that that would be the reaction of the vast majority of people in this country.
I hope for the sake, not only of our ancient and fundamental liberties, but of the cause which I believe Government

Front Bench spokesmen and those behind them have at heart, of good race relations in this country, that the Government will think again about this matter.

Dr. Miller: The hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) talked about depriving people of the right to decide whom they should have as tenants and who should occupy their houses. The people still have that right. I call his attention to the object of the Bill, which is merely that one should not discriminate on certain grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origin. This holds good for the fears which the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) has in connection with his dilemma about shared accommodation or accommodation which is separate but where people nevertheless live in close proximity.
Why should the principle that discrimination on the grounds mentioned in the Bill be maintained? The Bill does not prevent people from deciding who should occupy their premises. I would go so far as to say that it may have a beneficial effect, because in many instances more care should be taken in letting or disposing of accommodation of this kind. It is wrong to say that the Bill should apply only to large premises, because it is in small premises that the greatest hurt and offence occur. We must always remember the tremendous affront and offence given to a group of innocent people who are our citizens and who in every respect may be admirable tenants but the colour of whose skin might not be suitable to certain prejudiced individuals.
All that is requested is that discrimination should not take place on grounds of colour, or ethnic or national origin. In other words, no one denies people the right to prevent someone from occupying premises which belong to the owner on any other ground except those which I have mentioned. I do not think that the establishing of a principle in this respect is something with which the hon. Member for Runcorn would disagree.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Carlisle: Surely, there is this trouble. Let us leave aside for the moment the question of colour and come to nationality. With great respect to the hon. Member, let us say that a Scotsman comes to one's door to take a flat. One


may say, "I do not like his face, I do not want him", but under the Bill there is the danger that the applicant would go on to say that he was turned down because he was a Scotsman. The landlord would be in great difficulty in replying that he refused him, not because he was a Scotsman, but because he did not like the man's face.

Dr. Miller: That is precisely the point. A balance is involved. The owner of the property might not like the person's face or the way he looks, and the person might then take objection and feel that the reason why he was refused the premises was that he was a Scotsman or was coloured or whatever reason is applicable under the Bill. When the complaint is made to the Race Relations Board, it would soon be obvious that the reason for refusal was not ethnic or national origin or colour but was something entirely different. That is the important point. This is where the balance is involved.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Interventions must be brief.

Mr. Carlisle: The hon. Member is making his speech, Mr. Speaker, and had kindly given way to me.

Mr. Speaker: My profound apologies to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin-grove (Dr. Miller).

Mr. Carlisle: I agree that with a conciliation stage the landlord might be able to show that he turned the applicant down, not because he was a Scotsman, but because he did not like the man's face. The danger is, however, that a person in that position would be afraid to refuse to let the flat to a person whom he did not like because he would say to himself, "Although I do not like him, he is also a Scotsman."

Mr. Speaker: Order. With more justification, I repeat interventions must be brief.

Mr. Carlisle: I apologise, Mr. Speaker. If I may conclude, the landlady or landlord would be afraid to refuse the person because he was a Scotsman or was coloured in the belief that he or she would be taken to court.

Dr. Miller: On balance that is not a bad thing at all, because if the landlord wishes to refute the allegation that he

has refused on the ground of colour or for the other reasons set out in the Bill, he is at liberty to do so. If he does not want to get himself involved in any possibility of proceedings, I submit with humility that on balance this is a good thing. It is not necessary that every object should be achieved—indeed, every object will not be achieved—but one has to have a balance in this.
I suggest that to reduce the number of people to which this provision applies by making it not applicable to smaller households would destroy one of the main objects of the Bill. It is obvious from all reports that people who are being discriminated against find the greatest difficulty when they go to households of that kind. In most instances, it is the rent of only the smaller households that immigrants can afford. I would suggest therefore that to increase the numbers, thereby making the provision apply only to larger establishments, would be against the principles of the Bill.

Mr. Gower: With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I think he is living in a world of make-believe in considering this problem. Enough has been said by my hon. Friends to show that these Amendments are not adequate. I hope the hon. Gentleman will realise that this is a highly personal relationship; it is not a normal relationship to have someone under one's own roof, or even to be in close proximity at the entrance, where there is a common entrance, or even a common drive; and the Clause, even with the Amendment, will not operate in anything like the manner which the hon. Gentleman suggested.
What will happen will be that the uninitiated widow who has been mentioned may well be afraid not to let her premises for some quite extraneous reason, but the cleverer person will not let at all. The person who is initiated and who can see ahead will refuse to let at all and will keep the place vacant until such time as she has a tenant of her own choice. Therefore, it will not operate fairly between two persons. It will operate most unfairly unless there is a further Amendment. I implore the Government to look again at this matter in that light.
I accept that the Amendment is a slight improvement but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) suggested, where there is a


letting of part of a house, with the owner and the new tenant in constant proximity, perhaps every morning and every evening, in those circumstances the objective of creating more accommodation for persons who are short of it, people for immigrant communities and so on, would be defeated. We need to create more accommodation, and we would be defeating the objective unless we widened the exemptions which are granted by these modest Amendments.

Mr. Heffer: I wonder whether the hon. Gentlemen understand the situation when they speak in terms of shared accommodation or separate accommodation under the same roof. I have a feeling that, apart from the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) who gave his own personal experience, it has not been the experience of many hon. Members opposite to be involved in this sort of situation.
I understand very well the position that could arise with shared accommodation, in the sense of a shared bathroom, shared toilet facilities, a shared kitchen or possibly a communal room. I understand that this could lead to all sorts of problems which would never arise with separate accommodation in the sense of a completely self-contained flat. What do we mean by "close proximity"? It would mean that somebody in a self-contained flat, possibly in the upstairs part of a house, would come down the stairs in the morning and go out of the front door to work, or come into the front door at night and go up to the self-contained flat. That is the sort of proximity we are talking about.
That is the reality of the situation, which is very different from the situation that would exist with two women at night using the same kitchen facilities. I know about shared accommodation. I mentioned to the Committee my own experience of living with a Jewish family for seven years in genuine shared accommodation, where we did not eat the same foods, but we shared the toilet facilities, the cooking facilities and we both had bedrooms on the first floor. I know about shared accommodation and I know the problems which can arise from close proximity where two women share a kitchen. However, that is not the same thing, and it must be kept in perspective.
Once again, the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) drew the

picture of the poor widow woman. He did not use the name "Mrs. Murphy", who was referred to frequently in Committee. Indeed, I remember referring to her myself and saying that I knew all about her because she lives in my constituency. The point is that the widow woman who lets off one or two rooms in the form of shared accommodation is not touched under the Bill. Therefore, the problem does not arise.

Mr. Grieve: But the widow who divides her house into two, even though it be a small house with thin walls and ceilings and a small garden, is.

Mr. Heffer: In such a case, the accommodation becomes a self-contained flat and creates the sort of proximity that I have referred to already.
There have been the Mrs. Murphies who themselves have been prejudiced in the first place but who have taken in coloured families. Originally, she was not happy with the idea, but she took in the family and eventually has been seen holding the baby, looking after the children and becoming part of the family. Those of us who live in areas where there are coloured populations know what happens in such cases.
I ask hon. Members to keep matters in perspective. I understand the problems and fears involved, but we are discussing separate accommodation and, in these circumstances, I think that the Bill covers all the fears that hon. Members have expressed.

Mr. Deedes: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), I find that this part of the Bill brings me closer to direct conflict with it than any other section. What I have heard of the discussions so far in no way reduces my feeling, partly because every hon. Member is speaking from his own experience, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) has just done and as my hon. Friend did. The simple fact is that we shall not be able with exactitude to determine the conditions which cover the wide miscellany of instances which will arise under these provisions.
As my hon. Friend said, this is the most personal and perhaps the most difficult area into which the Bill takes us. We are dealing with no past experience


and very little data by way of a background. In a sense, we are guessing what will touch people here or there. As the hon. Member for Walton has just done most reasonably, we talk about close proximity. That may be defined in a dezen different circumstances and in a hundred different ways. We shall discover this as we go along.
I do not want to delay discussion about this except to express the view which I share with my hon. Friend, but I think that this part of the Bill ought to make us very careful of any assumption that the Measure will last for three or five years and will be beyond change or remedy after it is passed tonight.
There are many people with strong views about race relations who feel that this is the last chance in the sense that it will be the last Measure for a long time and will become the definitive Statute on the subject. They think that what we do here will be final. But if there is any part of the Bill which makes me hope that that is not so and about which we shall want to consider amending legislation in the light of experience, it is that with which we are dealing now.
However sincerely hon. Members apply their minds to this problem and speak from their experience and from the experience of their constituents, we cannot—even the Home Secretary cannot, with all the assistance at his disposal —guarantee to get this right first time. Some of this legislation is, therefore, bound to be wrong. I hope, therefore, that we will approach the possibility of amending legislation with an open mind, remembering that changes may be necessary in due course.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I wish to concentrate on Amendment No. 27, which seeks to exclude shared accommodation, as mentioned in subsection (l)(c), and which is designed to delete subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) which, in any event, the Government propose to delete. I commend the Amendment as being the way in principle to consider this whole matter.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) approaches this matter with a complete disregard of the principle that is involved. There is a direct conflict here between the principle

that there should not be discrimination on grounds of colour or race, with which the Bill deals in part, and the principle that there should not be invasion of the personal privacy of an individual in his own home. A person in his home has, I believe, an absolute right to discriminate against everybody.
If I dislike Jews or coloured people, if I am an Ulsterman and object to those who come from Southern Ireland or if I dislike the Chinese, I have every right to discriminate in my own home. If, for reasons of prejudice, I have become, as is referred to in Mau Mau, so persecuted by a particular sect that I can no longer stand them—and there are people throughout the country, and in the party opposite, who would under no circumstances have an ex-member of the Nazi Party in their homes if he was a German and who would be objecting, therefore, on ethnic grounds—[Interruption.]

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Rees-Davies: I will give way shortly. I wish to be explicit about this. The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) knows this.

Mr. Rose: Mr. Rose rose—

Mr. Rees-Davies: Would the hon. Gentleman accept a Nazi in his home who was a German?

Dr. Miller: I would certainly not object to any German coming into my home—

Mr. Rees-Davies: I was putting the question to the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackely, who is of the Jewish faith and who would be absolutely justified in refusing to have a Nazi or ex-Nazi in his home. I would agree with him.

Mr. Rose: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I would be perfectly happy to welcome a German into my home? Is he also aware that to discriminate against a Nazi would be to discriminate on grounds of his politics and beliefs, inherent in his being a Nazi, and not because he is a German, which is no fault of his, any more than it is the hon. Gentleman's fault that he is what he is, unfortunate though that is?

Mr. Rees-Davies: That is not true. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It is a well


known, perfectly proper and reasonable fact that those of the Jewish faith would be singularly unlikely to accept Germans into their homes at the present time. [Interruption.]

Several Hon. Members rose․

Mr. Speaker: Order.We can debate this matter calmly.

Mr. Heffer: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we in Liverpool, as trade unionists and as members of the Labour Party, have been inviting young German trade unionists to Liverpool for many years and that many of our Jewish colleagues have been accepting them gladly into their homes?

Mr. Rees-Davies: Of course, I entirely accept that statement but, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, it is quite irrelevant to my point. What I am pointing out is that we have an absolute conflict here between two principles, and the House must face it. It is the conflict between whether or not it is believed that an Englishman's home is his castle, and that he is entitled to discriminate in his own home but not outside it. I was merely seeking to point that out as a fact, and to say that we are faced with this position. Hon. Member, opposite always try to have their cake and eat it. They will not face the fact that there is here a fundamental conflict of principle.
I believe that a man should be entitled in his own home to decide, on prejudice or any other grounds, either to have or refuse anyone in that home. I am entirely in favour of a Bill, and this Bill, in so far as it seeks to prevent discrimination in jobs, and outside homes—in hotels, for instance, and many other places. But I say that in his own home, whether or not it is shared accommodation, a man ought to be entitled to do exactly as he pleases, and that no one at all in this country, least of all the Government, should have any power to interfere with the way in which he seeks to operate the management of his own home. I hope that at least we can agree on that point.
It is not a crime to have a prejudice. It is only a crime to express it in circumstances which will violate the accepted rules of human conduct. I may intensely dislike some particular form of colour, or

class or nation—so many other hon. Members—either for good cause or no cause. It is no crime in this country to be able to feel that, but in one's own home it ought not to be any crime to express it.
How can one make the situation plainer? Suppose an individual has a violent objection to the Jewish race, wishes to express it in the privacy of his own home but, perforce, has had thrust on him someone upstairs of the Jewish nationality. That will obviously cause trouble and will end up before the Board. It is not right that we should intrude. Let me give another example. I would always resist, and have resisted, efforts of Government to introduce into the affairs of matrimony as between husband and wife in their own home. We do not seek to probe that conduct at all unless it offends certain matrimonial laws, because it is the privacy between husband and wife.
Likewise, here, there is a conflict of principle. I quite accept that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Walton comes down, from the practical experience of which he has spoken, and which I entirely accept from him, on the side of preferring a Measure which outlaws discrimination rather than one which does not involve the invasion of one's own private home. I point out, and I am sure that he will be tolerant enough to accept this, that many of us take precisely the opposite view where that conflict arises. Amendment No. 27 goes to the root of the matter, and is the only way of doing what we want.
In the place of this Amendment, it is sought to put Government Amendment No. 33. It is no answer to earlier debates on Clause 2 to say that inserting the words "small premises" and seeking to add permission to have six persons in addition to the landlord and his family will answer the problem of the small paying-guest accommodation.
The House will remember that earlier the Under-Secretary pointed out that we had to come to Clause 7 to answer the position of the small boarding-house keeper, but this Clause does not answer it. It is no answer for the small boarding-house keeper to be told that with his family he can have up to six guests only in the establishment and if it is


not more than six he will not be guilty of discrimination provided those six share the accommodation in that establishment. If the law is passed in this form, it will mean that Mr. and Mrs. Bloggs can have up to six people in their accommodation provided it is shared, which means the kitchen, bathroom and other facilities are all shared, and they can be exempt. But if there are seven, eight, nine or 10 guests in the modem type of accommodation, such as flatlets, even if there are thin partitions through which people can be heard, they will be caught. I find that wholly inadequate.
There is an Amendment in the names of my hon. Friends which seeks to make the number 12. That would have been infinitely more reasonable although I do not think it would have gone far enough. If the Government had made some effort to meet this position we would have been happier. They have not done so and I do not think they have faced the dichotomy of these two principles which are at loggerheads. Time will show that we shall have to amend this Measure in order to put this right. This will be so because in the years ahead personal freedom will become the dominant principle.

Sir D. Renton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You have said that Amendment No. 33, which provides a new Government subsection to Clause 7, shall be discussed with Amendment No. 25. On the Notice Paper my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Mary-lebone, other hon. Friends and I have put down two Amendments to Amendment No. 33. We attach great importance to those two Amendments. I hope that we may have your permission to have a Division, at any rate on the first of them, in order that our views may be expressed.

Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member. I think that to ask for two Divisions would be unreasonable, but I am prepared to grant a Division on the first Amendment to Amendment No. 33.

Sir D. Renton: I am much obliged, Mr. Speaker.
In Clause 7 we are dealing with one of the most difficult parts of the Bill. We are dealing with human relations at their most intimate and most sensitive stage—

people living cheek by jowl under the same roof in what is normally a private house. In those circumstances, one would generally say that the right to privacy should prevail and there should be no interference with it whatever. That is another way of saying, as my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) said, that an Englishman's home is his castle. [An HON. MEMBER: "He was wrong."]
We should be very careful indeed before we depart from that principle. The Government have said that some houses are so large and contain so many people, and the accommodation may be so separated, that we should legislate in such a way that the letting of that accommodation should not be the subject of discrimination. The Government themselves have accepted up to a point the principle of privacy, but they then say that we must draw the line. These are complicated Amendments. The Parliamentary Secretary did his best to explain their effect. I understand the position is that in order to gain exemption from the general discrimination part of the Bill, the accommodation in the circumstances we have in mind must clearly be for not more than six people and the landlord, the landlord must reside there and intend to continue to reside there, and there must be shared accommodation, which is defined as accommodation other than storage accommodation and means of access.
9.45 p.m.
Bearing in mind our discussions in Committee, which were on somewhat the same lines as the discussions we have had tonight, although I think that some important new points have been brought out tonight, I find the Government's attitude disappointing. They still have too stringent an attitude towards what will happen under the roof of a private house. I do not think that the Government Amendments adequately meet the realities of the small divided dwelling, because that is what we are dealing with, especially in crowded conditions.
Further, as my hon. Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) pointed out, no provision is made as to a part of a private house which is let as a self-contained flat—that is, without there being any shared accommodation. In any event, quite apart from the points


raised by our Amendments, that is a point which should engage the Parliamentary Secretary's attention as something to be dealt with later.
I come to our Amendments to Amendment No. 33. Amendment No. 33 would provide that, apart from the landlord and his household, there must be no more than six people in order that there shall be exemption; but it says—this is in the new subsection (3)—that in the first two years it will be all right if there are 12 people. We say that that is unrealistic and too restrictive. The combined effect of our two Amendments to Amendment 33 would be that the exemption should apply if there are no more than 12 people plus the landlord and his household.
If that is right, it would be right for a good many years to come. I do not say for all time, because, as was pointed out so rightly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), there can be no finality about legislation of this kind. We must feel our way. However, all the indications are that the Bill will be in operation for from three to five years. The next Government—we have a pretty good idea of which party they will be composed—will have to take a careful look at it, and especially at Clause 7. We believe that for the few years for which the Bill will run it would be right to plump for a limit of 12 people as forming the right dividing line between the circumstances where complete privacy should be allowed to prevail and the circumstances in which there may be scope for preventing discrimination.
I do not want to repeat the points made so forcefully by my hon. Friends. A very strong case has been made for further thoughts to be taken on this very delicate matter. I am sure that the Parliamentary Secretary himself would not wish to invade the right of privacy in a man's own home any more than is absolutely necessary to prevent discrimination in circumstances where it would be reasonable to do so.

Mr. MacColl: This is, as right hon. and hon. Members on both sides have said, a very difficult problem. It is a question of striking a careful balance between the rights of the owner of the

house and those of the unfortunate person who is trying to find somewhere to live. I fully accept that. I fully understand the difficulties. I thought that it was all the more unfair of hon. Members opposite to chide us with having done nothing to meet any of the points that they had raised.

Mr. Grieve: We did nothing of the kind. My hon. Friends the Members for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) and others and I chided the Joint Parliamentary Secretary with not meeting the specific question of the house sub-divided into independent units.

Mr. MacColl: I wish to deal with the other point raised by the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet, the question of the number of people, the number of lodgers, to be written into the Bill. In Committee, hon. Members suggested 20, but, as the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) said, there was general agreement that that was too high. In their Amendment to Clause 2, hon. Members suggested 10. We suggest that for two years it should be 12 and that after two years, after the test period or phasing for which the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) asked, it should come down to six. All the response we have to that is that we ought to make it 12 for all time. Right hon. and hon. Members may not think that we have gone far enough in this difficult matter, but to say that we have not looked carefully and anxiously at the question is to be less than fair.
I agree with what the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) said in his last speech in the House. He said that there was a problem here, that one was not entitled to interfere with conduct because one thought it morally reprehensible unless there were important social consequences arising from the conduct in question. I entirely share that view. It is a good starting point. Where I part company from the right hon. and learned Gentleman is in my assessment of the social consequences. In housing more than in any other field in which racial prejudice can operate, the social consequences, the consequences to the public apart from the parties directly concerned, can be disastrous because, unless people can have a


wide choice of homes, they cannot avoid the sort of concentration in certain parts of towns which becomes known as the ghetto.
When the Government are scolded, as they often are, for not doing enough to deal with overcrowding caused in certain areas by immigration—this is the problem, the problem of concentration, not a wide spread over the country—one can only reply that it is possible to do little unless in addition to the public sector housing available there is also a wide choice of private accommodation. As one of my hon. Friends said, it must be accommodation which is cheap, accommodation of the kind which ordinary people want to use, not merely large houses. That is the reason why we consider that we have drawn the right line.
I should draw attention to one point about the self-contained flat which has not been mentioned. Under the Clause as we propose to amend it, if there are, say, three storeys to the house, the bottom one being in the occupation of the owner and the next sharing accommodation with it, the top storey can be self-contained. It is not necessary to have sharing of accommodation with each of the other two households. To some extent, therefore, that goes in the direction of meeting the point made by the hon. Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle).

Dr. Miller: Surely, my hon. Friend is aware of the situation in places like Glasgow in the tenement blocks which may be three, four, or sometimes 10 or 12 storeys high. There is separate close accommodation for people, but there are all kinds of common parts, a common entrance and common facilities. There is really no difference between that kind of proximity and the kind of proximity about which hon. Members opposite are worried.

Mr. McColl: The difficulty here is to decide where to draw the line. I am dealing with the point raised by the hon. Member for Runcorn, whose views everyone respects. The great snag in this proposal which he saw was the one raised by the self-contained flat. When we come to draw the line, the self-contained flat with its separate door which can be locked is a reasonable test of whether or not the man's home is being shared or a separate home is created with which he

is dealing as a separate unit of accommodation. If we went so far as to include vertical self-contained accommodation, we should have the difficult question of what we do about self-contained accommodation going laterally. There is the problem of the next door house, of the two semi-detached houses, when the man who buys them lets one and not the other, as so often happens. One would soon get into great difficulties about the kind of test to be applied.
I recognise that this is a difficult problem which the Street Committee found baffling. It did not come to a conclusion on it, but set out clearly the choice which should be made and took as the test the question of intimate personal proximity. It said that if the owner of a block of 50 flats chooses to live in one he is quite clearly not living in his own home with the others. Similarly, if there are three self-contained flats with three different tenants, the Committee did not think that that should be regarded as the letting of a home. It is a commercial transaction. It then considered the case where there are other tenants in the accommodation sharing the facilities, and thought that this was the strongest. Interestingly enough, it used the widow, whose shadow has been the background of all our proceedings, to show that her main needs would be met not by converting to self-contained accommodation but by dealing with the sharing point.
Therefore, the Clause in its new form is the result of very careful, painful and conscientious examination of the problem to try to find the right balance between a number of possibilities, all of which are attractive in one way or another. My advice to the House is that it should accept the Clause in its new form.

Mr. Hogg: I must begin by apologising for not having been present throughout this important discussion. Obviously, in a prolonged debate such as this, one must delegate one's rests when one is away. I apologise to the hon. Members who have taken part, including my hon. Friends, for not having been present throughout.
Everyone would agree that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary has proceeded in a peaceable and wholly acceptable manner. I hope to do the same, although I think that the question will inevitably proceed to a Division. I hope that it


will be a Division without any ill-will, as the last one can be said to have been.
There are points of agreement, at any rate between the two Front Benches, and it is as well to emphasise them and the points of difference here. Both sides are agreed that in the intimate field of housing, both for reasons of convenience, which are important, and for reasons of principle, there must be an exemption limit of some kind. We think—we have divided upon this, and, therefore, I do not need to elaborate the difference—that there should be separate treatment for temporary accommodation and accommodation which is sought as a permanent home. I do not want to embark upon this again.

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Ordered,
That the Proceedings on the Race Relations Bill may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour, though opposed.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Question again proposed, That the Amendment be made.

Mr. Hogg: The Government on the whole have sought to place their exemption limit common to both temporary accommodation and permanent accommodation, and we have sought to make a separate exemption limit for temporary and permanent accommodation. We are now dealing with permanent accommodation, recognising that the Government have ha$ their way in embracing temporary accommodation with it.
The first question is that of sharing. Should that be an essential factor in declaring what is meant by "small accommodation"? We think "no"; I understand that the Government think "yes". This is not a fundamental difference between the two sides of the House, although it is a difference on which we may have to choose by voting.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), to whose views I always listen with respect, spoke of his own experience and tended to think that the Government were right. I can speak only of my experience. I have had only the shortest period of my life in shared accommodation, but in the course of my professional life I have had considerable

experience of the bitterness and misery caused by people who do not get on in multiple units whether the accommodation of the kitchen and so on is shared or not.
I do not find the criterion of shared accommodation decisive. It is, of course, extremely important. Whether a kitchen, a toilet or a bathroom is shared is perhaps one of the most important factors in the situation, and I do not want to underestimate it, but noise and deliberately engineered nuisance occur whether the accommodation is shared or not. In my early days at the Bar in the Shoreditch and Clerkenwell County Courts the number of miserable, bitter, prolonged, expensive and unrewarding disputes that I heard being fought out to nobody's advantage which depended simply on noise or mutual persecution were almost unnumbered. I admit that shared accommodation is important, but I do not find it decisive.

Mr. Heffer: Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that most of those cases, which I entirely accept exist, had nothing to do with colour, racial or ethnic problems? It was merely that individuals did not get on with each other.

Mr. Hogg: I agree absolutely with the hon. Gentleman. In those days—I am speaking of many years ago—the question of race hardly arose. This is a novel problem, but I think we are entitled to bring our personal experiences to bear on the problem of race as it has emerged in the last 12 or perhaps 20 years. The reasons why people do not get on are innumerable. It may be religion, it may be race, it may be family or it may be personal. They are irrational in their inception, but they are none the less miserable in their results.
The question we are trying to concentrate on is the point at which we draw the line, there being two incompatible principles, as my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) said, to bring to bear in the situation. There is the right of the individual to do what other people think wrong and there are the social consequences which proceed from the fact that a great number of people act in the same way. The question is not one of a vast gulf between the two sides of the


House. That would be a wrong way of presenting the problem. The Government have yielded to the Opposition on an important and significant but not fundamental point. The Bill as unamended said "four". The Government have said "twelve for two years and six thereafter." This is a concession and it would be churlish of me to under-estimate that they have argued this matter out with us and have come to a conclusion based on the desire to be reasonable.
The point at which we are at issue is not a vast question of principle but it may be one of considerable practical importance. The Government have moved from four to 12 for two years and thereafter to six and we say that there should be 12 but without a tapering period. That is the question we are debating. It is a narrow question but one which affects the fortunes of many thousands and, therefore, I am entitled to spend time upon it. It is not a question which shakes society to its foundations. If we divide upon it, I hope that we shall do so without bad temper.
The reasons which have led me to take the higher rather than the lower limit are twofold. The first is the question of workability, of the practical efficiency of the Bill. It is true that a large number of people live in units of accommodation which come within the higher exemption limit which I would seek to impose, bat on the other hand the amount of reward one gets for investigating any particular complaint which affects the range between six and 12 is very small.
I want the Race Relations Board to do significant and important work. I do not want it to get bogged down on a great number of small and individually unremunerative cases, each of which takes just as much time and trouble to investigate as one of the larger cases. That is a reasonable and practical ground of convenience.
Secondly, I appeal to the principle of justice. The managers of small units of accommodation have to face different management problems from those of the larger units. I have pointed this out before and I do not want to weary the House with it, but the question of scale ultimately develops into a question of principle. If one employs five men, one cannot make switches or make individual arrangements of the sort one can make

if one employs a large number of people. It is a question of judgment as to where to draw the line and I would prefer the higher to the lower limit.
Lastly, we come to the question of tapering. There are those who have used the question of tapering in seeking to show that we on this side, by avoiding the tapering provisions, want to enshrine our limit in permanent form for ever. That is not so. I have said this before but it is important to repeat it. We are embarking upon a novel and in some ways perilous kind of legislation, as our current discussions have shown. I do not pretend that the limit which we have proposed is a matter of eternal verity at all.
In the nature of things—and I say this without attempting to make a party point —this Parliament is ultimately coming to an end at some time. The tapering limits which have been proposed by the Government in both this and the employment provisions probably overstretch the bounds of this Parliament, and another Government, conceivably of the same, but probably of a different complexion, will take their place. Are we to legislate for that Parliament or that Government, or to legislate as far as we can see? We on this side of the House think that we should legislate as far as we can see, and that is not particularly far in this context. A new Government—and a new Parliament will legislate in the light of the experience of what the limits should be. We think that 12 and not six is the right limit. We think that we should not limit the legislation to shared accommodation and we think that temporary accommodation should be separately treated.
In those circumstances, despite the very courteous, careful and conscientious speech of the Parliamentary Secretary, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide the House as I have indicated.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 26, in page 3, line 40, leave out 'resides' and insert:
'(in this subsection and subsection (2) below referred to as "the landlord") resides and intends to continue to reside'.

No. 29, in line 41, leave out paragraph (b).

No. 31, in page 4, line 9, leave out from 'by' to 'shared' in line 10 and insert 'the landlord, relevant accommodation'.—[Mr. MacColl.]

Amendment proposed: No. 33, in page 4, line 12, at end insert:
'(2) Premises shall be treated for the purposes of subsection (1) above as small premises if—
(a) in the case of premises comprising residential accommodation for one or more households (under separate letting or similar agreements) in addition to the accommodation occupied by the landlord, there is not normally residential accommodation for more than two such households and only the landlord and any member of his household reside in the accommodation occupied by him;

(b) in the case of premises not falling within paragraph (a) above, there is not normally residential accommodation on the premises for more than six persons in addition to the landlord and any members of his household.

(3) During the two years beginning with the commencement of this Act, subsection (2)(b) above shall have effect as if for the reference to six persons there were substituted a reference to twelve persons'.—[Mr. MacColl.]

Amendment proposed to the proposed Amendment, in paragraph (b) leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.—[Mr. Hogg.]

Question put, That the Amendment to the proposed Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 149, Noes 234.

Division No. 272.]
AYES
[10.14 p.m.


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Grant-Ferris, R.
Onslow, Cranley


Astor, John
Gresham Cooke, R.
Osborn, John (Hallam)


Atkins, Humphrey (M't'n &amp; M'd'n)
Grieve, Percy
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)


Awdry, Daniel
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
 Page, Graham (Crosby)


Baker, Kenneth (Acton)
Gurden, Harold
Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Peel, John


Bell, Ronald
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Percival, Ian


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Pounder, Rafton


Biff en, John
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch


Biggs-Davison, John
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Pym, Francis


Black, Sir Cyril
Heald, Rt. Hn. Sir Lionel
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Blaker, Peter
Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
 Higgins, Terence L.
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David


Body, Richard
Hirst, Geoffrey
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Bossom, Sir Clive
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Brewis, John
Holland, Philip
Ridsdale, Julian


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Howell, David (Guildford)
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Bryan, Paul
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Royle, Anthony


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Iremonger, T. L.
Russetl, Sir Ronald


Bullus, Sir Eric
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Scott-Hopkins, James


Burden, F. A.
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Sharpies, Richard


Campbell, B. (Oldham, W.)
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Silvester, Frederick


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Smith, Dudley (W'wick &amp; L'mington)


Carlisle, Mark
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Smith, John (London &amp; W'minster)


Chichester-Clark, R.
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Speed, Keith


Cooke, Robert
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Stainton, Keith


Cordle, John
Kirk, Peter
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M. (Rlpon)


Corfield, F. V.
Kitson, Timothy
Summers, Sir Spencer


Costain, A. P.
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Tapsell, Peter


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Lane, David
Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow,Cathcart)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Sir Oliver
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Crouch, David
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Currie, G. B. H.
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Vickers, Dame Joan


Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Walker, Peter (Worcester)


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Maddan, Martin
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Maginnis, John E.
Ward, Dame Irene


Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Marten, Neil
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Doughty, Charles
Maude, Angus
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Drayson, G. B.
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Williams, Donald (Dudley)


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshahon)
Monro, Hector
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Elliott,R.W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)
Montgomery, Fergus
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Errington, Sir Eric
More, Jasper
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Fortescue, Tim
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Woodnutt, Mark


Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Worsley, Marcus


Gibson-Watt, David
Murton, Oscar
Younger, Hn. George


Glover, Sir Douglas
Nabarro, Sir Gerald



Goodhart, Philip
Neave, Airey
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Gower, Raymond
Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Mr. Reginald Eyre and


Grant, Anthony
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Mr. Bernard Weatherill




NOES


Abse, Leo
Forrester, John
Millar, Dr. M. S.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Alldritt, Walter
Freeson, Reginald
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)


Anderson, Donald
Galpern, Sir Myer
Molloy, William


Archer, Peter
Ginsburg, David
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)


Armstrong, Ernest
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Morris, John (Aberavon)


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Gregory, Arnold
Moyle, Roland


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Grey, Charles (Durham)
Murray, Albert


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Neal, Harold


Barnes, Michael
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Newens, Stan


Barnett, Joel
Griffiths, Rt. Hn, James (Llanelly)
Ogden, Eric


Baxter, William
Griffiths, Will (Exchange)
O'Malley, Brian


Beaney, Alan
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Orbach, Maurice


Bence, Cyril
Hamling, William
Orme, Stanley


Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgeton)
Hannan, William
Oswald, Thomas


Bidwell, Sydney
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Owen, Will (Morpeth)


Blackburn, F.
Haseldine, Norman
Paget, R. T.


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Hattersley, Roy
Palmer, Arthur


Boardman, H. (Le'gh)
Hazell, Bert
Pannell, nt. Hn. Charles


Booth, Albert
Heffer, Eric S.
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Boston, Terence
Henig, Stanley
Pavitt, Laurence


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Hilton, W. S.
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)


Boyden, James
Hooley, Frank
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Horner, John
Pentland, Norman


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)


Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)
Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)
Price, Thomas (Westhoughton)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Rankin, John


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Howie, W.
Rhodes, Geoffrey


Buchan, Norman
Hoy, James
Richard, Ivor


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Huckfield, Leslie
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Cant, R. B.
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)
Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth (St.P'c'as)


Carmichael, Neil
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E)


Chapman, Donald
Hunter, Adam
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Coe, Denis
Hynd, John
Rose, Paul


Coleman, Donald
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp;Spenb'gh)
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Concannon, J. D.
Janner, Sir Barnett
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)


Conlan, Bernard
Jeger, Mrs.Lena(H'b'n&amp; St.P'cras,S.)
Sheldon, Robert


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)


Cronin, John
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)


Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton,N.E.)


Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Rt. Hn.Sir Elwyn(W.Ham,S.)
Silverman, Julius


Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Skeffington, Arthur


Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Judd, Frank
Slater, Joseph


Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire,W.)
Kelley, Richard
Small, William


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)
Spriggs, Leslie


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stratford)
Lawson, George
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Leadbitter, Ted
Steele, Thomas (Dunbartonshire, W.)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John


Davies, S. 0. (Merthyr)
Lee, John (Reading)
Summersklll, Hn Dr. Shirley


Dell, Edmund
Lestor, Miss Joan
Swain, Thomas


Dempsey, James
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Taverne, Dick


Dewar Donald
Lomas, Kenneth
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Luard, Evan
Urwin, T. W.


Dickens, James
Lubbock, Eric
Varley, Eric G.


Dobson, Ray
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Doig, Peter
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne Valley)


Dunn, James A.
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Walden, Brian (All Saints)


Dunnett, Jack
McCann, John
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)
MacColl, James
Watkins, David (Consett)


Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Macdonald, A. H.
Weitzman, David


Eadie, Alex
McGuire, Michael
Wellbeloved, James


Edelman, Maurice
McKay, Mrs. Margaret
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross&amp; Crom'ty)
Whitaker, Ben


Ellis, John
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
White, Mrs. Eirene


Ennala, David
Mackintosh, John p.
Whitlock, William


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Maclennan, Robert
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Evans, Gwynfor (C'marthen)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Evans, Ioan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
McNamara, J. Kevin
Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)


Faulds, Andrew
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Fernyhough, E.
Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.(Huddersfield,E.)
Winnlck, David


Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Manuel, Archie
Winstanley, Dr. M. P.


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marks, Kenneth
Yates, Victor


Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)
Mendelson, J. J.



Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Mikardo, Ian
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Ford, Ben
Millan, Bruce
Mr. Joseph Harper and




Mr. Neil McBride.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 34, in page 4, line 13, leave out 'subsection (1)' and insert:
the foregoing provisions of this section'.

No. 35, in line 14, after 'accommodation', insert 'or to the landlord'.

No. 36, in line 28, leave out 'subsection (1) above' and insert:
'the foregoing provisions of this section'.

No. 37, in line 30, at end insert:
'and "relevant accommodation" means any accommodation other than storage accommodation and means of access'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Mr. Speaker: We now come to Amendment No. 38, in page 4, line 32, at end insert 'cabin', with which I suggest that we take also the following Amendments:

No. 39, in line 33, leave out 'accommodation' and insert 'cabins'.

No. 40, in line 33, after 'accommodation', insert:
'in a hotel, boarding house, or other similar establishment or'.

No. 42, in line 36, leave out 'such accommodation' and insert 'any such cabin'.

Amendment No. 44, in line 36, after 'such', insert 'residential'.

Mr. Rose: As Amendment No. 39 by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary entirely meets the point of my Amendment No. 38, I do not propose to move it. I thank my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for meeting the wishes of the Committee in this matter in distinguishing between cabin accommodation, on the one hand, with its necessary close proximity and intimacy and, on the other hand, the general accommodation in ships. For that reason, I do not wish to proceed with my Amendment.

Amendment made: No. 39, in page 4, line 33, leave out 'accommodation' and insert 'cabins'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Mr. Rose: I beg to move Amendment No. 41, in page 4, line 33, after 'ship', insert:
'on the specific request of an intending passenger'.
The addition of the words which I propose would prevent the occurrence of a situation which was referred to in Committee whereby a shipping company or the employees of a shipping company attempted to operate a policy of segregation or apartheid. As I said then, I recognise that with the provision of cabin accommodation one cannot force people to share accommodation which puts them in close proximity for the period of a long voyage. I cited the problem which might arise if, for example, a Turkish and a Greek Cypriot were asked to share the same cabin. The same situation might well arise, after the proceedings on this stage of the Bill, if I were asked to share

a cabin with the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies).
What I cannot accept is that, without a specific request from a prospective voyager on a shipping line, the shipping line should nevertheless allocate accommodation on a racial basis, because it would be open to the shipping line to use the legitimate exemption which is provided for in the Clause to give legal sanction to a policy of segregation in the allocation of accommodation.
Even on this side of the House, we have to concede to prejudice where to ignore it would create a worse situation. We should not, however, pander to the possibility of prejudice which has not already been expressed or shown. That would be the sure way to stimulate that kind of prejudice. It therefore seems to me that, where there has not been a specific request, the wording should be so framed as to prevent the possibility of places on a ship being allocated on a racial basis.
For that reason I commend the Amendment to the House, because the Clause, as it now stands, cuts down the scope not only of the Bill as it stood before Committee stage, but also of the Race Relations Act, 1965, which applied to places of public resort. Essentially, if one is not to undermine the basis of the Bill and of the 1965 Act, we have to be careful in circumscribing the exceptions that the law permits to the general provisions with regard to discrimination. I believe the Amendment does precisely that, and for this reason I hope that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be as helpful in meeting this point as he has undoubtedly been in meeting the earlier Amendment with regard to cabin accommodation as distinct from general accommodation on board ship.

10.30 p.m.

Mr. Callaghan: It seems a little churlish after what my hon. Friend said about my meeting him on the previous Amendment not to be able to do so in relation to the cabins now, but I regret that I cannot.
I have discussed this matter with the Board of Trade. As my hon. Friend knows, the shipping companies do not


operate discrimination in these matters. They have no intention of doing so. It would be foreign not only to their policy but to their interests to do so, because they run ships that cater for people of all colours. The main objection that they have, and which I ask the House to accept, to a provision on these lines is that it puts them in a very difficult position without altering the policy that they endeavour to follow. They make certain assumptions, they operate on the basis of very long experience, and on the whole the system works out very well at present. If it did not work well, then we would have to look at it again, but I know of no discrimination of this sort at the present time, and therefore I would ask my hon. Friend not to press the Amendment.

5
(5) It shall not be unlawful by virtue of section 5 above for any person to discriminate against another with respect to the disposal by the former of his interest in any premises owned and wholly occupied by him unless he uses the services of an estate agent in connection with the disposal, or publishes or displays, or causes the publication or display, of an advertisement or notice in connection therewith.


10
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above a person shall be taken to own premises if the fee simple or a lease of the premises is vested in him, and in that subsection 'estate agent' means a person who in connection with the disposal of an interest in land does any of the following acts in the course of a trade, business or profession, that is to say, he brings together or takes steps to bring together the person proposing to dispose of the interest and the prospective purchaser thereof, or acts as an auctioneer.


In the application of this subsection to Scotland 'fee simple' means the estate or interest of the proprietor of the dominium utile.

Mr. Speaker: With this Amendment we can discuss the Amendments to the Amendment, in line 2, leave out from 'of' to 'by' in line 3 and insert:
an interest in any premises owned'
in line 2, after 'in', insert 'or the letting of' and in line 3, leave out from 'him' to end of line 5.

Mr. Callaghan: This is an Amendment of substance that I should say a word about. It arose out of a discussion in Committee, and the Amendment, which will form the new subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 7, sets out circumstances in which it is not unlawful to discriminate, which is perhaps an odd way of putting the proposition. To put it positively, the Amendment means that a private householder who seeks to dispose of his house privately without advertisement shall not be regarded as being in breach of the Bill if he discriminates. I do not know the circumstances in which this is likely to arise, but the position which the Committee had in mind, and which I am meeting by the Amendment,

Mr. Rose: Although I cannot say that I am entirely satisfied with the reply of my right hon. Friend, and it was not my intention to allege that any particular shipping company would necessarily want to discriminate—I was basing this upon the interpretation that might be given to the wording—since my right hon. Friend has been so forthcoming in the other matter, perhaps I may meet him half-way and beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 42, in page 4, line 36, leave out 'such accommodation and insert' any such cabin'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move, Amendment No. 45, in page 4, line 36, at end insert:

is that of a man who wishes to dispose of his house to a son or a daughter, or to an even more distant relative or to a close friend. He does not advertise it in any way. It is a private transaction and, as such, it is right that no third party should intervene in it. It is for that reason that I am proposing to except these genuinely private sales by an owner-occupier.

If, however, he uses an agent to dispose of his property or if he publicises the matter or displays an advertisement for the sale of his property, then it ceases to be an entirely private transaction, and in that case it would be subject to the Measure and the normal provisions would apply.

I have heard it said many times that this requires a private house owner to sell his house to a coloured man. Of course it does not mean anything of the sort. In the case I am now discussing, of a private transaction, he can do exactly as he pleases. But if he advertises or uses an agent, he may not refuse to sell


his house on grounds of colour, race or whatever the ethnic provisions contained in the discrimination provisions. That is the difference. It is an important difference. This concession to the views expressed in Committee will apply to owner-occupied property and, for this purpose, owner-occupied property includes leasehold property.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: It would be nice at this hour to be able to welcome this as a major concession, but transparently it is not. This concession is likely to be very limited in its practical scope. The right hon. Gentleman said that people may do what they please in their private transactions of selling houses. But how many people buy or sell their houses as a purely personal and private transaction, without any intervention or assistance, save possibly that of solicitors for conveyancing?

Mr. Robert Howarth: Speak for yourself.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman may or may not be conversant with these matters. I do not recall having seen him often before. I do not know for how long he has been an hon. Member or what experience he has of these matters.

Mr. Robert Howarth: The right hon. and learned Gentleman may be interested to learn that only six months ago I disposed privately of the house which I then owned. This is not uncommon in parts of the world where, I admit, we do not own rather grand houses.

Mr. Callaghan: Some months ago I disposed privately of a very grand house.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: The Home Secretary is very fortunate. According to what I read in the newspapers, the right hon. Gentleman has had four houses to dispose of or acquire in one way or another. We do not know whether or not he made a good bargain. Nor do we know whether the hon. Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Robert Howarth) made a good bargain. It might help if I tell the hon. Gentleman my qualifications, such as they are, in these matters. I have practised in the law for a great many years, and in a side of the law which has brought me a little into contact with these issues. So my experience extends a little beyond the six months for which he takes such credit.
Despite those two interventions, I repeat that I do not believe that it is very normal for people to buy or sell houses as a purely personal, private and unaided transaction. Apart from his personal experience, to which the Home Secretary evidently attaches so much importance—[Interruption.]—he would not have mentioned it if he did not attach importance to it.

Mr. Orme: Stop talking nonsense. Get on with it.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: The hon. Member is very fond of making sedentary interruptions.

Mr. Orme: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman would only get back to the Bill and what we are discussing, instead of reminiscing, we might be able to get on.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I thought when I gave way to the hon. Member when he made an intervention from a seated position—[Interruption.]—is the hon. Member criticising me for having given way to him and his hon. Friends?
I submit—as I did before those three interruptions to which, I hope courteously, I gave way—that in my experience and in the general experience it is not very usual to buy or sell houses as purely private and personal transactions unaided by any advice or assistance. [Interruption.] Hon. Members say, on what evidence? Has any inquiry been made?

Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making very heavy weather of this, but he knows that he is wrong. This Amendment was pursued and was pressed on me by his own side in Committee.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: If the right hon. Gentleman would amend it in the form suggested by my hon. Friends, to exempt private transactions without the limitations which the right hon. Gentleman puts on it, I would willingly concede that it was a concession of substance which we should receive with appreciation.

Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman was not on the Committee. The point put to me was about the owner-occupier. He should know when he is on a weak point.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: If the right hon. Gentleman will extend his Amendment, as he is asked to do by the Amendment in the names of my hon. Friends, to all sales by owner-occupiers without the limitation that they should not use an estate agent, and should not advertise them, I am sure that we would all accept his Amendment as a substantial concession and one which we ought to welcome. Will he do that? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If he does not do that, I repeat that this is not an Amendment of substance and not one which should be welcomed.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will answer this. What is the position where a surveyor is employed to give a report on the condition and physical state of the house for both parties? What is the position where a surveyor is brought in to make a valuation for the joint information of both parties? He is clearly bringing the parties together by rendering his services in that way, but under the Amendment that will exclude those parties from the concessions the right hon. Gentleman is making.
How is it suggested that the vendor of a house can fix the price without testing the market; if he is to make a private sale, if he is not allowed to consult an estate agent, if he is not allowed to insert an advertisement and not even allowed to erect a notice. [An HON. MEMBER: "He is."] If he does, he does not get the benefit of the concession which the right hon. Gentleman is making. How can he test the market without doing one or other of those things? Any prudent person when selling a house, even if he is to sell it by private transaction, will test the market in one or other of those ways. Very few people indeed will enter into the transaction without doing one or other of those things. That being so, this concession as it is framed is illusory and a mere piece of window dressing. Far from being worthy of being welcomed by the House, it is evidence of the very limited degree of concession which the Home Secretary is willing to make in the passage of the Bill.

10.45 p.m.

Mr. Whitaker: I am unhappy about this concession, but for precisely opposite reasons to those of the right hon. and learned Member the Mem-

ber for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). I believe I am right in saying that only last month the Supreme Court of the United States of America declared that discrimination in any private sale in housing is illegal, which is something which we are seeking not to do in the Bill.
It has rightly and often been said that our circumstances in Britain are not exactly parallel to those in the United States. The chief difference is that the racial problem in the United States is of far greater magnitude than it is in this country. Therefore, racial legislation should certainly not be any less strong in this country than it is in America. I do not wish to prolong this point, but this is one of a number of concessions which have been made to weaken the Bill. In general, I cannot help feeling that any pandering to prejudice does not diminish that prejudice. It increases it. I therefore hope that my right hon. Friend, who has made a number of concessions to weaken the Bill, will, with impartiality, make some more concessions—to those on this side who wish the Bill to be strengthened.

Mr. Costain: I am in full agreement with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). His experience in housing is very great. I hope that the Home Secretary is not going to claim that I have no experience of houses and house sales.

Mr. Callaghan: What I would claim is that the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who I respect for his knowledge, displays a lamentable ignorance of the way in which most people in Britain know the state of the market and the value of their own houses without having to go near an estate agent and are quite capable of forming their own view as to what the value of their house is.

Mr. Costain: The Home Secretary talks utter poppycock. He may, from what we read in the Press, be an expert at selling four houses, but I doubt if anybody, with present house values, has the ability properly to assess the value of his house without testing the market. The Amendment is not a concession. It represents mixed thinking. It is said that


somebody can sell a house privately, provided that he does not use the services of an estate agent, but the Bill makes no reference to what is an estate agent.
My right hon. and learned Friend referred to a surveyor or valuer being brought in to assess the property. Is he an estate agent, or is he not? Most valuers are in some capacity connected with the estate agency business. If someone calls in a partner in an estate agency who happens to be the valuer in that agency, does he contravene this provision?
Has not the Home Secretary forgotten what this is all about? Someone who is about to sell his house probably is not very concerned about who he sells it to. The people who will be concerned about that are the neighbours of the vendor. The result of this so-called concession will be a black market in houses. So many Socialist controls end up in black markets. There will be a black market in houses because the next-door neighbour will want to acquire the house so as to have some control over who his neighbours are. He is the person who will be affected. When anybody wants to sell a house, provided that he can persuade his next door neighbour to buy it from him without the services of an estate agent, this will be the easiest way to do it, because the vendor and his next door neighbour can talk over the fence. The neighbour will buy the house and it will be his job to select the person who is to live next door to him. This concession is unworkable. It is not really a concession at all. It would lead to a black market in housing, a situation which this House should not bring about.
The right thing to do is to accept the Amendments to the Amendment and so make it possible for people—owner-occupiers—to have freedom to sell their own properties. Does the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. John Lee) want to intervene?

Mr. John Lee: Yes. I want the hon. Member to make it clear to the House whether he wants to limit the scope of discrimination or extend it? This is what the Bill is about. It is not at all clear from what he has said where he stands on this. We want to know.

Mr. Costain: I made my position perfectly clear when we had a debate earlier this evening whether an Englishman's home should be his castle. There is here reference specially to a person's own home. That is a special situation. A person should be free to deal with it as he wishes. That is my view on this.
I suggest that this Amendment is not really a concession at all unless we accept the Amendments to it, and I hope the House will accept them.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: My right hon. Friend moved this Amendment in response to requests from hon. Gentlemen opposite, and now they say they do not like it. What we want to know is, are they going to divide the House against it? Because, if so, they may find some support from this side of the House; and, indeed, we could vote the Amendment down. I ask the hon. Gentleman the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain), did he mean what he said? Because if he did, if he does not like the Amendment, he is going to divide the House and vote against the Amendment. All right. I would make two suggestions. One to my right hon. Friend: since the gift which he has offered to hon. Gentlemen opposite has been so brusquely rejected, he ought to withdraw the Amendment. I see that my right hon. Friend is tempted. I think he would satisfy all quarters of the House if, for once, he went along with his old schoolmate and withdrew this Amendment. But if he does not, then those hon. Gentlemen opposite who have spoken against this Amendment will be manifestly guilty of the most arrant hypocrisy if they do not divide the House against it, and if they do, I think I can almost assure them we can vote it down.

Mr. Julian Ridsdale: Not being a lawyer, and not having sat on the Committee on the Bill, I do not wish to detain the House for long, but in reply to the hon. Member for Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) I would say I do not wish to look a gift horse in the mouth, but, on the other hand, I do wish to speak to the Amendments which I and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) have put down to the Amendment. Alas, those Amendments to the Amendment have not been called and cannot be moved. Otherwise, they


would have considerably improved the Amendment moved by the Home Secretary.
I am most concerned about the position of the owner-occupiers of houses or flats or other property. As I understand it, this Amendment denies to an owner-occupier the right to dispose of his house or flat or other property as he may see fit. When the Home Secretary says it is nonsense for one to go to an estate agent when one is seeking the best price for a house I ask him to think again. I can assure him that during the time he was Chancellor of the Exchequer the Railways Board disposed of quite a number of houses privately in my constituency and certainly did not get the best price in doing so. I regard the Amendment as a thoroughly mean, unhelpful concession. I wish to amend it, but my Amendment has not been called. It is unhelpful to say that an owner-occupier can dispose of his property privately, but not through an estate agent or by advertising.
Does the Home Secretary realise that this places very severe limitations on the freedom of an owner-occupier? In my Amendment I added the words "or letting", because to a layman like myself "disposal" means selling and not "or letting". However, I understand that in the lawyers' sense "disposal" includes letting.
It is a fundamental right of an owner-occupier to do what he wishes with his home, and the Home Secretary is taking it away. It is another case of the man in Whitehall knowing best. The Home Secretary is acting under a dictum which one used to see in big letters as one crossed the frontier of Spain: "There is no freedom without order". Why cannot he trust the good sense of Englishmen to act fairly in these matters? It is not orders or dictates from the Home Secretary or anyone else that will improve race relations, but a growing sense of responsibility. The more one resorts to orders and the less to appeals to responsibility the more difficult it will be to overcome the very difficult problem of race relations—[Interruption.]—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Order. This is not a Second Reading debate.

Mr. Ridsdale: Some hon. Gentlemen opposite may not like my speech, but I wish that they would let me make it as I want.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must address himself to the Amendment.

Mr. Ridsdale: Why should not the owner-occupier have the freedom of the open market to sell or let his house as he wishes? What reason has the Home Secretary to believe that an owner-occupier will not act in the best way to achieve racial harmony and good relations? This is bad law. We shall put 8,550,000 owner-occupiers in grave danger of breaking the law. They must be allowed to retain the right to choose.
If the Home Secretary really believes that it is right to sell by private means, why is it wrong to sell by public means? In this Human Rights Year of the United Nations he is taking away a fundamental right of an owner-occupier to act as he thinks best and to sell his house if he wishes. He is taking away the freedom to choose. Does not the right hon. Gentleman trust his own countrymen to act as they see fit?
Whilst I realise that it is difficult to divide against the Amendment, I shall certainly vote against the Third Reading of the Bill because of it.

Mr. Orme: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker has selected Amendment No. 45 and the selection list says "plus three Amendments thereto". Is it not possible for Divisions to take place on them after the Government Amendment has been accepted?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: No. The words "three Amendments thereto" are in brackets. Mr. Speaker's selection indicates that the three Amendments to the Government Amendment can be referred to in the debate on the Amendment, but they are not selected. They cannot be called, and there cannot be Divisions on them.

11.0 p.m.

Dr. Winstanley: I am not an estate agent, not yet; I am not a solicitor; and I have certainly not disposed of as many houses as the Home Secretary, but I should like to ask the House in making up its mind about this Amendment and


the subject to which it relates to think about what would happen in reality in regard to private sales.
I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) that the Home Secretary's Amendment is drawn pretty tightly. There are not many people who sell their houses wholly by word of mouth. There are many who seek to avoid estate agents, for very understandable reasons, and seek to sell their houses themselves, but usually they advertise them. Therefore, I accept what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said when he pointed out that this is drawing it rather narrowly. But in deciding whether or not this matters, let us think for a moment what happens under the Bill with regard to private sales within the definition the right hon. and learned Gentleman has in mind.
We are not dealing here with making a whole series of acts illegal. We are dealing with procedural for introducing conciliation through the Race Relations Board. If a person who is anxious to purchase a house finds that the house is not sold to him, what can he do? He cannot automatically put some embargo on the sale. All he can do is to complain to the Race Relations Board that the house has not been sold to him, and I think the Board is going to say in 99 cases out of a hundred, "Hard luck". It is only when he can produce evidence that the house was not sold to him on grounds of racial discrimination that the Board is going to investigate the matter.
If the Board get a constant series of complaints from someone that in his efforts to purchase a house through a particular estate agent he has constantly been told that the house has been sold, or that they have refused to give him leaflets about properties, and so on, this is precisely the kind of situation which the Board surely ought to investigate, because here one would have an organised pattern of discrimination practised systematically by an organisation or individual agent.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. There is no reference to the Race Relations Board in this Clause.

Dr. Winstanley: Then I am at a loss to know what the Amendment is about.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are dealing with a particular limited Amendment, an Amendment proposed by the Home Secretary to provide that something shall not be unlawful. In discussing this Amendment it is not open to hon. Members to ventilate the whole question of what happens to the Race Relations Board.

Dr. Winstanley: I hope you will immediately rebuke me if I stray out of order again, Sir Eric. My point is that this Amendment proposed by the Home Secretary has been objected to by many hon. Members because they believe it does not provide a sufficient safeguard. I am trying to explain that a safguard does exist in the circumstances in which this Amendment is set, namely, in the circumstances under which the procedures are carried out. But in view of your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I will not pursue that particular line, save to say this. I want to put this question very clearly to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, East and others who have objected to this Amendment, in order to make then-position perfectly clear. They have objected to this, and I hoped the right hon. and learned Member would intervene to answer my question.
If we take a private sale of a house, arranged privately by an individual, and the sale is arranged to a person named let us say, Mr. Arthur Brown—[Interruption.]—Mr. George Brown, if one likes, and let us accept that his credit-worthiness has been established and all the procedures have been gone through, and the householder who is making the private sale discovers—on the threshhold of doing the final irreversible act—when he meets this Mr. George Brown that Mr. George Brown is coloured. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman saying that this person should be allowed to say, "I did not realise that you were coloured, and therefore I am not selling the house to you"? That is what this is about. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman say "Yes" or "No"?

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I am not saying that for a moment. Whatever the colour of the hypothetical Mr. Brown in the example, the transaction should obviously go through. All I am saying is that the number of transactions done on this basis


will be very small, and the text of the Amendment constitutes an invitation and inducement to people to sell and buy houses as a personal private transaction and eschew the benefits of professional advice, which they would be much wiser to avail themselves of.

Mr. Gower: The hon. Member for Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) will not be surprised, because of his experience, if any Amendment is criticised for inadequacy or any other reason. This is what my hon. Friends have done.
I recognise that the Home Secretary has made some concession but it is a very strange and unusual one. He is, in effect, saying that he does not like discrimination but apparently it is all right to discriminate as long as one does it out of sight. There is nothing very noble about that. As long as one does it without the advice of an estate agent or auctioneer it is apparently all right, but if one engages one of those professional men it becomes wrong. I can see no great virtue in that.
The Home Secretary is admitting that this part of the Bill is unenforceable, that if one makes it completely an offence he knows full well that all this kind of thing will go on underground, that these transactions will not be done with the publicity which will enable the Bill to operate. Therefore, the only thing he has power to do is to enable some check to be made through the medium of the Amendment, which preserves some control through the limitation on the employment of an auctioneer or estate agent.
It is a very slight concession. It is a most unusual one. I see nothing very wonderful about it. It is an admission by the Government that in reality this is an unenforceable part of the legislation.

Hon. Members: Withdraw the Amendment.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: When the Home Secretary was proposing to make the concession in Committee I expressed some reservations about it but was told that it was necessary to placate the Opposition and carry people with us. As it is evidently not placating the Opposition he should withdraw it.

Mr. Callaghan: Before we get carried away on too great a wave about this I had better restate the facts.
The Amendment was pressed upon me from the Opposition Front Bench and hon. Gentlemen on the back benches opposite, including all three wings of the Conservative Party on this Bill—the progressives, the reactionaries and those who are either one or the other depending on the issue. So it was a united request. More than that—I say this seriously to my hon. Friends—it was also pressed upon me by hon. Members on this side. It was because it came unitedly from the Committee that I undertook to look at it, and it was on that basis that other Amendments were withdrawn.
This ought to be stated as a fact. We can have a bit of fun and say, "If they do not like it and gibe at it, withdraw it", but there was strong feeling in the Committee—perhaps in rather a less heated or hilarious atmosphere than we have now and a rather better informed atmosphere than in some of the contributions that we have had—that this would provide a useful means of effecting a concession. It was on that basis that I tabled the Amendment, on the basis that I was asked to table it by general consent, and it is on that basis that I shall ask the House to vote for it. I would not dream of withdrawing it at this moment. I say this with due deference to my old schoolmate. I will meet him some other time on some other particular matter, but on this one I hope that he will not press me.
I want to put the issue in relation to housing. Although I respect your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I must say that we heard some prejudices expressed by the hon. Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale). He even dragged in Third Reading in order to make his speech. He must recognise that all experience shows that discrimination in housing and employment is the most serious aspect of discrimination that we have to deal with. Moreover, we have many coloured citizens who desire to purchase their own houses and they must be free to do so. We cannot create ghettos. We cannot have areas where they may buy and areas where they may not. One owner-occupier is as good as any other, no matter what may be his colour. That is the basis on which this proceeds and it


is a fundamental part of the Bill. If we allowed a substantial measure of discrimination in housing, Parliament would be storing up great trouble for the nation in future. This is a serious case and that is why I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's proposal that we should widen the concession to the limits to which he wishes to go.
I like and respect the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) and I say to him that this really is a useful concession. My experience is long and good about what my constituents do and the way they test their market. In Cardiff, they know pretty closely—I do not know what it is like in Hertfordshire—the value of their houses and now that values are going up about 10 per cent. a year they keep an even closer eye on them. An increasing number of people have a very good idea of the value of their houses and do not wish to employ an estate agent. They wish to dispose of their houses privately and undertake the transaction. It is worth while providing for those cases.
Where the transaction is private, then no mischief is done. This provision does not stop anyone disposing of his house. It merely says, "If you advertise the sale of your house, you shall not specify, 'no coloureds need apply'". That is our purpose. I think we are all agreed that public offensiveness of this sort should be outlawed. That is why the House gave the Bill its Second Reading. Similarly, estate agents cannot be used for purpose of advancing discrimination.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked me about the position of a surveyor. The surveyor is a person who is engaged by both parties to give a valuation. He is not a person who, in the words of the Amendment
…brings together or takes steps to bring together the person proposing to dispose of the interest and the prospective purchaser thereof, or acts as an auctioneer.
Therefore, the surveyor engaged professionally in order to give a valuation is excluded.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I hope that it is as the right hon. Gentleman says, but he will appreciate that, if an agreement is made conditional to a valuation, the act of the valuer in giving his joint valuation is of course bringing the people together

in the sense that he is bringing them to a consensus, a contractual agreement.

Mr. Callaghan: I disagree with that. [An HON. MEMBER: "You are not a lawyer."] I thank heaven that I am not a lawyer sometimes when I hear the differing views which they put upon simple propositions. But I am advised, and I take my stand on the ordinary understanding of this matter, that a surveyor is engaged by two persons who have been brought together. He is engaged to give a valuation and he is not to be construed as being a person who has brought together the person who wishes to dispose of the property and a person who wishes to buy it.

11.15 p.m.

Dr. Miller: Will my right hon. Friend give me a little clarification? The practice in Scotland is somewhat different from that in England. In Scotland estate agents are neither so popular nor so prevalent as they are in England and houses are sold by lawyers if not sold privately. Would a lawyer come into this category if he and not an estate agent were acting for this purpose?

Mr. Callaghan: The words are clear. If he
does any of the following acts in the course of a trade, business or profession, that is to say, he brings together or takes steps to bring together the person proposing to dispose of the interest and the prospective purchaser".
If a solicitor does that in the course of following a trade, business or profession, clearly he would be caught by the Bill in that connection, whether in Scotland, England or Wales, where these things sometimes happen.
I do not wish the hon. Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale) to be misled by an aside which I just caught and which suggested that "disposal" would include lettings. I want to make it clear that it does not.

Mr. Hogg: I understood from the terms of the Amendment that leasehold was included. I think that that is expressly stated.

Mr. Callaghan: I do not want to get into deep water, but leaseholds are included and I understand that in the accepted sense a leasehold is for a relatively long period. I understood the


intention of the hon. Member for Harwich to be to deal with short lettings of, say, 12 months. I did not want him to be under any misapprehension as the result of an aside. I know that that does not make it any more palatable to him, but I did not want there to be any misunderstanding.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Did I understand the Home Secretary to say that his legal advice was that the words of the Amendment as they stood would not preclude a private owner-occupier from advertising his house for sale provided that the offensive words which he has mentioned were not included in the advertisement?

Mr. Callaghan: There seems to be some misunderstanding about this. Anybody can advertise his house for sale and there is nothing in the Bill to prevent anybody from doing so. Perhaps I have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: I want to get this clear. There is no question of the house having been publicly advertised by the owner-occupier and the fact that he has merely advertised it attracting penalties under the Bill?

Mr. Callaghan: The answer is, "Yes". That brings him within the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Hogg: I do not know whether this is a purely private fight or whether I am allowed to take part. [HON. MEMBERS: "You started it."] That gives me a sort of locus standi. The Home Secretary perfectly rightly said that this discussion originated on this side of the House. I was one of those who originated it and I was supported from both sides. My Amendments are like bacon and eggs—excellent when eaten apart, but even better when eaten together. This was, in fact, intended to be taken together with a number of other Amendments, and it is not for me to accept the responsibility if the Home Secretary decides to take egg by egg and the bacon by bacon while, at the same time, omitting some of the more important parts.
It has been said that there is an element of horseplay between the two sides of the House, but that is not true.

The Home Secretary has a case of merit, and I have tried, in spite of the fact that I have not met with universal approval, to have a purely objective attitude; an attitude which was consistent.
The value of this Amendment has been under-estimated. During the Committee stage it was attacked from both sides of the House, by the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) saying it was so enormous a concession on the part of the Government that the proverbial coach and horses could be driven through the Bill if it was accepted, and by my hon. and leaned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell). He is somewhere about. Like the poor, he is always with us, and he mentioned, as did many of my hon. Friends during the course of that rather hilarious little debate, that so far from the hon. Member for York being right, the Amendment was valueless. They said that, they claimed, because statistically, it represented so tiny a proportion of the sales of houses in this country.
My own view is that both the hon. Member for York and my hon. and learned Friend were wrong. I agree that the vast majority of people who own houses sell them through the medium of an estate agent or by way of advertisement and, sometimes, through both; but, after a great deal of hesitation—and I must tell the House that I had great hesitation about this—I decided that it should be included in the Bill if I was to be consistent in my attitude.
I say that because I have consistently said that one must draw a distinction between the morality of the individual case and the social consequences resulting from a large number of cases piling up. One cannot get away from the fact that half of the immigrants buy their own houses. It is a fact, because it is recorded in the second report of the Race Relations Board, and one cannot get out of it. My hon. and learned Friend probably underestimates the number of people who do without an estate agent and also do without advertising and I think that it is in the nature of things that I cannot give the numbers who do.
It cannot be ignored because we do not know how many people sell their houses privately. But, if they do so and


select their purchaser on discriminatory grounds, then that is consistent with what I have said from the beginning; namely, that they should be allowed to do so whether it is morally desirable or not morally desirable. But if they use one of the principal means for selling their house, and unless one is to exempt freehold property altogether, then on that assumption, I cannot see how they could be exempt. If we can be told how it can be exempted, I would wish that it could be given sympathetic consideration.
I want on the whole to present a consistent view from this side of the House as to what we think ought to be done in this kind of situation. I have tried to do so, admittedly I have sometimes fallen foul of the Government, and sometimes of my hon. Friends. My view has been consistent. It has been that we are legislating for social conditions and not private morality. This is the line which I draw.
So far as units of accommodation are concerned, I have tried, in one way or another, to put an exemption limit by a numerical maximum. That seems sensible. If people choose to operate through the large agencies, the total effect of which is to create a social condition, and subject to the other limitations I have sought to insert into the Bill, it does not seem to me that I can think of a way in which one can exempt them altogether. If, on the other hand, they choose to use their own discretion, refuse to pay commission to an agent, select their own purchaser, it seems that they are indulging in an act of private morality, and I ought not to intervene. I said that I wondered whether this was a private fight or one in which I was entitled to intervene. I am bound to say that I felt in honour bound to the right hon. Gentleman to state my conclusions, and to say why I supported the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 8

EXCEPTIONS IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYMENT

Mr. Hattersley: I beg to move Amendment No. 47, in page 4, line 40, leave out 'ten' and insert 'twenty-five.'
This Amendment deals with certain temporary exemptions provided by the Bill in the employment sphere. I should emphasise that the exemptions are, in the Government's opinion, and should so remain, essentially temporary. The proposition I am putting forward is simply for an extension in the temporary exemptions, for the Government could not conceive of a situation in which we were prepared to grant permanent exemption for any sort or class of employers under those provisions of the Bill which insist that there should be no discrimination in employment.
As the Bill stands, the time exemption is in two parts. For the first two years of the Measure's operation, firms employing 10 people or less are exempt. That provides an exemption for firms employing 14 per cent. of the working population. The extension of that exemption in the Bill is for a third year, in which firms employing five people or less continue to be exempt. That third year exemption will cover firms employing 6 per cent. of the working population. It was suggested in Committee that a more substantial and longer exemption was necessary if the objectives of the temporary exemption were to be achieved.
The first objective is to give the small company time to prepare for the effects of the Bill, and to make necessary adjustments. The second objective is to make sure that the Race Relations Board is not presented, in the first year or two years of the operation of the Act, with more cases than it can reasonably or rationally examine in the way that my right hon. Friend expects.
These exemptions never were, and never can be, intended as a means by which the force of the Bill is reduced. All our experience suggests that the immigrant population probably has greater difficulties in finding employment in smaller firms than in larger ones. Our attempts to provide exemptions of a sufficiently long period, covering sufficiently large numbers of firms, are intended to do no more than to make the Bill operate smoothly, and make the firm which must eventually be covered by it have the opportunity of adjusting to its proposals.
It was said in Committee that there is no way of knowing what the exact figure of the exemption should be. There are


no magic numbers which are right for a certain number of years for a certain sector of the economy. My right hon. Friend and I certainly take the point. The decision as to which firms should be exempt, and when, and for how long is in part an arbitrary decision and certainly a subjective decision. In consequence of that, we were prepared to take into account the views expressed in Committee that the purpose we seek to achieve would be more easily achieved if the exemption was increased. This is exactly what the Committee was promised would be the nature and purpose of the Amendment. That is, that firms employing 25 people or less are exempted for the first two years—that is, firms employing 20 per cent. of the population—and firms employing 10 people or less are exempted for the following two years after the initial exemption; that covers 14 per cent. of the population.
We hope that the Amendment will commend itself to the House in the knowledge that our intention is simply to make the Bill work smoothly and is in no way to reduce the effects of the Bill or its force in employment situations.

11.30 p.m.

Mr. Hogg: This time it is I who am looking a gift horse in the mouth, and looking it in the mouth rather squarely. I must accept the gift horse for what it is worth because my own Amendment No. 49, in page 4, line 42, leave out from 'household' to 'to' in line 43, has not been selected for discussion, although it is an Amendment which I would have sought leave to divide upon had it been selected because we attach considerable importance to it.
Again we are concerned with the exemption limits which are acceptable in a Bill of this kind, and again we are concerned with a difference of degree which divides the two sides of the House, without perhaps the gulf being as wide as some people have made it out to be.
The figure of 25 has been substituted by the Under-Secretary of State, coupled with an increase of the tapering period from two to four years. It would be churlish of me not to recognise that these are significant improvements in the Bill from my point of view. On the other hand, it would be equally unrealistic to

say that they were satisfactory improvements from my point of view in the sense that I can accept them with a glad heart.
Both sides agree that an exemption limit of some kind is desirable. Both sides agree that to impose an employment Clause on the public without an exemption limit would be impossible. The two points at issue are whether there should be a tapering period and what the exemption limit should be. The Government appear to think that they have satised the requirements by giving a number of figures showing the number of people employed in small units and showing that this number is large, and arguing from that that the Bill must cover them sooner or later.
I do not accept that, for a number of reasons. Obviously the exact line at which one draws the limits either of tapering or of exemption is a matter of judgment, and therefore in itself arbitrary. In favour of 25, which is the preliminary limit chosen by the Government and which my Amendment, had it been selected, would have made indefinite, is that it is the figure chosen by the American Code—not that this is conclusive in our favour because our situation is different, but it is significant that it was chosen by the American Code—and the Street Committee chose either 25 or 50;I have forgotten which. At any rate, it chose a figure which was not less than 25.
We therefore start from the proposition that this is not an unreasonable figure to choose. I am not impressed by the number of individuals who may be employed in establishments of less than 25. Those of us who read the Donovan Committee's Report—I cannot pretend to have read it all yet, but I hope that I shall have read it all certainly before the end of the recess —recognise how many of our fellow countrymen serve in establishments which employ very large numbers of people. The numbers of individuals serving in establishments employing 5,000 or more people are very large.
The point which we are making in seeking for a high exemption limit in the absence of tapering off is basically threefold. First, one gets progressively unrewarding the more one bogs down in investigations into small establishments. We do not think that it is an answer that there are a very large number of people


serving in small establishments, because we notice that a large number of small establishments are involved and the number of investigations would have to be very high to result in a significant change in pattern.
Secondly, as I have pointed out before, we think that the problems involved in small establishments become different in kind when the scale dwindles below a threshold. The problems of management in a large establishment are easily solved. If one man does not get on with another or if a small group forms up against a smaller one, various arrangements are open to the management of the large establishment whereby the situation can be solved without causing a great deal—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are not discussing the large establishments on the Amendment. We are discussing only whether the figure should be 10 or 25.

Mr. Hogg: We are discussing whether it should be 25, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I am indicating why I favour the higher figure rather than the lower.
I was answering the Under-Secretary's argument that a large number of people were employed in the establishments within the critical range which he sought to alter. I was trying to establish on our side that the management problems involved above the critical threshold figure must be intrinsically different in kind, because there are various solutions of personal difficulties and personal antagonisms open to management in a large establishment—I am prepared to take the threshold to some extent at an arbitrary figure—which are not open to the management of a small establishment.
Then, it is said that there should be tapering off. This involves two fallacies. The first is that the Bill will stay on the Statute Book unamended for an indefinite time, which I simply do not believe to be the case. The Bill is designed to amend an Act of Parliament dated 1965, and I simply do not believe that experience in this novel sphere of legislation will leave it unamended for another five years. I doubt whether it will leave it unamended for another three years. Therefore, it is foolish to insert periods of four years like that which the Under-Secretary proposes

in the Amendments. It is far better to take a figure which for the moment we consider to be satisfactory and stick to it.
Secondly, I feel that we would create good will among those who are in a relatively humble way of business by not imposing on them at this stage a time limit beyond which they came within the ambit of a law which they may well view as oppressive.
Let us see how we get on with the big operators. Let us see how it works. Let us get experience of how the Bill operates. The Race Relations Board will have plenty on its plate with the employment Clause and the accommodation Clause for more than two years and, I think, for more than four years. Let us gain experience before we plunge out into the jungle of small establishments, small operators, problems of individual management, problems of individual antagonisms. If the Bill can justify itself by experience, it very likely will succeed over the range of small establishments without further legislation. I should not be a bit surprised. If it fails, I doubt whether further legislation will help it.
As matters are, I would be disposed to think that the Government would have been wise to accept the experience of the American code and put in 25 without a tapering clause. The Government would have been wise to accept the Street Committee's recommendations without putting in a tapering clause. I cannot see why they have insisted on this limitation to their wisdom.
Although it is not open to us to divide, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in view of the selection of the Chair which of course we loyally accept, as we have loyally accepted every selection that the Chair has made, I think I should make my protest as I have made it. Although we on this side of the House accept the Amendment, we think it is insufficient, and even now we are not above asking the Government whether they would not in another place consider an indication that it ought to be of more indefinite significance than they have hitherto thought.

Mr. Heffer: I think that the Government have gone as far as they should go in this matter. I certainly hope that they will resist the extremely friendly


blandishments from the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg), since this is a compromise Clause. There was pressure, if one may use that term, from industry on both sides in relation to this. If one went beyond this the Clause would be defeated, because it would mean that a considerable section of the working population would be completely exempt from ever becoming involved in complete integration. I accepted this very reluctantly, but on the ground that there ought to be an easing-in period until final and complete integration was achieved. I think the four years is about right. Anything beyond that would be wrong, and I therefore hope that my hon. Friends will not go any further in this matter and will keep the Bill as it stands.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: I share the reservations of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) on this matter. I cannot understand why the Government are coming so low down in the scale on this Bill, since they did not come down so low in nominating firms of certain numbers in previous Bills, for instance in the Prices and Incomes Bill. It is extremely difficult administratively to deal with firms that are employing few people since there is such a vast number of them. It may seem relatively difficult for us to pass legislation which does not apply the same rules across the board, but my right hon. and learned Friend in making the point that we are in a new sphere here and ought to try it out on larger organisations made a valid point. By bringing the number so low, the right hon. Gentleman will add to discrimination, because the Bill lays down regulations for both employment and dismissal.
The head of a small firm will be careful whom he employs for fear that, should he later have to dismiss the man, the firm will be charged with discrimination. It is, therefore, relatively easy to get round the subsection dealing with employment. No small firm need employ anybody it does not wish to employ in that a valid excuse can be made, covering up discrimination; the inability of the applicant to do a certain job. that

a suitable job is not available and so on. This means that although a small firm might wish to employ an immigrant, it will avoid doing so for fear of being charged, at a later date, should redundancy occur, with discrimination.
11.45 p.m.
A larger firm need not have this fear. A company employing 100, 1,000 or 5,000 people can keep an individual on its books for a few months without much difficulty. A small firm employing only a handful of men is in a different position, and I fear that this provision will add to, rather than detract from, discrimination in employment in these circumstances.

Sir S. Summers: The Government assert that they are doing something in favour of coloured immigrants by ensuring that after four years it becomes an offence to discriminate against them. When one considers how this will work in small firms, one must wonder whether this will really benefit immigrants. Are we doing a service to immigrants if we make it possible for them to force then-way into firms? We must bear in mind the personal relations that exist among workers in particularly small firms. I trust, therefore, that further thought will be given to this matter.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Hattersley: I beg to move Amendment No. 48, in page 4, line 41, leave out 'in or'.
This proposal deals with exemptions, but on this occasion we seek to tighten up, rather than extend, the definition of the word. On three occasions the Bill refers to persons employed
…in or for the purposes of a private household.
It was suggested in Committee that the presence of those words might imply that the calculation of exemptions in terms of employment could include those who, while not working permanently in a private household as an intimate, personal part of it, perhaps living in it doing, say, domestic work within its boundaries, might include those who occasionally call, for example, to clean windows, repair the television set or do some other temporary and occasional task. Clearly, the exemption for private households in terms of numbers should not apply. By asking the House to delete these words, we are


asking the House to remove any possible ambiguity and to make clear that the exemption applies to people in households as originally intended.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 50, in page 4, line 43, leave out 'year' and insert 'two years'.

No. 51, in line 45, leave out 'five' and insert 'ten'.

No. 52, in line 45, leave out 'in or'.

No. 53, in page 5, line 2, after 'discriminate', insert 'against any person'.—[Mr. Hattersley.]

Mr. Rose: I beg to move Amendment No. 54, in page 5, line 4, after 'faith', insert
'with prior approval of the Race Relations Board'.
In Committee we debated in full the implications of the so-called racial violence Clause. The Committee, in its wisdom, by a small majority on two occasions rejected Amendments moved by my hon. Friends the Members for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) and Southall (Mr. Bidwell). I stress that these were very small majorities and hon. Members on the second bench below the Gangway opposite fought very strenuously over this matter, which we believe to be one of the most fundamental issues in the Bill.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: What is wrong with a small majority?

Mr. Rose: The hon. Member was not a member of the Committee. I have not seen him here very much tonight. Perhaps he will do me the courtesy of listening.
This Amendment would at least remove a very strong objection to the Clause as it stands. The test of what is a reasonable balance remains an objective test. It depends on whether the particular employer in the particular circumstances thinks that he is preserving what he considers a bad balance. There is no question of objectivity in this test, but it is a matter of what the employer in good faith feels reasonable in the circumstances. It does not apparently depend on what the Race Relations Board considers a bad balance.

Mr. Grieve: Surely, as the Clause stands, if he thinks it is not in good faith, the person discriminated against is entitled to take it to the Race Relations Board and the Board will determine whether it is in good faith or not?

Mr. Rose: The hon. and learned Member entirely misses that this is the difference between intention and result. The Clause does not define either. The hon. and learned Member also misses the point about the person on whom there is an onus to show that it is in good faith. Is he the person against whom discrimination is alleged, or the person whom it is alleged is discriminated against? In the absence of a definition, the burden might lie on the complainant to show bad faith rather than on the employer to show good faith.
The Clause also misses what I would call "vertical discrimination", which, I assure my hon. Friend the Undersecretary, has nothing to do with vertical integration. This is the way I describe the kind of difficulties where there may be a balance in the numbers of the labour force and individuals are not allowed to rise above a certain level. We know of the case of the bus guard who is not allowed to become a bus inspector. This is more concerned with levels of employment.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Surely the hon. Gentleman recalls that the bus conductor who could not become a bus inspector was prevented from becoming a bus inspector, not by his employer, but by his co-employees.

Mr. Rose: The hon. Gentleman must not accuse me of referring to an individual case. I was using this as a general example. I could have cited many examples where people are not allowed to rise beyond a certain level. For example, they are not allowed to become foremen or managers. I am not referring to any individual case of discrimination. Even if it is conceded that good faith may rest with the employer—this is the important point that hon. Members opposite fail to grasp—the employer's action, which may be in good faith, may objectively discriminate. This is why the Board, which is experienced in these matters, should define what a balance is.
I have never taken the view that a so-called fair balance is itself discriminatory. I find the principle of a quota somewhat abhorrent, but it may well facilitate integration at a later stage. I said in Committee that I accept that in some employments there is a threshold beyond which, if more coloured people are employed, the white personnel will leave and what might be termed an industrial ghetto situation is created.
I realise what my right hon. Friends are trying to do by the Clause. It is very laudable, but the result may well be different from what they intend, because this would be valid only if the purpose was to create a fair balance and to promote integration in the future. As it stands, the Clause could provide for a situation where the balance is by no means fair, except in the mind of the person against whom discrimination is alleged. For this reason, I should like a far more objective view to be taken of this, a view which would allow the Board, on the basis of its wide experience, to decide, having been consulted by the employer, whether in a given case it would be right for the employer to apply a certain quota or arrange his labour force in a given way. This would make the existing Clause far less objectionable. In those circumstances, I should be prepared to accept the so-called racial balance Clause, abhorrent as many of us find it.
I make no apologies for raising this at this late hour. I believe that this is the fundamental weakness of the Bill. Even if we cannot be given an assurance tonight, I hope that it will not be too late to correct in another place what is a major defect in an excellent Bill. It would be a shame if the Bill were to go on to the Statute Book with this major defect in it, after all the work which has been done in race relations legislation since the 1965 Act. I therefore ask my hon. Friend seriously to consider accepting the Amendment, even at this stage, in order to allow the Board to make the test, rather than leaving this at the discretion and will of the employer.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell: As my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) has said, many of us on this side who are well experienced in

immigration questions, particularly as they affect matters of employment, regard the Clause as it stands as the greatest weakness in the Bill. However, we realise that the wording of the Clause, particularly these words—
The Secretary of State may, if it appears to him expedient to do so, by order repeal subsections (2) and (3) above"—
can be regarded as a tentative or transitional situation.
12 m.
What many of us on this side of the House feel is that this transitional period might prove to be extremely dangerous to the central purpose of the Bill, which is to bring about not simply integration, which is a rather harsh word, but human harmony in all fields, and especially in employment. I said in Committee many times, and other Members said it as well, that it was employment opportunities which were supreme. In an earlier discussion it was suggested by my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government that housing was the most important part of the Bill. It may be the most sensitive part of the Bill at this stage, but in my view it is not the central part of the Bill. The central part of the Bill is equal job opportunities for all people, consistent with their skills and abilities and educational qualifications, regardless of the colour of their skin or their ethnic origin.
I regard these subsections of Clause 8, as they stand, as an impediment to that, because an employer can say he has got sufficient employees and can put up a notice, lawfully within the Bill as it stands, saying "No more immigrants wanted". Not "No immigrants wanted"; but "No more immigrants wanted". Not "No blacks wanted" but "No more blacks wanted". Not "No Irishmen wanted" but "No more Irishmen wanted". My hon. Friend shakes his head, but that becomes quite lawful. It may not be the intention; it may not happen in that way; and I hope the conciliatory spirit of the Bill blossoms and flowers and that this kind of thing will be, as it is, totally unthinkable; but we are dealing with legislation of which the words will be interpreted, in the courts, perhaps, eventually, and by the conciliation


machinery and the Race Relations Board. Clause 8(2) says,
It shall not be unlawful…
In other words, the whole central purpose of the Bill is outlawed. It starts by making unlawful discrimination on grounds of colour or ethnic origin and then kicks that provision in the teeth. It opens wide a way of discrimination. I say to my hon. Friend that there is considerable depth of feeling about this on this side of the House. Not least is there depth of feeling in the hon. Member for Southall who has a considerable amount of immigration experience.
In Committee I read a letter about the intake of apprentices by London Transport. Someone in my constituency was complaining about present quota arrangements by which only three in ten of our Indian boys were taken into apprenticeships. I argued then along the lines I have argued earlier this evening, and there was no reply to the points I made in that discussion. I hope I shall not be without a reply this evening. It was suggested that there are in industry enormous difficulties in this matter. Of course there are, but there is a great sense of fair play.
In Committee my hon. Friend rejected the terminology of "quota"; he said it was not a quota arrangement. Whatever we call it, it becomes a quota arrangement, but it is not defined. We argued about the matter of percentages, but we did not get even a figure of percentages; we did not get any numbers at all. The Bill does not deal with an establishment but sections of an establishment. I asked in Committee how it was this arose, because in my experience in industry it does not arise. One would be hard put to it to find an employer who could immediately say how many Irishmen he had, how many Cypriots he had, how many Indians, how many Pakistanis, how many other people of differing national origins. He might even be not all that conscious of colour, especially if his black and white employees were used to working together. Similarly, school children cannot tell one how many coloured and how many white children there are in their class.
Therefore, I hope that my hon. Friend will at least meet our general complaint about this part of the Clause. It is

dangerous, undefinable and virtually inoperable in any sense of legality, and therefore it is best left out.
I am not enamoured by arguments from the C.B.I., which has not fallen over itself to support the idea of legislation, or from the T.U.C., which has only been a reluctant accepter. The leading industrialists to whom I have spoken on the idea of racial legislation have said, "Leave it alone. We do not want it. We want to please ourselves." We heard that from hon. Members opposite when we discussed other matters.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are on Report. The hon. Gentleman must address himself to the Amendment.

Mr. Bidwell: I do not think that the arguments from either side of industry for the Clause—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We cannot argue about the Clause in general, but only the Amendment, as to whether the words:
with prior approval of the Race Relations Board
should be added in line four.

Mr. Bidwell: Having regard to the discussions in Committee about the point we now seek to amend, we can go so far as to say that employers can abuse this—and not only employers. Sometimes they hide behind the activities of their workers, and the workers hide behind the activities of their employers. If the Bill is to be effective this nonsense must stop. There will be no qualified body other than the Race Relations Board, and because my hon. Friend's Amendment is an effort not only to change but to improve the Bill I commend it to the House.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: There is a much better body than the Race Relations Board to decide these matters. That is the men at work, whether employers or employees, on the shop floor in the factory. They are far better qualified than the Board to decide these very practical matters.
One thing that has not been pointed out is that the Clause refers only to a very limited group—first-generation immigrants. It is made perfectly clear in subsection (4) that those born and


educated in this country are not caught by the Bill, and that is important.
The Amendment is wholly impracticable. It is wrong in principle that the Board should be asked to intervene on the floor of factories and offices to manage their own businesses for those in industry. I cannot imagine that the Board wants to be asked to do this, and I would hope that it would oppose the Amendment.
It is a practical question. In many plants there are already large numbers of coloured people. They are very useful. They contribute a great deal to our country. But it is fact, whether we like it or not—and I believe most of us deplore it—that when some-thirds of the staff of a paint shop in a car factory in Coventry or on night-shift in an hotel in London are members of the coloured community, there is a tendency for white workers no longer to stay there. What happens is that the shop in question or the shift in question tends to become all-immigrant, all black. This is some thing all of us would deplore.
Therefore it must be reasonable to allow the employer, the manager of the shop, the shop steward in the shop, to apply his commonsense and try to arrange some kind of racial balance there so that this problem does not arise. This is a really practical consideration, and I am sure it is one of the considerations which prompted the Government to include this Clause in the first place.
Then there is the other practical aspect. If for some reason in a particular shop, factory or canteen, there comes to be difficulty between one group of people and another—and it may be a difficulty on racial grounds because whatever Act we pass will not change the nature of human beings—it must be right to allow the shop steward, the manager of the plant, to move people around in that factory to maintain some sort of balance so that, human relations being what they are, the plant is not brought to a standstill.
Therefore, the practical reasons of an employer keeping his production line going and a shop steward maintaining harmony in the shop, there must be this power. It is quite wrong that the Race

Relations Board should be brought into the act and asked to decide in advance every little detailed consideration of balance which an employer or shop steward may wish to bring about. I hope that the Government will not accept the Amendment.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Of course my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) is absolutely right in saying that this is the most offensive part of the Bill to those of us who have supported the idea of legislation for a long time, and who have tried to strengthen those parts of the Bill we thought were weak. We failed in Committee to have the Clause deleted, and this is by way of being a half-measure to improve the situation now that we have to accept that there is going to be a racial balance Clause included in the Bill.
But, if I may say so, it was made clear in Committee, and indeed it has been made clear again tonight in the speech of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths), that when we are talking about the nature of the racial balance Clause it is something that one cannot talk about with any great precision. It is a matter of trying to access the undefinable in the particular atmosphere of a particular shop floor in a particular factory. That is why the Government, I think rightly, have said they do not want to be bound to any idea of quotas, any arithmetical proportion of the labour force which would be acceptable. It must be a question of judgment in each single case.
What we are saying in this Amendment is that we have to decide whose judgment is going to be final in assessing what is reasonable. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, speaking as he does for the C.B.I. on this matter, has said that the best persons to decide that issue are those who are actually on the shop floor. All I can say to him is that if that were true we would not need a Bill in this particular section of community relations, because if the people who are on the shop floor at the moment were not discriminating there would be no need for the Bill.
The fact is, as was brought out in the P.E.P. Report, that we do need a Bill to deal with discrimination in industry,


and that is because people on the shop floor are discriminating..

12.15 a.m.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman must recognise that those on the shop floor will be acting within the context of the Bill as a whole, which outlaws racial discrimination. The Amendment is on whether or not they should have to get in touch with the Race Relations Board before they can move a man from one part of the plant to another or before they can decide how they are going to avoid a certain shop becoming all black or all white.

Mr. Lyon: I am not impressed by the argument that those who have been discriminating and, therefore, have provoked legislation should be able to decide what is reasonable in relation to an offence arising in the course of the Bill. It may be the kind of factory posed by the Home Secretary in Committee when discussing this racial balance Clause. It may be the case of the reasonable employer who has done his best in the past to employ coloured people and because of his indulgence has reached the limit where his white employees are saying that they will no longer stay and, therefore, ask for some protection against the calling in of any further coloured persons. It may be that there are those situations, but it is wrong that even where the good employer is acting on the dictates perhaps of his own workpeople the decision about what is a reasonable balance should be left to them.
One must recollect that at the moment there are areas of employment where discrimination has been practised so successfully that no coloured person has been employed. When the Bill comes into operation it will be necessary for those areas to accept coloured employees at some stages if coloured people wish to apply for jobs and are equipped to do them. In those circumstances the danger that we have always foreseen about the racial balance Clause will become apparent. The racial balance Clause will be used so that as few coloured employees as possible will be taken on. I should rot want to think that in such a situation they were to be the deciders of what was reasonable.

Mr. Hattersley: I am sure that the House does not want to proceed on what

is becoming an increasingly false premise increasingly widely held. My hon. Friend will realise that in interpreting what is a reasonable racial balance in all the circumstances under the other provisions of the Bill and under the general way in which the Bill is operated and when the powers in the Bill are in operation, if he or an immigrant believes that he has been rejected for employment because a firm is operating the malpractices to which he has referred, he or the immigrant will be able to appeal to the Race Relations Board and make the normal complaint, and the decision will be in no way the decision of the company but determined in the normal way. To have a debate in which it is stated from both sides that the decision is that of the firm is to have a debate on a totally false premise.

Mr. Lyon: If my hon. Friend had allowed me to develop my argument I should have saved him that intervention. I was dealing with the argument of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds that the people to decide whether it was reasonable were the employers or the employees.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Within the context of the Bill.

Mr. Lyon: Yes, within the context of the Bill, but the hon. Gentleman said that they were the persons to decide. I accept that under the Bill they are not necessarily the persons who will decide and that the person who has been discriminated against can go to the Race Relations Board so that, willy nilly, despite the opinion of the C.B.I. and the hon. Gentleman, in the end the decision has to go to the Race Relations Board. The question that one has to ask is whether it should go further, whether it should go to the court to decide, whether if the Race Relations Board says that it is unreasonable the employer can go further and say to the court, "The Race Relations Boards says that we are being unreasonable. We say that in all the circumstances we are being reasonable." It is here that I want to draw the line.
I accept that we are dealing with an amorphous situation not easily definable in judicial terms. It is not the kind of thing that a court can easily assess. It will have to take evidence about the


kinds of pressure going on inside a factory. I do not think that a court, even with assessors, will necessarily be able to do it. I doubt whether it can do it successfully at all. That is why I have grave reservations about the racial balance Clause.
But if this is to be done, let us ensure that it is done by someone who can really assess the atmosphere in a factory —someone who is not a part of the factory. The only body I can see in that rôle is the Race Relations Board. If we accept that, in disputed cases, the Board can make a decision, clearly it is not going to be excluded. It should be the final judge of what is reasonable. If it is to be the final judge, there is much to be said for the view that it should be the prior judge.
If any employer wishes to claim in defence that he has reached a reasonable balance, there is much to be said for his consulting the Board for its view. It would safeguard his future position. If this is going to be done in a lot of cases, it is probably wise that it should be done in all cases. In these circumstances, there is much to be said for Amendment No. 54. My Amendment No. 56 would put it at a later stage, but I prefer No. 54 and will therefore not press mine. I hope that the Government will reconsider their attitude.

Mr. Heffer: What the Amendment asks for may seem a very good thing to those hon. Members with little experience of industrial life. I thought that the object of the Bill was to conciliate between the various races in order to solve problems. The rôle of the Race Relations Board is to conciliate. But the Amendment suggests that it should enter prior to there being any problem whatever in a factory. The sponsors of the Amendment have it the wrong way round.
I have heard statements tending to be somewhat of a slander on the overwhelming mass of British trade unionists and particularly their shop stewards and officials. There are pockets of people in the trade union movement who are prejudiced, but there are thousands of shop stewards who are daily dealing with problems not only of normal industrial life but of racial integration in factories where the Board will never be brought

in because the problems are being dealt with on the shop floor. The few dockers who marched on this House do not represent the general view of trade unionists and of the workers in the industry. We have to allow the normal machinery of industrial conciliation to operate first. If that breaks down, then the Board should be brought in.
Let us get this problem of racial balance into proper perspective. The danger is that certain unscrupulous employers may start using immigrants as cheap labour, turning certain jobs into jobs for immigrants only. In Committee I gave an example from the United States where a man can be a railway porter only if he is a negro. The negroes now have those jobs completely within their control, and a white man cannot get in. This is racial discrimination in reverse and it is a situation which we do not want in this country. We never want a particular job to be dominated by all black workers, or by Pakistanis, or Indians.
The Bill makes a clear distinction: if a coloured boy is born in this country, irrespective of his ethnic origin, he is a British citizen and the problem is not related to him; it relates only to immigrants, and for their protection we need something like the Clause until the problem is finally eased away altogether.
We have to be very careful about this problem and that is why the T.U.C. has adopted the attitude which it takes to this matter. Is the T.U.C. racialist? Is the T.U.C. not prepared to ensure genuine racial integration? Does anybody seriously suggest that? My experience in the trade union movement teaches me that the very opposite is true. The normal industrial machinery must be used first. If it breaks down, the Board and its conciliation machinery can be brought in.
I ask my hon. Friend not to persist with their contention that the Clause is racialist in concept. It is the very reverse. Whatever the Bill says, there will continue to be unscrupulous employers who are racialist and who endeavour to get round it, and some workers will be racialist, but they will be in a minority and I hope that the House will accept the trade unions' view of the problem.

Mr. Richard: Of course nobody is suggesting that my hon. Friend the


Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is racialist, or that the T.U.C. is racialist, or that the vast majority of working people are racialist. My hon. Friend says that we should use the machinery of industrial conciliation first. That is fine for those jobs which employ trade union labour, but what of those employers who do not employ trade union labour? What industrial machinery does my hon. Friend suggest that we use in those circumstances? What status and locus does the trade union movement have there? The answer is absolutely none—or, with respect to my hon. Friend, the answer is that it is not good enough to stand up and say that a fair part of the trade union movement is not racialist and that, therefore, we do not need this Clause. I have said time and time again, that we are dealing with a most difficult and delicate subject and that it is high time the country got out of thinking that, because a subject is difficult and delicate, then that is a reason for inaction.
12.30 a.m.
We have heard the expression before during this debate, but I say that one can drive a coach and horses through this Bill so far as this Clause is concerned. I have said it before, but the Government do not seem to have realised the fact, nor dealt with the problem. If I may say so, it seems to me that although it may thought to be a semilegal point—and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Walton will listen to me—where one is trying to write into the Bill some provision which at one moment gives legal protection to the liberally minded employer who is trying to preserve a racial balance in the interests of harmony, and at the same time is trying to produce a situation where the illiberal are protected, then one has got to get somebody to decide what is on one side of the line and what is on the other.
The whole argument is really about to whom one gives that discretion. I have always said that it is wrong to give it to the courts. They form completely the wrong body, and I am equally against giving it to the employers. They are not the people who should have it, and when we have deliberately set up enforcement machinery, with experts in

this field to serve it, then why on earth cannot the discretion be given to them? Why, in heaven's name, should not the Race Relations Board be allowed to say on which side of the line it thinks any given action falls? They are the people who should assess the discretion, but I am not very surprised that the Government have not been able to accept that rather obvious principle.
If the Government cannot accept it, then can we at least be told that in the Clause through which it is attempted to write into the Bill what the court should take into consideration, there should at least be the rudimentary reasons for giving a certificate? Just to say that this does not matter because it applies only to first generation immigrants is really the biggest nonsense. This is a licence to an employer to discriminate on the ground that he believes he has a certain racial balance which he wants to preserve; and if he believes it is necessary to discriminate, does anybody really say that circumstances will change because the first generation employee was born in England rather than elsewhere?
If one believes that there are racial differences, then they will remain whether the man was born here or not. Let us forget what the C.B.I. and others have said about this matter of where the man was born. As I have already said, this is a licence to discriminate and the Race Relations Board should be allowed to come in and have the power to say that this should be dealt with at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Hattersley: My hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) told the House on several occasions that the existence of this Clause, in its present form, gives employers a licence to discriminate. It is a good, ringing, attractive phrase, the sort of phrase that, I am sure, makes enjoyable reading in the national Press. [An HON. MEMBER: "It happens to be true."] It is, however, wildly wrong, as applied to this Bill. I have to tell my hon. Friends that I believe, and I say this in all humility and good faith, that it might have been easier had the discussion on this Clause been conducted on the not unreasonable assumption that the Government were acting in the same sort of good faith as is written into the Clause.
I do not minimise the feelings of my hon. Friends, nor do I minimise the importance of seeking to specify, clearly and properly, the way in which a racial balance is determined. I understand many of their doubts. I concede immediately that the concept of racial balance is a notion against which it is possible to advance formidable arguments. I should be dishonest were I not to accept and concede that.
On the other hand, even stronger arguments can be advanced in favour of this concept. Those strong arguments are made relevant and meaningful if we have a legitimate, proper and reasonable way of determining when the argument for racial balance can be applied to the work situation. The arguments in its favour are reasonable because, in the interests of the immigrants already here, and those likely to enter the country, it is important that they should be encouraged to take their place in a genuine cross-section of industry, that they should be spread throughout industry, and that we should avoid some jobs becoming immigrant jobs, becoming thought of as "black" jobs. That is not in the interests of the immigrants or industry.
All we seek to do in this Clause is to make sure that that situation does not arise. I hope that it is some consolation to my hon. Friends to know that my right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and the First Secretary accept entirely that if this Clause is to work at all tolerably, "reasonable balance" has to be interpreted so as to facilitate integration, to avoid the difficulties involved in immigrant jobs, rather than to allow —and this is another emotive phrase, but a totally accurate one—the employer with malicious or frivolous intent to drive a coach and horses through the Bill.
I can only explain the weaknesses of the arguments of some of my hon. Friends if I remind them of the processes which must be undertaken if the racial balance criteria, or the racial balance conception, is to be applied. If I know of a company which has intentionally and overtly discriminated against an immigrant in employment—and I have some experience of constituencies in which immigrants are to be found—the advice that I would give that immigrant would be to process

his complaint, as he is entitled to do under the Bill.
If an immigrant is turned down when applying for employment by the man at the gate, or the personnel officer, or whoever is responsible for employment, and told that he has been turned down not because that company was opposed to the employment of immigrants, but because it believed in a racial balance, and already employed a suitably high proportion of immigrants, then he would be entitled to make a complaint under the provisions of the Bill. He would, I hope, in the first instance, make that complaint to the voluntary machinery set up in the industry. I believe that the integration of immigrants into industrial life makes it important for the Government to bring in no measures, and to advance no principles that dissociate them from trade union and other normal principles.
I hope that the first thing that the immigrant would do would be to make a complaint to the voluntary machinery. If that failed, or if he were dissatisfied, that complaint would automatically go to the Race Relations Board. If the immigrant is dissatisfied by the decision handed to him by the voluntary machinery, it would be the Race Relations Board which would determine whether a company was reasonable in applying the racial balance Clause.

Mr. Richard: No.

Mr. Hattersley: My hon. Friend says "No". Let me put to him the situation in which the Race Relations Board says "Yes, indeed, the firm was right in applying the racial balance argument here and there is no case to answer." Then the matter would be determined by the Board and would not go any further. Then the determination would be entirely in the hands of the Race Relations Board.
The case to which my hon. Friend refers and to which he takes exception is when the Race Relations Board says, "This company was not entitled to apply the racial balance argument and it should have accepted this man for employment" and the firm says "We believe the Race Relations Board is wrong, and we are not prepared to accept its adjudication." In that case, I think, my hon. Friend says that the Race Relations Board is in a position where it can only process the


complaint a stage further and take it to the court, and that it must be the court which decides whether the Race Relations Board's judgment was right or whether the judgment of the firm was right.
Surely my hon. Friend is not suggesting that the Race Relations Board, which will be responsible for processing the complaint to the court if necessary, should not only take the case to court but should also, before the case gets to court, determine whether or not the case was proved?

Mr. Rose: My hon. Friend consistently and throughout the debate has failed to take the point that what we are questioning is the matter of bona fide intention. The Race Relations Board does not have to decide whether it is reasonable or not, but has to decide merely whether the employer had a bona fide intention, although the result may be alien to what the Bill intends to deal with. It has to apply a purely subjective test of the employer's intention. Will my hon. Friend deal with that?

Mr. Hattersley: Yes, I will deal with it. The Clause puts on the Race Relations Board a number of obligations and specifies a number of criteria that the Board must take into account. To abstract one of those and say that this is the only one that matters, that this is the only one which is crucial and, to adopt my hon. Friend's phrase, that this is the one which will enable a coach and horses to be driven through the Bill, is a misunderstanding of the criteria which, according to this Clause, limit and define the action which the Race Relations Board can take. The only dispute between my hon. Friends and myself—

Dr. Winstanley: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that point, may I put this to him? He has explained very clearly that a person would have a right to complain to the Race Relations Board if he had been told that he could not be employed because the firm wished to maintain a racial balance and that it was already employing enough coloured people. But suppose that an applicant was told, not that it was wished to preserve a racial balance, but that his education was deficient. He would not have the right to complain to the Race Relations Board. Therefore, this provision would not be needed at all.

Mr. Hattersley: The hon. Gentleman is confusing the issue. If an applicant for employment is told that he is rejected not because of his race or ethnic origin but because of some industrial or educational deficiency, one is confronted with the problem of deciding whether the defence is legitimate or bogus. But that is hardly the issue with which we are concerned now. What we are concerned with is whether or not the Race Relations Board should be asked to give a judgment before the racial balance Clause is invoked, or after.
To say that a company cannot apply this rule until it possesses a certificate of exemption is asking for the rule to be applied in an intolerably inflexible way. It is asking for a certificate of exemption which would have to last for a period of time during which circumstances and employment patterns might change. It is asking for rigidity which is unacceptable and it misunderstands the way in which people employ individuals. It is making it impossible for the voluntary machinery to work, and it is asking for arbitrary and inflexible decisions to be taken.
All I am asking—and this is why I referred to my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court with unacceptable severity at the beginning of my speech, for which I humbly apologise—is the understanding that the Government seek to meet the problem and solve the difficulty—not to reduce the force of the Bill but to meet a problem of the immigrant community. We seek to do it in the most flexible or reasonable way, and we believe that as the Bill stands, it does that as well as it can be done.

12.45 a.m.

Sir D. Renton: Since about midnight, we on this side have listened quietly, patiently and not without interest to the sort of clash which is inescapable in the party opposite between the Left-wing intellectuals as represented by the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) and the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) —

Mr. Richard: On a point of order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman should speak from more knowledge of this party before he makes allegations like that.

Sir D. Renton: I shall not be deterred by that intervention from drawing this


just and necessary comparison. We have heard the Left-wing intellectuals, on the one hand, clashing with the practical trade unionists as represented by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and, I am glad to say, on this occasion, supported by the Government representative.
I fully endorse what the hon. Gentleman has said. I might make so bold as to add to his reply that if one reads carefully the last Report of the Race Relations Board, and particularly paragraph 48, one sees that the Board does not envisage having to do the kind of work which the hon. Member for Black-ley would like to impose upon it. Indeed, the Board has a cautionary phrase or two which make it clear that it would not be qualified to do so.
The Board states:
If it is important to secure the confidence of members of minority groups, it is no less important to win the confidence of those who may find themselves in a position to discriminate. This means that the Board, its staff and its committees, must be properly qualified to carry out their duties.
When one thinks of the kind of duties that would have to be performed and the sort of staff, and the enormous numbers of staff, who would be needed to carry out the duty of giving the prior approval of the Board as mentioned in Amendment No. 54, one realises that the hon. Member's proposal is quite impractical, quite apart from being undesirable for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Walton and for the powerful reason taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) when he pointed out that the men on the shop floor, in consultation with management, can probably reach the right sort of preliminary decisions much better than anyone from outside and that if anything went wrong, or anyone feels that he has a complaint, there is opportunity to go to the Board.
The Under-Secretary is quite right about this, more especially when one bears in mind, as my hon. Friend pointed out, that subsection (4) of Clause 8 means that in any event the Clause is applicable only to first-generation immigrants.
The hon. Member for Blackley called the Clause the most offensive part of the Bill. It is unthinkable that we should

legislate in this field without having something on the lines of the reasonable balance Clause, difficult of definition though that becomes. We must face that.
We went into this matter in Committee. We made various suggestions to the Government. They have not put down Amendments which improve the position, and it may be that it is difficult to find the right phraseology. As I say, however, it is unthinkable that we should be without something like this provision, and I am glad that the Under-Secretary has, on this occasion, stuck to his guns.

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Hattersley: I beg to move, Amendment No. 57, in page 5, line 23, leave out 'and (3)' and insert 'to (4)'.
This is, I trust, an uncontentious Amendment. It merely seeks to add the right phrase rather than the wrong phrase. It intends that the powers we seek should be extended to cover the right subsections rather than the wrong subsections. It is entirely a correction, and I hope that the House will accept it in these terms.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 58, in page 5, line 28, leave out 'in or'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Mr. Ennals: I beg to move Amendment No. 63, in page 6, line 11, at end insert:
(12) For the purposes of this section British territorial waters shall be treated as part of Great Britain.
Certain parts of Clause 8 deal with ships at sea and aircraft, and in Committee it was suggested that the Parliamentary draftsman had overlooked territorial waters. The point was raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton). The Secretary of State said that he would look at the question. The Amendment, which removes any doubt that British territorial waters are to be treated as part of Great Britain, gives effect to that undertaking. Its practical effect will be minimal.

Sir D. Renton: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for this Amendment, may I express the hope that the Government will never again forget that Great


Britain is an island entirely surrounded by territorial waters?

Mr. Hogg: On a point of order. I know that hon. Friends of mine, and I dare say hon. Members opposite, have their own arrangements to make. Perhaps the Government would say one way or the other—I am not anxious to dictate to them in any way—what are their intensions about the progress of the Bill. I do not want to move a dilatory Motion, although I would do so to put myself in order if we wanted a discussion. I do not want a discussion, but I think hon. Members ought to know exactly what the intention of the Government is.

Mr. Callaghan: Further to that point of order, if this is a proper way of doing it. There is only one major Amendment left, namely, on damages, as I understand it, and it therefore should be possible to get through Report stage quickly and proceed to Third Reading, so that the Bill may be transferred to another place reasonably quickly so that it may be considered before the Summer Recess.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Hattersley: I beg to move, Amendment No. 64, in page 6, line 11, at end insert:
(12) Section 3 above shall not render unlawful the selection of a person of a particular nationality or particular descent for employment requiring attributes especially possessed by persons of that nationality or descent.
The Amendment seeks to meet an assurance given to the Committee that we would seek to remedy a situation in which quite unreasonable powers might be applied by the Bill. The Government accept that it is reasonable, to take a perhaps banal but obvious example, for an Indian restaurant to wish to employ Indian waiters and only Indian waiters, and to prevent them from doing that might be taking the principles of the Bill outside the bounds of reason.
I make the speech only to assure the House that the Clause is worded in such a way as to make it as near impossible as can be done for people to misuse the Clause and extend its powers over a wider sphere than the House would intend and regard as reasonable. I therefore commend the Amendment to the House on those principles.

Mr. Hogg: I ought to say "Thank you" to the Under-Secretary on behalf of my hon. Friends and myself. This matter occupied quite a long time in Committee. I had to claim the assistance of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Lestor) as a potential geisha girl, and we had to give a number of other highly commendable analogies and examples, but at least we made the Government see sense, and we are grateful to them for having seen it.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 9

ACTS DONE FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES

Amendment made: No. 65, in page 6, line 12, leave out Clause 9.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 11

INCITEMENT AND ACCESSORIES

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment 68, in page 6, line 27, leave out subsection (1).

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): I suggest that it would be convenient for the House to discuss at the same time the following Amendments: No. 69, in line 30 leave out from 'who' to 'an' in line 31 and insert:
'deliberately aids, induces or incites another person to do'.
and No. 79, in Clause 15, page 9, line 30, leave out from second 'of' to 'the' in line 31 and insert:
'aiding, inducing or inciting'.

Mr. Callaghan: I assure hon. Gentlemen opposite that I am prepared to accept all the insults, as long as I get the Amendments. It is always easy to swallow one if one can get the other.
This series of Amendments represents a great concession and I hope that I will not be accused of weakening the whole purpose of the Bill. The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) was very much opposed in Committee to the words
…aids, abets, counsels or procures…
and suggested that they should be replaced by an improved form of words. I have, therefore, substituted for that phrase the words
…deliberately aid, induces or incites another person.


I am sure that this represents a tremendous improvement in the Bill.

Mr. Antony Buck: I am not certain that the right hon. Gentleman was speaking tongue in cheek, but this matter occupied us for some time in Committee. It is a good thing that he has broken with precedent in the form of words chosen. This represents a marginal improvement in the Bill and as the suggestion originally came from my hon. Friends, we are grateful for the Amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: No. 69, in line 30, leave out from 'who' to 'an' in line 31 and insert:
'deliberately aids, induces or incites another person to do'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 12

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS

Mr. Rose: I beg to move Amendment No. 70, in page 6, line 35, after 'treated', insert 'prima facie'.
The purpose of this Amendment is dealt with in its essentials by the following Amendment standing in the name of the Home Secretary. For at least the second time tonight I find myself having tabled an Amendment in virtually the the same terms as the Government. While I make no apology for that, in view of the Government proposal in this matter, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendent, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Ennals: I beg to move Amendment No. 71, in line 42, at end insert:
(3) In proceedings brought under section 18 or 19 of this Act against any person in respect of an act alleged to have been done by an employee of his it shall be a defence for that person to prove that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing in the course of his employment acts of the same description as that act.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) for having withdrawn the previous Amendment.
As he explained, this Amendment deals with the same subject. In Committee the right hon. and learned Member for

Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) expressed concern about the implications of subsection (2). He argued—and, like hon. Members generally, I agreed—that it was wrong that an employer who had taken all reasonable steps to prevent acts of discrimination by his employees should be held responsible for any acts of discrimination that might be carried out by his employees. I undertook to look at the matter between that stage and Report. After further consideration, we have decided that there is a case for making the defence of "all reasonable steps" available to an employer, and the Amendment gives clear effect to that decision.

Sir D. Renton: Although an important Amendment, I can deal with it merely by thanking the hon. Gentleman and stressing that it means that the vicarious liability under the Bill will not be absolute and that there will be available the defence to which the hon. Gentleman referred. This is an important improvement in the Bill.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I, too, welcome the Amendment, which goes a long way towards meeting the points made in Committee, particularly from the point of view of the C.B.I.
Does the Minister consider that the phrase "reasonably practicable" would be sufficient if, for example, an employer had made it clear, through notices placed in his workshops, to his employees that he was wholly opposed to racial discrimination and wished to subscribe in full to the purposes of the Bill?
If a long-distance lorry driver employed by a firm engages at the end of a 100-mile journey—assuming that he will be allowed to travel 100 miles under the Transport Bill—in an act which could be regarded as discriminatory, would his employer be protected if he had made it clear to that driver that while in his employ he must not discriminate?

1.0 a.m.

Mr. Ennals: It would be first for the Board and later for a court to decide. A reasonable step for the employer to take would be to put up a notice making quite clear that he was against any form of discrimination. If an issue had arisen, he could do as was done in a recent case in Ontario where a circular was sent out to


all sections of a factory making known that the firm was against discrimination.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 14

GENERAL PROVISION AS TO INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION

Mr. Winnick: I beg to move Amendment No. 72, in page 8, line 3, leave out 'two' and insert 'six'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can discuss Amendment No. 73, in line 3, leave out 'two' and insert 'three'.

Mr. Winnick: The purpose of the Amendment is to extend the period for making complaints. I consider the present period too rigid. Coloured people who are new immigrants to Britain may not know the procedure. They may have a justified complaint regarding discrimination and not be told how to make the complaint until the two months period has passed. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Ennals) said that he had an open mind on the subject, so, if my Amendment is not acceptable, he may agree to a longer period than two months.
If at the end of the day the Government stand completely firm on two months, would it be possible for the Race Relations Board to look at a complaint which is more than two months old? I would rather have a situation in which the period is longer—six months, or even four months—but if it is not possible for the Government to shift on this, as a compromise could the Board have power to look at complaints which are over two months old?

Mr. Ennals: Any period we chose would be an arbitrary one. There was some consideration at one stage as to whether it should be one month and others suggested six months. The feeling of the Government and the Race Relations Board was that it should be relatively short—not so long that people would have forgotten the circumstances, but not so short as to make it difficult for busy people, or someone who had to make a journey outside the country, to make a complaint. Following discussions with the Board, which considered anything between one and three months reasonable, we thought two months about right.
I said in Committee that if I were under pressure I would not stand by two months, but there was not much pressure in Committee and my conclusion still is that two months is the right period. I cannot give the assurance for which my hon. Friend asked about the Board having power to extend the period if it wished. This was raised in Committee and it was felt that it would be putting the Board in a difficult situation. On what criteria should it decide to deal with a complaint which came three or four months later? It was thought better to have a firm rule and I think this is about right.

Mr. John Lee: As my hon. Friend did not get much pressure for this in Committee, I hope that I can supply a little pressure now. In civil proceedings under the limitation Acts one has six years in which to mount an action. This is a similar procedure dealing with simpler matters. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, South (Mr. Winnick) said, many of those who will raise these complaints will be unused to our proceedings and uncertain of their rights. Many of them will not be English-speakers. Often they will be working in a hostile environment. It is in just that situation that allegations are likely to be justified.
Although I do not want to make too much of an issue of this, I think that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary should look at this again. Six months is not unreasonably long. It is not so long that people will forget what has happened, certainly not the complainants. My hon. Friend's reply was disappointing.

Sir S. Summers: If pressure is to be mounted on the Minister to change his mind from the intention which he announced a few minutes ago, namely, two months, perhaps a brief intervention to support him would not be unwelcome to the Government Front Bench. If a genuine complaint cannot be started on its journey to the conciliation machinery within two months of the incident, it cannot be a very genuine complaint. I hope that the Minister will not change his mind but will stick to two months.

Dr. Miller: I want to lend support to those who suggest that the period should be longer. Last Saturday a young woman of West Indian origin came to see me at my political surgery about an alleged


discrimination with regard to housing. She was a highly intelligent young woman, yet she did not know that there existed in Scotland a local conciliation committee of the Board. One could well envisage a situation in which many immigrants, who obviously do not want to cause trouble and have no intention of being difficult, would not know of the facilities until the two months had elapsed. Two months is not a long time. I ask my hon. Friend to give serious consideration to extending the period considerably.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: In replying to the debate on an Amendment to Clause 8(2) the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity said nothing about complaints made to the Ministry. Schedule 2 sets out procedure whereby complaints can be put to the Ministry. They can be put to a body set up by the Ministry before they reach the Board. How would this affect the two months period? If the matter has not reached the Board, further time would be required.

Mr. Ennals: The two-month period applies to wherever the complaint is registered, whether with the Board, or through the Board, or direct to the voluntary machinery. We have looked at this issue very carefully. There has been a good deal of pressure directed to our having a system which enables complaints to be dealt with quickly. If the period from when the alleged discrimination took place to when the complaint is made to the Board is extended, conciliation is thus postponed. If rapid conciliation is desired, we must try to bring about a rapid reporting of complaints. Responding to the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers), I do not intend to change my mind.

Sir S. Summers: My point arises out of what the hon. Gentleman has just said. As I understood him, the two months starts from the time the complaint reaches either the Race Relations Board or the voluntary machinery. It follows, therefore, that if the complaint is sent to the Ministry in the first place and is delayed unreasonably in the Ministy and does not reach its destination within two months, the complainant will have forfeited his right to carry out

the complaint. Surely it is when the complaint reaches the Ministry that the time should start.

Mr. Ennals: The time is the time at which the complaint is registered, whether it is formally registered with the Race Relations Board or is formally registered with the Ministry. The important thing is that the period should be not less than two months after the alleged discrimination has taken place.

Amendment negatived.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): The next Amendment is No. 74, with which we may discuss Government Amendment No. 95.

Mr. Ennals: I beg to move, Amendment No. 74, in page 8, line 3, after 'and' insert:
'it is accompanied by the name and address of the person by whom it is made and'.
This can be dealt with very quickly. It is to carry out an assurance I gave to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) who, in Committee, proposed an Amendment requiring the complainant to give his name and address. This is what the Amendment seeks to do.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 75, in page 8, line 22, leave out from 'that' to end of line 23 and insert
'the act was one of discrimination against a particular person'.

No. 76, in line 31, leave out from 'of to 'shall' in line 33 and insert 'any other complaint'.—[Mr. Ennals.]

Clause 15

INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS AND ORGANISATIONS OF EMPLOYERS

Mr. Winnick: I beg to move, Amendment No. 78, in page 9, line 24, to leave out
'the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can also discuss the following Amendments: No. 80, in page 9, line 45, leave out 'to the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity'.
No. 96, in page 20, line 28 leave out from 'authorisation' to end of line 31.
No. 97, in line 32, leave out paragraph 2 and insert—
2. Where any such complaint is made it shall at first instance be referred to the Race Relations Board, and the Board shall decide if the complaint should be sent to a body of persons suitable to consider that complaint.
No. 100, in page 21, line 10, leave out paragraph 4 and insert—
4. A body of persons to whom a complaint is referred under this Schedule shall, on the expiration of the period of four weeks from the reference of the complaint to them or on completion of their investigation, whichever occurs first, report to the Race Relations Board on their findings and whether they have been able: to secure a settlement and assurance.
No. 101, in line 19, leave out paragraph 5 and insert—
5. The Board shall decide if the agreement is satisfactory where such an agreement has been reached with a complaint and if they are not satisfied to investigate themselves. Where no settlement has been reached by a body of persons outside the Board the Board will then decide whether to investigate the matter.
No. 102, in line 28, leave out paragraphs 6 to 16.

Mr. Winnick: What I am trying to do by the Amendment is to make sure that employment complaints are treated in the same way as housing and credit complaints; in other words, I should like complaints to go direct to the Race Relations Board. I cannot see any justification at all for the Department of Employment and Productivity being involved. Indeed, if anything, one would imagine that the Department has enough problems on its plate at the present without being involved with complaints about racial or colour discrimination.
Some people have argued, I do not know with what justification, that the Government have included the involvement of the Department as a sort of sop to the C.B.I. and the T.U.C. I would make the point, which has been made earlier today, that the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. have not been very keen, certainly not been very enthusiastic, about the Measure we are debating. They have been urging that voluntary machinery should be used in industry, and that there is no need for what we are now discussing. Therefore, perhaps the Government fell it only right and proper that the Department of Employment and Pro-

ductivity, the former Ministry of Labour, should be involved at some stage. I believe this to be totally unnecessary.
What I would urge is that complaints should be sent to the Race Relations Board which would then decide if there is appropriate voluntary machinery to be used in a given industry. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) seems to be heckling me from a sitting position. No doubt he can make his own views clear later on.

Mr. Hogg: I was taking no part in the hon. Gentleman's speech. I was giving instruction and advice and comfort to my hon. Friends.

1.15 a.m.

Mr. Winnick: I should be the last person to intervene in the internal affairs of the Conservative Party.
If complaints about employment went to the Board it would decide if there was a voluntary machinery in the industry. If such machinery exists there is no reason why the Board will not use it. Why use the Department of Employment and Productivity rather like a letter box?
It seems to me that we are doing so because the Government want to give a sop to the C.B.I. and the T.U.C. There is no difficulty over housing and credit facilities; complaints will go direct to the Board. I urge the Government to reconsider their decision over employment, and to keep out the Department of Employment and Productivity, which has enough problems. Complaints should go to the Race Relations Board in the first place.

Mr. Callaghan: The Amendments were considered in Committee, and the Committee resisted them. I have seen no reason and heard no new argument to make me change my mind about them at this stage.
I do not think that it would be right to give the Race Relations Board power to overturn settlements accepted by both parties to a complaint, as the Amendments would do. On that ground alone I resist them.
Moreover, it is a basic feature of the Bill that it gives industry a chance to settle employment complaints by its own


efforts where it has suitable machinery. If this system is to operate there must be some authority with the task of deciding whether, in relation to any particular complaint, suitable industrial machinery exists. It would be frivolous to give that sort of decision to the Board. It is clearly the responsibility of the Department of Employment and Productivity, the old Ministry of Labour, to decide whether suitable machinery exists. It has long-standing knowledge of industrial relations, procedures and close links with industrial machinery at all levels, closer than anybody else has. No serious critic or observer of the Bill could suggest that there is any authority better fitted to make these decisions.
With regret, I cannot accept my hon. Friend's Amendment.

Sir S. Summers: The Government are making a profound mistake in seeking to keep in the Department of Employment and Productivity. The Amendment is entirely right. For one thing, to introduce this additional wheel to the coach will only make it easier for delays to occur.
Even more important, the Bill's whole success, notably in employment, depends on the skill of the conciliation machinery and the confidence placed in it. That confidence will depend very largely on the extent to which the public, particularly complainants, regard the Race Relations Board as independent of the Government of the day. That is particularly so should there be complaints about employment in the public service or the nationalised industries. If the complainant in such circumstances doubts the independence of the conciliation machinery because the Department of Employment and Productivity is involved in its whole administration a very serious defect will arise, and lack of confidence will follow.
To the best of my information, those concerned with the conciliation machinery very much regret the Government's attitude in this matter. Experience will show that a mistake has been made if the Government stick to this. I hope that we shall make a change here in the not too distant future when we have a chance to make changes. I am sure that in the long run this additional responsibility

placed on the Department cannot do anybody any good. In column 664 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of our Committee proceedings on 20th June the Minister's view was set out quite clearly that the Department did not want to be involved. If they are going to be nothing but a postbox it can do nobody any good and can only lead to delay.

Mr. Callaghan: I do not wish to repeat my argument, except to say that the hon. Gentleman cannot have heard me clearly. There must be someone to determine whether the appropriate machinery exists—

Mr. John Lee: The Race Relations Board.

Mr. Callaghan: My hon. Friend interjects "the Race Relations Board", but I can think of few things that would lead to greater lack of confidence than that it should be put into the hands of those who are without experience in these matters. It should be the Department of Employment and Productivity—the old Ministry of Labour—which has got the experience to decide whether this machinery exists.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am quite sure the Home Secretary is right in this matter, but I hope he can urge on his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity that if the Department is going to deal with these matters it should do so reasonably expeditiously.
Since there are many other labours on the shoulders of the Secretary of State at the moment, I hope he will say to her that it is important she should deal with complaints of this kind more rapidly than she is able to deal with letters from hon. Members, which certainly takes a very long time.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: There are a good many of us who have considerable reservations about the Department of Employment and Productivity being involved in this field. I found it extremely interesting —and I tried to intervene when we were discussing the previous Amendment—that when the Under-Secretary for the Department spoke about the Race Relations Board and its responsibility in regard to complaints, he never once mentioned his own responsibility and the Departmental


activities that would flow from this Bill once it was passed by the House. Yet many of the complaints will undoubtedly come to his Ministry before ever they reach the Board, and one would hope that in so far as they go to the Department they will stop there and will not go on to the Board.
What some of us find puzzling about this is that assuming there were difficulties of employment in this field, and that there was no Bill of this kind, then clearly the matter would be discussed in the usual way as between the trade unions and the employers, or as between an individual trade unionist and his trade union, and would eventually go through the normal processes and might eventually be settled on a national or at a local level through the good offices of the Department of Employment and Productivity. This would happen in any case, and what we cannot understand is why they should be involved in this Bill. It seems to us necessary to bring in the Race Relations Board only at the end of the day, and if this is so, then the processes involving the old Ministry of Labour conciliation machinery would happen in any case, and it is quite unnecessary to write them into this Bill.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment made: In page 9, line 30, leave out from second 'of' to 'the' in line 31 and insert 'aiding, inducing or inciting'.—[Mr. Callaghan.]

Clause 18

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Mr. Hogg: I beg to move Amendment No. 81, in page 10, leave out lines 29 to 32.

The Deputy Speaker: With this Amendment we can discuss Amendment No. 86.

Mr. Hogg: As you have said, Mr. Deputy Speaker, this Amendment goes with Amendment No. 86, which is really a corollary to it. It raises a bone of contention between the parties which was discussed first on Second Reading and which occupied the Committee for a certain amount of time. I deployed the case at considerable length in Committee and do not want to detain the House

for the same length of time now, but it is a matter to which my hon. Friends and I attach a certain amount of importance, and, therefore, I shall deploy the case shortly so that hon. Members who were not on the Committee may understand how we feel.
Those who are concerned with the desire to remedy a wrong created by discrimination are concerned also that there should be an individual remedy. Although I am not sure that it would have applied to everybody, I was always prepared to compromise on the basis of out-of-pocket expenses. The Attorney-General, who is paying his usual courteous attention to what is said, will remember that I proposed a separate Amendment on that in Committee, and it would always have been acceptable to me, although it was a minor matter.
But what we have to consider is the remedy proposed by way of damages in Clause 18, to which Amendment 81 refers, and Clause 21, to which Amendment 86 refers. The first thing I would say to hon. Members opposite, which I ventured to say in Committee, is that they, too, recognise, although in somewhat different fields, that there may be cases of injustice where the provision of a remedy by way of damages is inappropriate and cases of very serious injustice which can yield serious financial loss. Less than three years ago, at about the same time as the first Act on the subject of race relations was being passed through this House, hon. Members opposite insisted on driving through this House a Measure designed to reverse the decision of the courts in the well-known case of Rookes v. Barnard in which the courts had found that damages of several thousands of£s yielded to a person who had suffered by reason of intimidation.
We did not agree with that, but the argument which existed between the two sides of the House then, as it was presented to us from the other side, was that, although a wrong might exist in legislation dealing with social conditions, it was not desirable that a remedy by way of damages should adhere to it. We did not agree then. It may be that they will not agree with us now. At any rate, they will not pretend, therefore, that in saying that, although there may be a wrong of some kind, as we do, the


remedy of damages should not adhere to it, we are asserting something which is wholly foreign to their way of thinking, because it is not.
The substantial question before the House is whether it is desirable to attach to an individual who complains of an act of discrimination—one must remember in this connection that a single act is enough to give rise to a complaint under the current Bill—a remedy by way of damages for compensation for the loss of chance of employment. In this connection it is important to understand what it is that the Government propose. They have never pretended—and we have never sought to pretend either, of course—that a person who applies for a job or a person who applies for a house should be able to compel a prospective employer to give him that job or the seller to give him that house. That is common ground between the two sides. It is because shot gun marriages of this kind would be bound to yield nothing but bitterness and hatred, and both sides wish to avoid it.
1.30 a.m.
It follows, therefore, that when someone applies for a job or a house but does not get it because the other party to the proposed arrangement discriminates against him on ground of race, he is not being deprived of that job or house by way of damage but is being deprived of a much more notional conception—the right to compete for it with other persons, it may be of his own race or colour or of some other race or some other colour. Such a right is not so much of an artificial character, because it could be enforced by assurance, declaration, injunction or conciliation, but a right of such doubtful character as regards money that to attempt to quantify it in terms of money is of necessity purely speculative.
I recognise that there are fields of law where judges are compelled to make somewhat similar calculations. Where a man is injured as a result of an accident, he is deprived not merely of employment but of his chances of getting some future employment. When a woman loses her husband, a great deal of resentment is caused because the courts have felt bound to speculate on her chances of remarriage, and this is translated by an act of arbitrary calculus into£s shillings

and pence. This circumstance has given rise to reasonable resentment and has been embarrassing to those taking part in the proceedings. In actions for breach of contract, there are fringe benefits attached —sometimes a share of profits or chances of future promotion—which enter into the calculations of damage.
Although I have never like it or welcomed it, although on the whole I think it a highly embarrassing and difficult calculation, it is something which the law probably has to accept as the lesser of two evils. But when I am asked in this novel and wholly uncharted field of legislation to introduce a right of general damages which are not general damages by reference to any ascertainable amount but to a purely abstract conception of what the chances of competing with an unknown number of potential competitors of different race, colour and language might be, I shrink from the calculation. It is pure speculation.
So the first proposition is that it is doubtful whether one could right such a wrong by way of damages and the second is that the damages themselves would be highly speculative. The third factor, as those of us which have been at the Bar a long time know, is that we have gradually moved in the legal profession away from speculative actions. When the Attorney-General and I went first to the Bar, many years ago, the ambulance chaser was a reality. He was a social menace. In those days we did not know how to get rid of him, but we have got rid of him by way of the process of legal aid and we are all very glad to have done so.
But a claim for damages, even in the county court—and at the moment these proceedings are to be in the county court —is a weapon of oppression against a person of moderate means, and I do not believe that, except where necessity demands it, it is a desirable thing to introduce into our legal system. I am sure that all hon. Members, whether they ultimately accept the Amendment or not, will have a certain sympathy with me when I say that it is a weapon of oppression. It is used as an instrument of blackmail; it is used as a means of extracting money in support of frivolous complaints, and it is undesirable.
I am sorry to take a little time about this, but I attach importance to it and it is a little more complicated than would seem at first sight and were I to try to oversimplify it, I should not be doing my duty to my own side, or to the House as a whole.
It is said in answer to this, and there is a certain measure of sense in it—I do not want to underestimate the case on the other side—that in this instance the potential target for speculative actions is fully safeguarded, because there is a provision in the Bill that these race relations proceedings can be initiated not by the complainant himself, but only by the Race Relations Board, which will have had a preliminary investigation. I concede that that is an important safeguard and it would be wholly unjustified for me not to recognise the force of that answer.
But my reply to it is that it is fundamentally a nonsense within a nonsense. Having arrived at a wholly irrational remedy, the Government realise that it is so oppressive that it cannot be applied, and they therefore arrive at a protection which in itself is an affront to almost every established principle of law. Let me establish why I say that.
When a man is entitled to damages, it may be for libel, it may be for breach of promise of marriage, it may be for a motor accident, he brings the action himself. He brings it on his own behalf and if he wins, he gets damages, and that is either right or wrong according to what is thought of the type of action which he brings. But in this instance it is not open to him to bring an action. The remedy is not his. It is operated at the whim—I do not say that in an offensive way;"discretion" may be the more appropriate word—of a public body.
That would be all right if the only thing which the public body had to consider was the complainant's interest. If it were simply proceeding for the complainant, if its natural interest were to consider justice and the complainant's interest, there might be something in it;but that is not so. The interest of the Board is quite different from that of the complainant and might diverge from it

and might diverge from it on the absolutely critical question of whether to apply for an action for damages.
The Board's interest is the public interest of creating a set of social conditions. Its prime interest is conciliation. Its secondary interest is a satisfactory assurance for the future. It is only when those two things break down that it asks for damages. It then asks for damages which belong not to the Board, but to the complainant. It therefore becomes a complete matter of chance whether an individual complainant gets any damages.
Quite properly influenced by its public duty, the Board may or may not proceed and, although the complainant's interest may be one factor which enters into the Board's calculations, it will not be the predominant factor, nor the only factor. The result is that the Bill will propose that a right of damages, in itself highly speculative and difficult of calculation and which may be used as an instrument of oppression against the other party, will become operated by a third party and that a public body which, in the nature of things, must be animated not by a desire for justice between the potential complainant and the potential defendant, but by whether it has achieved a public purpose which is separate from either of them.
This is fundamentally a nonsense within a nonsense, and I would come back—although I apologise first for having taken a length of time at this hour—to a proposition which I advanced on the Second Reading of this Bill because I believe that it is the true philosophy which should underlie proceedings of this kind.
I do not always agree with what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) has to say, but I fully agree with something which he said on the Second Reading, namely, that this particular remedy by way of damages is an alien body from the American code. That code encourages complaints because the legal system in the United States depends upon the individual complaint with the complainant acting, as it were, as a common informer for that against which the law is aimed. This serves no purpose in this Bill because we have handed the


initiative to initiate complaints before a court to a public body, the Race Relations Board. That is a public body, disinterested in profit, and acting in the public interest. That is right. The Race Relations Board already exists and fulfils an important public function under the terms of the 1965 Act.
In that Act, there is no right to pursue a claim for damages for oneself or for anybody else and it operates by way of injunction, by way of assurance, and by way of conciliation. This is a retrogressive step and something imported from a foreign code which serves no useful purpose and creates at the same time a number of anomalies both by way of application and by way of initiation.
The true philosophy is surely what I tried to make clear during the Second Reading of the Bill, namely, that we are working in a novel field of public law and that it is not right to create a statutory tort. The 1965 Act did not do so, and neither that Act nor this Bill have created a criminal offence. May I put it this way? What we are doing is to set up something akin to the Restrictive Practices Court, to which the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) has referred me. It is an analogy for what this legislation is trying to bring about—something in the nature of the resale price maintenance legislation. A characteristic of this new branch of public law is that one does not create a criminal offence with an individual remedy attaching to a complainant, but attach an enforcement apparatus, the purpose of which is not to obtain damages but to enforce an acceptable set of social conditions.
I apologise again for speaking at length at this hour of the morning, but I am trying to put the serious argument that what is here proposed is a retrogressive step. It adds complications to the Bill. On occasions it will be used as an instrument of speculation and oppression. It adds an element of uncertainty where uncertainty is undesirable, and it will tend, on occasions, to create antagonism between person and person, when the object of the Bill is to create a set of social conditions where antagonism does not exist. I have said

all I wanted to say. I hope that I have presented my case in an orderly and rational way.

1.45 a.m.

The Attorney-General: It may be convenient if I were to say at an early stage in this discussion what are the Government's reasons for recommending that the Amendment should be rejected. As the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) has said in a moderate, and if I may say so, ingenious speech, the effect of the Amendment would be to eliminate the provisions of damages altogether.
On this side of the House we think that it is appropriate and imperative that there should be room for an ultimate award of damages, in appropriate cases arising under the Bill, to those whom it can be shown have suffered loss, but that the damages should be limited to the headings indicated in Clause 21(l)(a) and (1)(b). I say that there should be room for an ultimate award of damages because I am sure that the House will appreciate that the question of damages will arise only in a limited number of cases, at the end of a very long process.
The process will start with the complaint by the person discriminated against. That complaint will be considered by the conciliation committee, and if the attempt at conciliation fails, it will be reported to the Race Relations Board. In turn the Board will no doubt attempt to settle the matter by negotiation. If that also fails, it will fall to the Board, in appropriate cases, to go to court, and I can imagine that it would take only the clearest cases to court.
It will be at that stage that the question of suing for damages will arise and that issue will fall for determination by a county court judge, sitting with two assessors. It seems to us that, if at the end of that process the victim who has suffered loss through discrimination is to get nothing, he will feel that the provisions of the Bill are mere humbug. This is the real danger in the right hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal. The House will remember that although it is true that Clause 18 provides other remedies against discrimination, injunction and declaration and a combination of injunction and damages, in the single act of discrimination, damages will be the


only remedy. I emphasise that the damages recoverable at the end of that long process are limited. There is no room for exemplary damages or punitive damages, of the kind common in the law of tort. They are rewardable on the occasion of defamation or malicious prosecution, assault or even negligence and nuisance. There is no room for that kind of head of claim for damages under the Bill, no solatium for wounded feelings, no penal damages to punish a discriminator who may have acted outrageously and in aggravating conditions in a given case. The reason why the Government took that view and limited the horizon of damages is that the main essential purpose of the Bill is conciliation, the avoidance and elimination of racial discrimination. It is not the intention to encourage an onset of litigation. The damages recoverable are strictly limited under the Bill, to compensate the victim for the loss that he has suffered.

Mr. John Lee: Mr. John Lee rose—

The Attorney-General: I should like to develop this point. I will resume my seat in a moment.
In the situations covered by the Bill, the loss the victim suffers by reason of the act of discrimination is essentially the loss of the opportunity of obtaining the benefit, be it a house or a job or any other facility which he is seeking, and we on this side of the House take the view that it is reasonable that where the Board can prove that he might reasonably be expected to have obtained or retained the benefit but for the act of discrimination, the court should have power to award such damages as it thinks just, for loss of opportunity.
We also think—and I gathered from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that he was disposed to go as far with us on this road as this—that he ought to recover his special damages for fares that he has incurred, for surveyor's fees that have been wasted and matters of that kind as an additional factor.

Mr. John Lee: The question that I want to ask my right hon. and learned Friend is this. Are the damages limited as in the county court limitation?

The Attorney-General: No, they are not limited as in county court jurisdiction. But frankly, I think it will be a

very rare case indeed where the damages awarded would exceed that limit. I imagine that they would be on a very much lower level.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has pointed out, as indeed is the case, that ascertainment of damages will be difficult, that, as he has characteristically and fairly pointed out, that is not an unusual situation arising in the courts. A court, doing the best that can be done with insufficient material, may have to form conclusions on matters on which there is no evidence and make allowances for contingencies even to the extent of making a pure guess. That is happening in the courts day in and day out. This is a common occurrence, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has indicated, in claims made, for example, in respect of pain and suffering or loss of expectation of life—almost metaphysical concepts that have got to be translated into terms of pounds, shillings and pence.
There is a claim for damages for loss of a chance of winning a prize. There was the case of Chaplin v. Hicks and the actress who was eliminated from the final elimination contest for selecting actresses for a part. The assessment of damages for loss of a chance of winning a prize is difficult, but the courts have faced the difficulty and have done their best with it. So that there is no insurmountable problem here that the experience and skill of learned judges cannot cope with.
Then the novelty of the claim, the creation of this new statutory wrong, whatever we call it, this new statutory duty, is in keeping with the development of our law. Whether this is a tort or a quasi-tort, or by whatever technical term one likes to describe it, the fact is that the history of the law of tort—this is not my language but language of a far more eminent legal source—is studded with new causes of action, both judge-made causes and statutory new causes of action. New problems and new changes in society demand new rights and remedies in the courts. The challenge that our contemporary society faces by racial discrimination and the threat which it provides to the order of society make necessary the new remedies that the Bill provides.
The final matter which worried the right hon. and learned Gentleman was the risk that the provision of this new cause of action, this new basis for claims of damages, might result in a flood of speculative cases. He readily provided the answer to that fear by pointing out that the individual has no right to sue. The Government have been under pressure to give him that right, but we felt that that also would involve some risk, at least, of impairing the process of conciliation and might provide encouragement to those who thought to make some quick money out of this exercise with the opportunity of going to the courts.
It is the Board alone that can bring the proceedings on behalf of the victim of discrimination. The Board will be manned by responsible people and at the end of the day, if the Board brings actions which it loses, there will be an award of costs against the Board. It is true that in the long run it will come out of the taxpayers' pocket, but the Treasury will not be unwatchful, I hope, of what goes on in this way.
Therefore, I invite the House to take the view that that responsible body, the Race Relations Board, would launch proceedings for recovery of damages in only the clearest cases and the obviously provable cases and that the risk of speculative actions is a risk which does not seriously exist.
Accordingly, I earnestly hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and hon. Members opposite will not divide the House on this matter. To do so would create a profound sense of injustice and denial on the part of those whom we seek to protect. The circumstances in which damages will be awarded are, as I have tried to say, hedged round with careful provisions against abuse, limited in their prospect of recovering sums and responsibly placed in the Bill as part, but only a small part, of the machinery of the Bill, which is essentially machinery to achieve conciliation. In the circumstances that I have indicated, the award of damages will not conflict with that but is an essential element in the Bill for what, I hope, will only be the rare case.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: If doubts were capable of being assuaged on this matter, they would be assuaged by the calm and dispassionate tones of the Attorney-General at 2 o'clock in the morning, but my own doubts remain entirely unaffected even by right hon. and learned Gentleman's formidable combination of charm and forensic persuasiveness. He has not met the main criticisms brought so clearly by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) against the novel concept in Clause 21(1)(b) which, in my view, will impose a virtually impossible task upon the county court judges when claims for damages have to be tried.
2.0 a.m.
After all, the tests for damages in the ordinary courts are difficult enough, as the case books show, as to whether they arise in the ordinary course, whether they are reasonably foreseeable, and so on, but at least in those cases the court starts from a solid basis of contract and breach of contract, and the court is able to put itself in the shoes of the parties. I will give two or three short and simple examples to show the practical difficulties involved.
I take first the simplest case of house purchase. The would-be purchaser is discriminated against. Under his duty to mitigate his loss, he buys a slightly smaller but cheaper house in the same locality. How is his loss to be evaluated? How can the less expenditure he has had to incur be equated and related to the slightly less result which he has achieved? In fact, this is an exercise that never has to be gone through. There is no such exercise in a case of breach of contract for the purchase of a house. It is achieved by the automatic method of the forfeit of the 10 per cent. paid if the contract is breached and does not go to completion.
Take the case where there are three bidders. The vendor discriminates against one of those bidders and therefore the offence is committed and the right to damages accrues straight away, but the other bidder, in ignorance of that, raises his bid and buys the house at a higher price than the discriminated bidder has ever offered. Has he suffered any loss of benefit by that, or has he, on the other hand, as a result of that discrimination


been saved from buying a house for more than its proper value? How can the court know whether or not he in his turn would have raised his bid? How can the court know whether he would have been prudent to have raised it? How can the court know whether the successful bidder would have raised it yet again?
I remember years ago in the House when we were debating the Local Government Bill, in 1948, Aneurin Bevan described the hypothetical tenant as a very fugitive character, but he is a solid figure compared with the phantoms and phantasies involved in these calculations.
Take the slightly less probable but not impossible case of four bidders, one of whom is white, three of whom are coloured. The owner unfortunately discriminates against the three and sells the house to the one. How can the right of the damages of those three possibly be evaluated? Only one of them could conceivably have bought the house. Therefore, it would be completely unrealistic to apportion the damages into three. How is the judge to select the lucky recipient—by a pin?—or perhaps by calling in those assessors and inviting them to discriminate between the three on the basis of what the sonorous language of Clause 18 calls their:
…special knowledge and experience of problems connected with race and community relations.
I do not want to prolong this catalogue of hypothetical absurdities which could arise, but one finally comes to the case of five bidders this time, the same four as in the last illustration plus a Yorkshire-man. The owner of the house in this case is a Lancastrian and will not sell his house to a Yorkshireman, so he discriminates against the three coloured bidders and the one Yorkshireman. The difference is that there is no offence, no unlawful act, in his discrimination against the Yorkshireman, because it is not a discrimination on grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins.

Mr. Grieve: Is my right hon. and learned Friend sure about the ethnic argument?

Sir D. Walker-Smith: My hon. and learned Friend asks if I am sure about the ethnic argument. I do not remember my Greek in the same way as the right

hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), but my recollection is that "ethnikos" means heathen; so unless my hon. and learned Friend is saying that Yorkshire is heathen, I think I am right in my proposition. There would be no damages for the Yorkshireman and it would be impossible to calculate damages for the other three.
One could give many other examples. In transport, for example; suppose that a man is discriminated against by a taxi driver and takes a bus instead. How would one evaluate the three elements of the loss of time, the saving of money and the additional discomfort? These exercises are not on, nor are they on in employment. The courts are not able to evaluate matters such as the likely length of stay with a firm, had the man succeeded in getting the job, the prospect of pay increases—that is, when the prices and incomes policy is no more—the possibility of the liquidation of a company, a take-over or redundancy. The courts are not equipped to do this.
Subsection (2) will work inequitably and haphazardly. There might be two applicants for similar jobs in different firms discriminated against at the same time, one being held entitled to damages for loss of benefit and the other being denied damages because the employer is able, under this subsection, successfully to plead that, having regard to the proportion of employees, discrimination was necessary to secure or preserve a reasonable balance. This means that damages will not depend on the degree of injury suffered but on fortuitous circumstances, so reducing the processes of the law to a lottery.
It is clear that this provision will give the courts and county court judges an impossible task. Nor will they get any help from the assessors. What their qualifications will be to enable them to pass judgment and render assistance on these intractable problems is far from clear.

The Attorney-General: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman think that in any of the cases he has given of alleged absurdity the Race Relations Board would authorise the bringing of proceedings?

Sir D. Walker-Smith: They are the sort of cases that will arise. They will go to the Board and we do not know how the Board will act in these matters. It might feel under considerable pressure not to be charged with denying the right of people to have their damages assessed by the judges. We cannot tell. We are probing into the unknown. The right hon. and learned Gentleman may have great confidence in the working of the Bill, but I cannot share it in view of the anomalies that are bound to arise.
It is anomalous and undesirable in principle that a public board should sue for damages for the benefit of a private person and at the instigation of that person, paying the costs out of public funds. This whole concept of damages is regrettable and misconceived and I hope that my hon. Friends will not yield to the Attorney-General's suggestion that we refrain from dividing the House on this issue.

Mr. John Lee: I do not propose to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) in all his ingenious arguments, although I concede that this is a difficult field of law. As one who generally welcomes the Clause, I foresee considerable difficulties in interpreting it. One of the problems which worries me I approach from a different standpoint from that of hon. Members opposite. The greatest objection to the proposal as it stands is the fact that the individual who suffers, or is alleged to have suffered, a loss as a result of discrimination has no part or lot in the decision whether or not an action should be taken. Hon. Members opposite appear to welcome this in so far as it would represent a restraint on frivolous, or possibly vexatious, litigation. The Board, being so mindful of social and political considerations, might decline to take action in any circumstances where it ought because the individual had suffered loss. Where there is common ground between the two sides about our reservations is that different criteria apply between what the Board might regard as desirable circumstances for taking action and what the individual will regard. Their views will obviously diverge.
Courts have had to embark on uncharted seas in assessing damages. My right hon. and learned Friend has advanced numerous instances of this happening, but this is a most unusual situation. One can well understand many city court judges proceeding "by guess and by God" for quite a while. I wonder whether it would have been better to have included some round figures, some upper limit, specific figures. Although they might be hard to justify, they would at least have provided some basis by which the courts could be guided. Earlier we had a long debate on whether it was appropriate to put in examples of discrimination. It might not have been a bad idea if in this Clause there were examples of the kind of damages which could be awarded. This would be an innovation, but we are embarking on an unusual field of activity.
An Amendment which we shall come to later provides for other remedies, injunctions and so forth, as an alternative to damages, but also for an element of punitive damages. I would have wished that this element had been included. I would have thought that there was a good deal to be said for saying in circumstances where discrimination occurs, this is the kind of conduct which is not only damaging in the sense of depriving a person of certain pecuniary benefits, or benefits which can be assessed in monetary terms, but which is indicative of conduct which should be discouraged, just as damages for libel bear on the conduct of the person who commits the libel which affects the status of the individual victim.
I do not know what the attitude of my right hon. and learned Friend will be to that Amendment. We shall have to wait until it is moved. He has been unduly defensive and apologetic because this Clause does not provide damages of that kind. Although we have our reservations and believe that the courts will be faced with a difficult task, we thoroughly welcome this provision. In the last analysis what is at stake is that someone will have suffered loss and, unless we make provision for remedying it financially, it is difficult to see how the Act will carry much weight for the kind of people it is designed to protect.

Mr. Grieve: As I listened to the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. John Lee) I wondered whether some of his right hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench would not say, "God save us from our friends". When they heard him urge on the Government that damages should be arbitrary and punitive, I realised some of the pressures which have been responsible for the many defects in this legislation.
2.15 a.m.
I want to make only one point in addition to the points which have been so well and fully made by my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) and Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). Quite apart from the difficulties of enforcing claims for damages, quite apart from the difficulties of assessing damages, the prime objection which I see to the whole concept of damages in this legislation is that it puts those whom it is desired to protect in a privileged position in the community. It has been said several times in the House and in the Press that it does nothing of the kind, because everybody belongs to some race and, therefore, the whole community is covered by the Bill.
This is wholly artificial. We all have various capacities. If we are discriminated against in 999 out the 1,000 capacities in which we exist and have our being, we have no claim for damages. If someone refuses to sell his house to me because I am a white man of Scottish descent and not because I am a Tory or a lawyer, I am given a claim for damages. What damages? The law of England over centuries has never recognised that anybody has lost anything by not getting that which he did not have before, unless he had a contract to get it. The argument founded upon the fact that this is creating a privileged class in the community is valid. The ultimate result of this, as of many of the Clauses dealing with housing, will be the very reverse of what is intended by the supporters of the Bill. It will create bitterness and worsen race relations.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson: On this occasion the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith), whose clear arguments I normally follow with

great interest, has not done justice to either his own intellect or the normal forcefulness of his case. He has piled case upon case to show what might be the difficulties of this legislation. One thing which the House should not let pass is that the right hon. and learned Gentleman brought a Yorkshireman into one of his examples. This was particularly unwise. If ever a report was to be published which proved that in six cities or towns Yorkshire men were strongly discriminated against, there would be legislation which would not be half as mild as this. I cannot believe that Yorkshire Members, no matter from which side of the House, would not wholeheartedly support such strong legislation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman should not introduce too much artifice into his argument. It weakens rather than strengthens it.
The hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) brought up again the shoddy argument about creating a privileged class and a privileged section of the community. That is not an argument which anyone who takes part in these serious debates should advance. We are dealing with a subject which is, perhaps, among the most serious in community and individual relations in the world today. The Government are introducing pioneering legislation. It does not do justice to the situation for an hon. Member to try to create absurd examples and to trot out the kind of propaganda which the hon. and learned Gentleman uttered at the conclusion of his speech when he sought to damage the serious attempt made by a responsible Government to deal with this situation. If there are opponents of this legislation let them come clean and not pile up these artificial arguments. I hope that without any further delay the House will proceed to reject this Amendment and to support my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Hogg: The Attorney-General always fascinates me. He is absolutely charming; one presents what is intended to be a serious argument to him; he gets up to reply; he answers none of the points; but coos like a wood pigeon, and by the time he sits down has so mesmerised his supporters into an orgy of enthusiasm that they cannot see that


they have been palmed off the branch. But he is not going to have me this time. This time we are going to divide.

Question put, That the Amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 121, Noes 182.

Division No. 273.]
AYES
[2.21 a.m.


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Grant, Anthony
Noble,-fit. Hn. Michael


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Grant-Ferris, R.
Onslow, Cranley


Astor, John
Gresham Cooke, R.
Osborn, John (Hallam)


Baker, Kenneth (Acton)
Grieve, Percy
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)


Bell, Ronald
Gurden, Harold
Peel, John


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Percival, Ian


Biffen, John
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Pink, R. Bonner


Biggs-Davison, John
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Pounder, Rafton


Black, Sir Cyril
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward
Pym, Francis


Body, Richard
Hirst, Geoffrey
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Bossom, Sir Clive
Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Holland, Philip
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter
Hordern, Peter
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Bryan, Paul
Howell, David (Guildford)
Ridsdale, Julian


Buck, Antony (Colchester)
Iremonger, T. L.
Russell, Sir Ronald


Bullus, Sir Eric
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.


Burden, F. A.
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Scott-Hopkins, James


Campbell, B. (Oldham, West)
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Sharpies, Richard


Chichester-Clark, R.
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Silvester, Frederick


Cooke, Robert
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Smith, John (London &amp; W'minster)


Corfield, F. V.
Kirk, Peter
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Kitson, Timothy
Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow, Cathcart)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Sir Oliver
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Teeling, Sir William


Crouch, David
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Dance, James
Maddan, Martin
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Dean, Paul (Somerset, N.)
Maginnis, John E.
Weatherill, Bernard


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F. (Ashford)
Marten, Neil
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Maude, Angus
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Drayson, G. B.
Mawby, Ray
Williams, Donald (Dudley)


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Monro, Hector
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Errington, Sir Eric
Montgomery, Fergus
Woodnutt, Mark


Eyre, Reginald
More, Jasper
Worsley, Marcus


Farr, John
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Younger, Hn. George


Fortescue, Tim
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles



Gibson-Watt, David
Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Goodhart, Philip
Murton, Oscar
Mr. Authony Royle and


Goodhew, Victor
Nabarro, Sir Gerald
Mr. Humphrey Atkins.


Gower, Raymond
Neave, Airey





NOES


Abse, Leo
Carmichael, Neil
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Chapman, Donald
Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)


Alldritt, Walter
Coe, Denis
Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)


Anderson, Donald
Coleman, Donald
Ford, Ben


Archer, Peter
Concannon, J. D.
Forrester, John


Armstrong, Ernest
Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Fraser, John (Norwood)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Freeson, Reginald


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Dalyell, Tarn
Galpern, Sir Myer


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Ginsburg, David


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire, W.)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.


Barnes, Michael
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony


Barnett, Joel
Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)


Baxter, William
Davies, Harold (Leek)
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)


Bidwell, Sydney
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Griffiths, Will (Exchange)


Blackburn, F.
Dell, Edmund
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Dewar, Donald
Hamling, William


Booth, Albert
Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Harman, William


Boston, Terence
Dobson, Ray
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Dunnett, Jack
Haseldine, Norman


Boyden, James
Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth (Exeter)
Hazell, Bert


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Heffer, Eric S.


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Eadie, Alex
Hilton, W. S.


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Hooley, Frank


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Ellis, John
Homer, John


Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch&amp; F'bury)
Ennals, David
Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)


Buchan, Norman
Evans, loan L. (Birm'h'm, Yardley)
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Faulds, Andrew
Howie, W.


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Fernyhough, E.
Hoy, James


Cant, R. B.
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)




Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Short, Mrs. René e (W'hampton, N. E.)


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Marks, Kenneth
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Hunter, Adam
Marquand, David
Silverman, Julius


Jackson, Colin (B'h'so &amp; Spenb'gh)
Mendelson, J. J.
Slater, Joseph


Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n&amp; St.P'cras, S.)
Mikardo, Ian
Small, William


Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Millan, Bruce
Spriggs, Leslie


Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley


Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)
Swain, Thomas


Judd, Frank
Molloy, William
Taverne, Dick


Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Lawson, George
Morris, John (Aberavon)
Urwin, T. W.


Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Moyle, Roland
Varley, Eric G.


Lee, John (Reading)
Murray, Albert
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Lestor, Miss Joan
Newens, Stan
Watkins, David (Consett)


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
O'Malley, Brian
Weitzman, David


Luand, Evan
Orbach, Maurice
Wellbeloved, James


Lubbock, Eric
Orme, Stanley
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Oswald, Thomas
Whitaker, Ben


Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Palmer, Arthur
White, Mrs, Eirene


Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)
Whitlock, William


McBride, Neil
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


MacColl, James
Pentland, Norman
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Macdonald A. H.
Perry, Ernest G. (Battersea, S.)
Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)


McGuire, Michael
Richard, Ivor
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross&amp;Crom'ty)
Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth (St.P'c'as)
Winnick, David


Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)
Winstanley Dr. M. P.


Mackintosh, John P.
Rose, Paul
Woof Robert


Maclennan, Robert
Ross, Rt. Hn. William
Yates, Victor


McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Ryan, John



McNamara, J. Kevin
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford, S.)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Sheldon, Robert
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Mr. Charles Grey.

Clause 21

DAMAGES

2.30 a.m.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move Amendment No. 88, in page 14, line 31, at end insert—
(3) In any case where it appears to the court reasonable so to do the court may in lieu of awarding damages under this section order the defendant to take such steps as may appear to the court to be equitable to place the person in respect of whom the complaint has been made as nearly as is practicable in the position in which he would have been but for the unlawful act; and if any defendant fails or neglects to comply with any such order within such period (or such extended period) as the court may allow, the court may thereupon award damages against him; and in the calculation of such damages the court shall take into account both the conduct of the defendant and any loss suffered by the person in respect of whom the complaint has been made which may be attributable to such failure or neglect.
This is a matter which arises out of the Street Report which, of course, was the basis of this legislation. The authors of the Report suggested that it might be a more effective remedy to a person who has been discriminated against if he could be put into the position that he would have had if he had not been the victim of discrimination, and for that reason a mandatory order would be better than either an injunction or damages. Indeed, this would to some extent get round the difficulty which the right

hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) raised about damages in that they would be speculative and to some extent arbitrary, because the effect of a positive or mandatory order would be that the person got the job, or the house, or the service, which he had been deprived of by reason of the discrimination.
The reasons for the Amendment were fully set out in the Street Report, and I do not intend to repeat them They are well known to the Front Bench, and I do not anticipate that at this stage of the Bill they are preparing any concession. But I think it would have been advisable if, at an early stage of the drafting of the Bill, they could have included positive orders, and I hope they may think about it again before it gets to another place.

The Attorney-General: I regret that I must advise the House to reject this Amendment. Mandatory injunctions to deal with the kind of situation which we are considering in this Bill would be, I submit, objectionable in principle. To empower a court, for example, to order an employer to employ a certain man, or a householder to sell his house to a particular individual, would be unacceptable.
An injunction is an appropriate remedy to prevent anyone from engaging


in a discriminatory course of conduct, but where an individual has suffered an ascertainable loss through discrimination, the provision in the Bill which we discussed in the last Amendments for the award of damages is, I submit, the appropriate remedy. Accordingly, in my submission the proposal for mandatory injunctions should be rejected.

Mr. Hogg: I should like to congratulate the Attorney-General. He has just persuaded the House to indulge in the absurd, but he has refrained from compelling it to attempt the impossible. Of course what is attempted by the hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) is not merely absurd but also impossible. It is, as the Attorney-General has pointed out to the House, quite impossible to secure, without grotesque injustice, specific performance of a contract of service, a contract of letting or a contract of purchase. But it is also logically impossible to attempt to do so. This is why the hon. Gentleman is pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp.
It is conceded that what a man is entitled to if he is not discriminated against is not to succeed in a contract but to be entitled to compete for one. When the act of discrimination is complete the contract goes off to somebody else, the house is sold, the job is filled, or the taxi-cab, if it is the case of a taxi-man discriminating, is driven off to Euston. What the hon. Gentleman is seeking to persuade us is to put things back as if they had never happened. I can see the force of the injunction, by a stretch of the imagination I can conceive of the absurdity of the damages, but to turn the clock back and make it never to have happened is something which even the hon. Member, as the Attorney-General has rightly pointed out, cannot achieve.

Mr. John Fraser: I hope that the Attorney-General will be good enough to look at this again. I think he fell into the same trap as the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) in choosing examples which were not valid ones. I see no reason why he should come to the belief that the judges would never find circumstances when a mandatory injunction would be necessary. I

give some examples, and ask him to think about this again.
Take a mortgage from a building society. Say a building society able to give mortgages discriminates against somebody applying for one. Is there any reason why the court in some circumstances should not order it to grant a mortgage to that person?
Secondly, take the sale of houses. There are many estates developed outside London consisting of, say, 250 houses all exactly the same and at the same price. Surely it is reasonable in these circumstances that a mandatory injunction should be given for the sale of one of these identical houses to a person who has been discriminated against.
I suggest that there are also circumstances where if somebody were refused membership of a trade union branch through discrimination there should be a mandatory injunction for admitting the person to membership.
There are many circumstances in which a mandatory injunction would be inapplicable, but there could be a few cases where it might be better to have the person discriminated against put in the position as if the discrimination had not taken place. I urge the Attorney-General to consider this and not exclude judges from ever being able to grant such an injunction.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 25

APPLICATION TO THE CROWN, THE POLICE AND PUBLIC BODIES

Mr. Speaker: I have suggested that we should take Amendments Nos. 89, 90 and 91 together.

Mr. Callaghan: I beg to move Amendment No. 89, in page 16, line 16, after first 'as', insert 'if it were'.
The purpose of the three Amendments is to make it as clear as possible that Clause 25(2) does not alter the status of the office of constable. The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) suggested a form of words in Committee most of which I have picked up here. It is slightly more complicated than he suggested, because the appointing authority may be an individual or a police authority, but the


intention is the same. The insertion of the words "if it were" I think makes the situation a little clearer.

Mr. Hogg: I thank the right hon. Gentleman. Even at this late hour one must be grateful for small mercies, and though this may be small, it is certainly a mercy.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I echo my right hon. and learned Friend's words. As the Home Secretary knows, there were two points at issue with regard to police. One was about the status of the constable, the question of employment, and the other was the question of the discipline code. The right hon. Gentleman has met the first one. The second one remains to be discussed in another place.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: No. 90, in page 16, line 16, at end insert 'if he were'.

No. 91, in line 18, leave out 'an employer' and insert:
'if he or they were an employer or employers'. —[Mr. Callaghan.]

New Schedule

INQUIRY INTO UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHERE NO COMPLAINT IS MADE

1. In investigating any matter under this Schedule the Board—

(a) shall make such inquiries as they think necessary with regard thereto;
(b) shall determine whether any person appears to them to have done any act which is unlawful by virtue of any provision of Part I of this Act;
(c) shall use their best endeavours by communication with the persons concerned to secure, where appropriate, a satisfactory written assurance against any repetition of the act determined to be unlawful or the doing of further acts of a similar kind by the person by whom it was done.

2. If on investigating any matter the Board determine that an act appears to have been done which is unlawful by virtue of any provision of Part I of this Act and they are unable to secure such an assurance, as aforesaid, or it appears to them that any such assurance has not been complied with, they shall decide whether or not to bring proceedings under section 18 or 19 of this Act.

3. Where the Board determine under paragraph 1 of this Schedule that an act which is unlawful by virtue of any provisions of Part I of this Act appears to have been done by any person, or make any decision under paragraph 2 of this Schedule in relation to that person, they shall give him written notification thereof.—[Mr. Scott.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Nicholas Scott: I beg to move, That the Schedule be read a Second time.
The essence of the new Schedule is to replace the cumbersome procedure in Schedule 3 for dealing with cases where no complaint has been made. The machinery both in Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 is extremely cumbersome. There may be some excuse for it where a specific complaint has been made. There is no excuse for it where no such complaint has been made.
One of the main advantages of this new Schedule is that it would replace four pages by half a page of procedure. The voluntary machinery which is included in Schedule 2 and repeated in Schedule 3 is being set up specifically to deal with complaints. I do not see that it is necessarily appropriate to deal with a more general state of affairs where no complaint has been made.
Schedule 3 in any case is, to a large extent, a repetition of Schedule 2, with some very loosely drafted provisions such as that the voluntary machinery shall keep in touch with those who appear to be concerned with the complaint rather than having to tell any specific people of any decision which is reached. Where the Board comes to a conclusion that there is a matter which merits its investigation but on which no complaint has been made, it should be able to follow up its own initiative to determine whether any act has been done which is unlawful and use its best endeavours to achieve a settlement. The whole initiative in these circumstances should rest with the Board.

Mr. Ennals: The hon. Gentleman's intentions are worthy but I cannot accept the new Schedule. It is true that Schedule 3 is complicated, but the present draft is necessary in order to spell out the arrangements properly and to try to produce a simplification can often lead to difficulties in these circumstances. One of the effects would be to exclude conciliation committees and the voluntary machinery in employment cases from investigating suspected cases of discrimination, and I think that this would be unacceptable.
An undertaking has already been given to allow industry's own machinery the first opportunity to settle employment


cases and we must abide by that. As for conciliation committees, where the voluntary machinery is involved the Bill already allows the Board to decide whether to investigate a suspected case itself or refer it to a conciliation committee. There seems no reason to preclude investigation by a conciliation committee. This would be an undesirable result of the hon. Gentleman's proposal and I regret that I cannot accept it.

Question put and negatived.

Schedule 2

COMPLAINTS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS AND ORGANISATIONS OF EMPLOYERS

Amendments made: No. 95, in page 20, line 27, after 'and', insert:
'it is accompanied by the name and address of the person by whom it is made and'.

No. 98, in line 46, leave out from 'that' to 'shall' in line 47 and insert:
'the act was one of discrimination against a particular person'.

No. 99, in page 21, line 6, leave out from 'of' to 'shall' in line 7 and insert 'any other complaint'.

No. 103, line 44, leave out 'determination' and insert 'conclusion'.

No. 104, in page 22, line 13, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Secretary of State'.—[Mr. Ennals.]

Schedule 3

INVESTIGATION OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHERE NO COMPLAINT MADE

Amendments made:

No. 106, in page 24, line 8, leave out 'by any person' and insert
'against a particular person, shall'.

No. 107, in line 15, leave out from 'investigation' to 'shall' in line 16 and insert 'does not so relate'.

No. 109, in page 25, line 21 [Schedule 3], leave out 'another person' and insert 'a particular person, shall'.

No. 110, in line 28, leave out from 'investigation' to 'shall' in line 29 and insert 'does not so relate'.

No. 111, in page 26, line 18, leave out 'determination' and insert 'conclusion'. —[Mr. Ennals.]

Order for Third Reading read.

[Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified]

2.45 a.m.

Mr. Ennals: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Mr. Speaker: May I announce to the House that I have not selected the Amendment.

Mr. Ennals: I am very proud to have been involved with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in piloting the Bill to its Third Reading and proud also to be a member of a Government which has had the wisdom and courage to produce the Bill. Discrimination on racial grounds is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, issues of our time and it is an issue which none of us can afford to sweep under the table. It has to be dealt with and it has to be dealt with firmly. Racial discrimination faces this country with a challenge to our beliefs in the principles of equality, and it is a challenge which we cannot hesitate to meet.
The Bill is based on existing experience of the Race Relations Board and the 1965 Act. At this stage it is appropriate to pay tribute to the work of the Board and to Mr. Mark Bonham Carter, its Chairman, and the other members for the work which they have done, because it was partly the experience and success of that earlier Measure which has enabled us to come forward with this.
I recall that in the Third Reading debate in 1965 the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) said:
I regard this Bill as a most dangerous attack on liberty…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th July, 1965;Vol. 716, c. 1064–5.]
That was said three years ago of the 1965 Act. How absurd it was! In fact it has expanded liberty. It has expanded the liberty of the subject in fields in which there was discrimination and it has done so without creating antagonism. The general principle of legislation has not been convincingly challenged on Second Reading, nor in our 50 hours in Standing Committee, nor yet today. The debate has been about the scope and application of the legislation.
I want to thank my hon. Friends on the Standing Committee and right hon.


and hon. Members opposite, especially the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) who played such a constructive rôle in the Standing Committee, which was a very constructive Standing Committee. It was one of those Committees when we did not divide in two directions. As has been said, we divided in five directions, two on our side and three on the other side. The discussions led to substantial improvements in the Bill. Our discussions resulted in a number of suggestions for amending the Bill which the Government have been happy to accept on Report.
In particular we have redefined discrimination to make it clear that, in the context of the Bill, that means treating somebody less favourably than other people because of his race, colour, or ethnic or national origin; but, in so doing, we have emphasised that it is no part of the Bill's purpose to create a privileged class. We have accepted the views of the Standing Committee that the Crown should rot be excepted from the procedure laid down in the Bill, and we have changed the exception relating to small employers so that, for the first two years of the operation of the Bill, those employing not more than 25 employees will be excepted, and that for the following two years, those employing not more than ten people.
Similarly, we have raised the limit of exception for landlords so that, for the first two years of the Bill's operation, only those with more than 12 lodgers will be subject to the provisions of the Bill and, thereafter, only those with more than six.
We have also made it clear that anybody disposing of his own property privately without using an estate agent or without advertising it will not be affected by the provisions of the Bill, and that any harassment of a tenant on racial grounds will be unlawful. There has also been a number of other Amendments made in the light of discussion in Committee to meet the wishes of hon. Members on both sides.
Some hon. Members have sought to weaken the Bill and others to strengthen it. Indeed, some of my hon. Friends would have made it a much tougher Measure, shifting the emphasis from conciliation to enforcement but in the Government's view this was not a proper

thing to do. It is sensible that we should pass a law which can command the support of the majority of British people who accept tolerance and fair play regardless of race.
The strength of this Bill will lie, not only in its actual provisions, but in the lead which it will give to the country "to practice tolerance and live together as good neighbours"—and for that I quote from the Charter of United Nations. I believe that it will be an historic occasion when this Parliament declares that discrimination in all fields covered by this Bill is not only morally wrong, but an offence in law. The Bill is an historic contribution to Human Rights Year in which all parts of the world are taking part.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: Is there anything in the present law of England which discriminates against any British citizen whatever his colour and, if there is not, then what is the object of this Bill?

Mr. Ennals: The hon. Member does not appear to have been in the chamber for much of the time. If he had followed the debates at all he would know that there is discrimination and it is because there is this element of discrimination that we are determined it shall not be sustained. The Bill will form a firm foundation for a programme of voluntary action. We need that in industry, from management and the trade unions and through the whole range of commerce. We need an understanding that there is equal opportunity for all regardless of race.
The Bill gives new scope for an educational campaign, but the most important thing is that the Bill should be used and not only by those whom it is sought to protect. Too much has been said to undermine confidence in the efficiency of this legislation that we are establishing. Some of the criticism made in this House has gone too far in undermining the effectiveness of this legislation. It is time that we spoke out, those of us who believe in this Bill—spoke out in the country, because if we say things that imply that this Bill will not have the desired effect, then those whom it is designed to protect will fear that the protection is not there. Hon. Members


of this House have a responsibility in this connection.
As a result of the debates in Committee and on Report, I believe that we are entitled, and I am speaking for the Government, to have a united House tonight. I hope that those who may have criticised this Bill will have second thoughts about whether they should vote against it. It would be in the interests of good race and community relations if the House was not to divide on the Bill, and I hope that that will not happen.

2.56 a.m.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: I want to start with a brief word about the connection between the attitude of people to this Bill and their attitude to race relations generally. There have been suggestions from outside this House that opposition to this Bill, or even criticism of it, derives from an illiberal attitude to race relations. I consider that such a suggestion is unjustified and reprehensible, reflecting at best an ignorance of, and reckless indifference to, the basis of the criticism, and at the worst a smear of an unpleasant character.
There is no inconsistency in combining a liberal attitude towards race relations generally with a belief that this Bill is, on balance, a bad one. In my own case I am against racial discrimination in all the many and varied forms in which it unfortunately manifests itself throughout the world today. I am in favour of racial harmony, understanding and co-operation. I believe in the equality of legal and political rights and status for all.
Like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) I belong to a profession, which, without compulsion of law, has over the years, practised non-discrimination and equality of opportunity. I am proud and happy to be a member of the Bar in a Commonwealth country which is perhaps one of the most multi-racial countries in the world. In February last I was one of 76 hon. Members of this House who found it necessary to vote against Clause 2 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, which I regarded as a gross discrimination, based on a breach of faith.
Nevertheless, against that background, I believe reluctantly that this Bill is on balance, a bad Bill. It is bad because it is inept for the high purposes which it purports to serve, and bad because it is likely to exacerbate the situation which it is designed to ameliorate and to evoke the dangers which it is designed to exorcise. There is nothing paradoxical or even very unusual in this. We know from the old proverb the sad fate of those good intentions which take account only of the end and are indifferent to the means. That is a course which this Parliament should never take.
Here we are not engaged in promulgating intentions but in formulating laws. What we put upon the Statute Book is binding on courts and citizens alike, not in the generalised context of their intention, but in the specific context of their provisions. In English law, unlike Continental law, there is no licence to look at what they call travaux préparatories.As the leading textbook on the subject, "Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes", puts it:
It is unquestionably a rule that the Parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to explain its meaning.
In another passage Maxwell says:
The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed."—
a flattering assumption, which I hope we deserve.
There rests, therefore, on Parliament a high and heavy duty to see that bad laws, even if well-intentioned, are not put on the Statute Book. It is not enough for Parliament to identify a problem and propound a solution. It must be the right solution. Otherwise we fall into that false syllogism which in the early days of the last Parliament I diagnosed as the central weakness of this Government—the false syllogism "something should be done; this is something; therefore, let us do it". This Bill is unhappily another example of this false logic. It is, no doubt, some comfort to hon. Members to feel that they are doing something, but if it is the wrong something, we are asking the citizen and the law to pay the price for our own feeling of comfort in this situation.
I come to the imperfections of this Bill, the imperfect means that mar the worthy aim. Part I of the Bill is far


from perfect, despite its good intention. Difficulties of definition and drafting, inherent in this exercise, stand out in almost every Clause. The very exemptions and inconsistencies proclaim the difficulty of the task and the imperfection of the result—the exemption for shipping and the different treatment of employment on the one hand, which is the concern of large and powerful organisations, compared with the treatment of housing which is the concern of small and humble citizens.
Nevertheless, mindful of its good intentions, it would be possible to swallow Part I but for the enforcement provisions of Part II, Part II is a novelty in our law and legal system. It is a sort of grey no-man's land between criminal and civil proceedings. It seems to combine the consequential rigours of criminal proceedings without their safeguards, and the penalties of civil proceedings without their even-handedness.
Consider the combination of circumstances with which the subject of a complaint is faced. There is no reason to suppose that every complaint will be justified. They are formidable indeed—the novel methods of inquiry, the power to impose perpetual injunctions and to exact perpetual assurances, the grim sanction of indefinite incarceration by way of committal for contempt, the fear of damages with an award of costs superimposed, the spectacle of a powerful board as adversary with all the resources of public funds behind it. Is not that a prospect at which the stoutest heart might quail and to which the clearest conscience might yield? [Laughter.] The Home Secretary laughts, but it might well be so.

Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) was laughing.

Sir D. Walker-Smith: It is not really a laughing matter. It is not a laughing matter on either side of the House.
In such circumstances, though there might be victory, there would not be justice. It would not help race relations because it would create bitterness and provoke the very evil which the Bill is intended to eradicate. Part II is radically defective in that it constitutes a derogation from our accepted standard of the rule of law, and the progress of

this Bill has unfortunately shown no material improvement. It follows that in this vital respect the Bill stands as it did when, on 23rd April, we were obliged to condemn it because on balance it would not in its praotical application contribute to the achievement of racial harmony.
For that reason we voted as we did that day, and I believe rightly; and for that reason, regretfully but still rightly, I think we should condemn it tonight.

3.5 a.m.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I rise to make my only comment on the Bill, and it will not take more than a couple of minutes to do so. As my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary has pointed out, the purpose of legislation is not merely to establish the boundaries of the permissible. It is also to create climates of opinion and to establish custom and behaviour. As has been pointed out, that is peculiarly the case in the Bill.
There are areas that the Bill does not touch and has not attempted to touch, but I hope that behaviour in those areas will be influenced by the Bill. If behaviour is not so influenced, it will be necessary to legislate further.
As an example of that, I refer to clubs which practise racial and colour discrimination. There is one such club in Wolverhampton. It has been blacked, if that is the right word, by the entertainment unions because it has discriminated against a coloured singer, a Miss Ruth Saxon, and refused her entry to the club. I hope that the Club and Institute Union will realise that it cannot run away from its responsibilities and that no racialist club can be permitted to remain a member of the C.I.U.
The T.U.C. will be asked to carry a resolution on the subject this year and I believe that this will be helpful, together with this legislation, in creating a climate in which racial prejudice is recognised for what it is, a sort of venereal disease of the spirit. I am sorry if there are those who suffer from that disease in this House. That Bill is their medicine. They may not like it, but in the end it will do them and all of us a great deal of good.

3.7 a.m.

Sir S. Summers: I was glad that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D.


Walker-Smith) began his speech by saying that those who consider this to be a bad Bill and who intend to vote against it should be acquitted of any suggestion of being racialist by so doing.
I want to start by protesting as strongly as I can against the leading article in The Times a few days ago.

Mr. J. C. Jennings: Absolute rubbish.

Sir S. Summers: That part which I consider totally unjustified reads as follows:
Those who disobey the Conservative Party whip in order to oppose it cannot escape the charge that they do not care how their coloured fellow citizens are treated.
[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The article also accuses those who would vote against the Bill of a complete lack of charity.
In the whole of this discussion, which is dealing with an entirely novel field, it would be much happier for all concerned if those of us who differ from others had a little more charity, tolerance and humility, because—perhaps I may be wrong, perhaps they may be wrong—we are dealing with a new situation. As such, mistakes may well be made, and it is dangerous to take up rigid attitudes at this stage without the experience of this kind of legislation from the past, because we may regret so doing.
Unlike practically every other hon. Member, I was prevented from being here on Second Reading. I shall not speculate what I would have done had I been here. At least, I tried to discover what has gone on since. In studying the Committee stage, I was a little disappointed to find that on 23 occasions when there was a Division my Front Bench was on the losing side, compared with only eight times when they were on the winning side. So, from a superficial point of view, it would appear that they did not succeed in making drastic changes in the Bill which, at the time it was presented on Second Reading, attracted a reasoned Amendment to throw it out.
I have considerable faults to find with the Bill, notably the rôle assigned to the Ministry of Employment and Productivity, and the limited scope for exemption for what is termed the small operator

both in housing and in employment. Those who think that not sufficient changes have been made in Committee may well feel that the reasons that prompted the Opposition to throw out the Bill on Second Reading still prevail. I do not share that view. I confess that I am influenced somewhat by the fact that a close friend of mine in America is at present suffering in prison for his activities in the civil rights campaign. I am influenced further by the thought that in my view Martin Luther King was one of the greatest men of our time, and I cannot but believe that some legislation is needed.
I will not go into detail, but I fear that the outstanding speech of my hon. and learned Friend at the beginning might well have been made on almost any Bill on this subject presented to the House. He did not indicate what changes would have prompted him to say that this would do more good than harm, and there are many who take a serious view of the Bill and would probably take a similar view on almost any Bill that was introduced. Therefore, in the last resort, one has to make up one's mind whether one is merely against any legislation, in which case clearly the consequence is to vote against this Bill.
If, on the other hand, one believes that some Bill is needed, it is very much more difficult to decide whether or not to vote against this one, but on balance, as I say chiefly because the emphasis is on conciliation, I am prepared to give it a chance to see how it works, without voting for it but without voting against it.
To those who intend to vote against it I would say three things. It is frequently said by mothers of children who are in danger through the lack of a zebra crossing, "Must we wait until two or three more children are killed before the safeguard is provided?" There is evidence that there is widespread discrimination in this country. Must we wait for the situation of discrimination to get all that much worse than it is before the House takes its courage into both hands and tries to legislate? If we take the view that the problems of drafting, of penalties and of enforcement are so complicated and intractable that this is not a subject that can be tackled by legislation, sooner or later that view will recoil to our regret and to our detriment.
Fortunately, the problem associated with colour as yet is comparatively small, thank God, compared with the situation in America. If legislation to tackle the problem is put off the problem will become more serious. We will make mistakes in the Bill;I have no doubt that the next Government provided from this side will make drastic changes in the Bill—I hope they do. The question that we must ask ourselves in the last resort is whether this is a perhaps inadequate attempt to provide a background which will help to create a public opinion response on this subject, or whether it is such a bad Bill that we will throw it out. I hope that we will give it a chance and see how it works.

3.15 a.m.

Miss Joan Lestor: Although I do not wish to delay the House at this late hour, as one who is very conscious of the meaning of this legislation and who has a large number of immigrants among my constituents, I must comment on a few aspects of the Bill.
I welcome the Measure and the fact that the Labour Party it talking about equality for everybody. Although some of my hon. Friends have severely criticised the Measure, and I have shared their view, we would be foolish not to accept this as a good first step in the right direction. However, it would be wrong for us now to rest on the assumption that, having declared that we want equality for all, the problem will solve itself. It will not, because the Bill represents only a small part of the public education that is vital in this sphere. Many of us are wondering where we go from here, and that is why we are apprehensive about the enforcement aspects of the Measure.
When the Bill was first discussed people tended to talk more about immigration than about race relations. Many speeches about immigration were made at that time and we tried to point out that we were really concerned with race relations. That must be right because we are concerned with relationships among our population, among the people who are already here and among those who are likely to come here. Nevertheless, one cannot separate one's attitude towards immigration from one's attitude towards building harmonious race relations.
I will not hark back to previous legislation, except to point out that the impact of that legislation—including the provisions affecting Asians in Kenya—made us hesitant on this score That is why I say that one cannot separate one's attitude towards immigration from one's attitude towards building a harmonious society.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am afraid that we can separate them on Third Reading.

Miss Lestor: I wish to refer to Clause 24, which enables the Government to conduct research into the whole question of race relations and the building of a better society. It is in this context that I wish to make it abundantly clear how sad it is that when we in Britain talk about immigration we think in terms of coloured immigrants. I have deduced from Answers to Questions in the House that this impression is unfounded. From the employment point of view, the Home Office has admitted that there are more white than coloured immigrants coming to this country.
It is vital to remember this, because on so many occasions when we have talked about race relations and immigration we have virtually always talked about coloured immigration. This highlights the question of colour, when that should not be the main issue. For this reason the Government should, when conducting research—as they can under the Bill—direct their attention to having a rational immigration policy which removes the present emphasis on colour from the concept of immigration. We must devise a policy which is concerned with skills and the needs of the country.
There should not be a limit placed on people from one part of the world because they happen to be coloured, and no ceiling should be placed on people from other parts. Unless we have such a rational policy we will go on talking only about coloured immigration. And if that happens, this Measure will not achieve any of our hopes. This is an important Bill and, if we try, we can make it effective. That will not happen unless, when we talk about immigration, we talk about it broadly and not in terms of colour.

3.20 a.m.

Mr. John Hall: It will not pass unnoticed that I put my name


to an Amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) which is in almost identical terms with that tabled by the Opposition on Second Reading, except, of course, that it has one or two amendments to bring it up to date. It was moved by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) in an outstanding and very moving speech.
In that speech, my right hon. and learned Friend said:
Again we are proposing to divide the House on a reasonable Amendment. Again we will seek to improve the Bill in Committee. Again, if scome of our objections are met, there may be a chance of passing the Bill on Third Reading.
Later in his speech, when he was referring to the judgment of the Lord President of the Council, who had said that when the Bill became law it would
probably be uneven in application and partially ineffective,
my right hon. and learned Friend said:
We think this subject is so important that Parliament ought not to be asked to pass a Bill which will 'probably be uneven in application and partially ineffective.' If a Bill is partially ineffective it will bring the law into contempt. If it is uneven in application, which is what the Lord President said, it will certainly exacerbate racial relations, not improve them.
So far as I understand the proceedings in Committee—and having listened to the debate today—only the most minor changes have been made in the Bill and they certainly do not meet the major objections raised on Second Reading by my right hon. and learned Friend. If he still retains the same objections—and he has shown a consistency in attitude to the Bill throughout the Committee and Report stages—if I am right in maintaining that the Bill has changed only in minor respects, we are still in the position in which Parliament ought not to be asked to pass a Bill which, again in the Lord President's words, will
probably be uneven in application and partially ineffective.
There is no merit, of course, as hon. Members on both sides will agree, in consistency purely for consistency's sake. Circumstances might arise, the march of events might demand, or even command, a change in attitude, but in this case nothing has happened between Second Reading and Third Reading which would

justify a change in attitude, certainly on this side of the House.
There were three broad principles of policy which were described very well indeed by my right hon. and learned Friend in his speech which still remain the same, which I accept, and I imagine most hon. Members on both sides of the House accept. The statement with which my right hon. and learned Friend ended his speech is as true now as it was then. He said:
…the Government will not miprove matters in this field unless they can carry the people with them. Some of us flatter ourselves about being progressive. But the more progressive we are in this field, and the more progressive we think ourselves, very often the more surprised we are at how our constituents say that we are out of touch with them. And so it may be the case."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd April, 1968;Vol. 762, cc. 69–80.]
Nothing has changed except perhaps the attitude of that great organ of editorial opinion, The Times, which has already been quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers). In its Saturday leader it was praising my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition for handling the present issue which, it was said, divided our party, in such a way as to reduce the damage of disunity, but in an interesting leader on 13th April, it was condemning my right hon. Friend for tabling an Amendment which, it was contended, was designed to do exactly the same thing. On Saturday it suggested that those not prepared to follow the party line could cast reflection on the Conservative Party. On 13th April, The Times was saying:
it would be misguided to try to paper over Tory differences in that this would surely be to misunderstand what the public requires of an Opposition on a great issue. There are deep and sincere differences of opinion within the country as to the best method of dealing with the racial problem and it is likely to increase rather than to diminish respect for the Tories if the public can see these differences reflected within the party.
On Saturday The Times was suggesting that those who were now against the Bill were men of prejudice, men without charity; little, mean men the product of the private bar and the provincial caucus. On 13th April the same newspaper said this:
It is not disreputable to argue that racial harmony cannot be achieved through the


pronouncements or the pressures of the law, and that it can be developed only through the healing properties of time, of education, or of other policies... It is entirely reasonable that this difference of opinion should be argued out in public debate.
It is not for me to suggest why The Times should change its attitude in a leader which displays all the prejudice, meanness, hypocrisy and lack of charity which it professes to discern in those with whose views it does not agree. Perhaps I can comment, in reply to The Times reference to the parable of the Good Samaritan, that had the Good Samaritan lived in a time when the race relations legislation was in force, and had he been called upon to succour two injured travellers of different races, with the possible threat of being referred to the Race Relations Board if he chose to succour one first, he might well have passed by on the other side. This is no more absurd than the reference made by The Times to them. [An HON. MEMBER: "Sacrilege."] I suggest that the hon. Gentleman addresses that remark to The Times.
Let me finally reiterate my own position. I think that some hon. Members on both sides of the House will know that for many years, in co-operation with many organisations and with leading citizens in my constituency of High Wycombe, I have worked with and through immigrant organisations to try to help them to settle into the community in which they have chosen to live. We have done a lot through these organisations to iron out differences which naturally arise when newcomers come to a town in large numbers—the problems of education, the problems of housing, the problems of catering for the different religious requirements which in themselves impose quite a problem on a comparatively small local authority. We have done a great deal to prevent the development of racial prejudice, both between the coloured immigrants and the white people in the town and—this is equally important—between members of the immigrant races themselves. A great deal of prejudice and discrimination exist between the immigrants who come to live in this country.
I would be the first to admit that a great deal still remains to be done. I would be the first to admit that there are cases of discrimination, prejudice and injustice. However, there are cases of

prejudice, discrimination and injustice between white people as well as between white and black. Nevertheless, allowing for that, a very high degree of success has been achieved by those who work in this field in my constituency. In a town with one of the highest proportions of immigrants to white population in the country, a considerable degree of racial harmony has prevailed.
Indeed, we have had no trouble of any consequence throughout the whole period that I have been the Member for this constituency. We have achieved this by education, by persuasion, by conciliation, by dealing with problems before they have arisen. We have done it without the aid of any new legislation. We have done it within the existing law.
My objection is that the Bill when enacted will stir up all the prejudice which lies beneath the surface. It will make the work of those who are already working in this field far more difficult. It will create the impression among many people, with its anomalies, with its injustices, and with its appeal to the sanctions of the courts, that they are being singled out for discrimination themselves white against black. It will make our problems in a town like High Wycombe ten times more difficult. This is the reason I oppose this Bill. I opposed it at the beginning. I regarded it as a bad Bill. I still think it is a bad Bill. I shall go on doing what I have done throughout and in which I have been consistent, and that is, oppose it.
I only pray that the Bill we pass in this House tonight will not do what I think it will do: I hope it will not provoke the animosities which, we know, underlie the feelings of some of our citizens in this country. I hope that it will not undo the work we in Wycombe have been doing for many years. I hope it will not do damage to the good relations we have built up in Wycombe over many years without the aid of legislation.

3.30 a.m.

Mr. Winnick: I would say to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) that good race relations have been destroyed in the last few weeks by the notorious speech of the right hon. Member for


Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). I believe that it should be said that many of us were disgusted, nauseated, by the type of speech the right hon. Member made.
The Bill is a most welcome Measure. I consider that there are certain imperfections in it, but I also would like to congratulate the Government on the Bill, for I believe that they should be congratulated on their courage in tackling this problem. It is a problem which needed to be tackled, and by this Bill they have taken necessary measures.
Some mischief makers have spread the nonsense that what we are doing is creating a privileged minority. It is not true, and the people who spread that dangerous nonsense know it is not true. We are not in any way creating a privileged minority. What we are doing is to try to take the necessary steps to overcome the discrimination people have to suffer in Britain because of the colour of their skins. If any proof was needed that discrimination existed, and still unfortunately continues to exist, in our country, it was given by the P.E.P. report. I knew discrimination existed, and I raised the matter in the House before the P.E.P. report was published. What worried me was the evidence that the people suffering most in the coloured community were people who had been here the longest and the people with the most skills. That was indeed very worrying and disturbing, and as long as a single person in our country is penalised or discriminated against because of the colour of his skin the House of Commons ought to be very worried indeed.
One of my hon. Friends said earlier that in America a situation existed in which all the car pullman porters are negroes and it is difficult for white people to become such porters. If that type of situation existed in Britain I would be against it. I do not look upon myself as being pro-negro or pro-white: I believe in equal rights, and I believe discrimination should be combatted. The Bill, to a very large extent, does so by the measures it proposes over housing, employment, and credit facilities.
In what will be a very brief speech I must say I hope the House will not be

complacent about the future. In my opinion—perhaps I am being somewhat pessimistic—in the next few years we shall have a tremendous struggle in Britain to make sure that people who were born here, or who, if not born here, have spent most of their early life here and been brought up here, and who have non-white skins, have the same opportunities as the white people. What causes me more concern than anything else is the feeling that we shall not overcome the problem but will have the same type of racial situation as exists in the United States. It is not too late to learn lessons from America. Hence the reason we should welcome the Bill which, I hope, will become law in the very near future, but I hope that we shall not be unduly complacent about the the problems which will arise in the near future. Given good will and tolerance we can, I believe, overcome our problems, but we have to make sure that mischief-making people who stir up racial trouble are answered.
We need political courage in facing the problem of the minority in Britain, and if we have sufficient political courage we can make sure that people not white can live their lives here in Britain without being penalised or discriminated against in any way.

3.35 a.m.

Dr. Winstanley: In a way this is perhaps rather a sad occasion, because I believe that the vast majority of hon. Members do not discriminate in their behaviour towards coloured people or people of different racial or ethnic origins, do not wish to discriminate, and do not believe that other people should discriminate. They want to see people protected from that kind of discrimination, but it seems to me rather unlikely that the message that will emerge tonight will have that degree of clarity.
Our party political system is divisive in a sense, though I make no criticism of that. It is understandable and right perhaps, that whatever a Government suggest an Opposition tend either to oppose or at best damn with very faint praise. We must also accept that things people disagree about are news, and things they agree about are not often news. I make no complaint about that either, but it means that the divisions of opinion are often publicised with much


greater force than the agreements. This is inevitable, but on a moral issue of this kind we should all strive on an occasion like this to achieve the kind of unity and consensus which perhaps normally emerge only in time of war. When there is a war we do not very often find reasoned Amendments.
I realise that that cannot be used as an argument for getting people to support a Bill which they regard as defective or do not agree with in detail. Therefore, before the Bills leaves us we should look at the kind of criticisms that have been made. Many hon. Members have said that it will not do its job and cannot be enforced. I accept some of those criticisms. We may find when it is operating that in many fields it cannot be enforced with the vigour and effectiveness that some hon. Members would wish. But that is not a reason for opposing it. The House has a duty to set an example by stating clearly at least what should happen, even if it cannot enforce it to the fullest possible extent.
It has been said by many hon. Members that in some curious way the Bill interferes with the ordinary liberties of the subject. Many examples have been given tonight. I do not accept for a moment that any well-intentioned person will be inhibited in any way from doing anything which any honourable or decent person should regard as something which he or she should be able to do. I think that it was the hon. Member for Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) who went on at some length about private behaviour in a person's private home. When we examined what he meant by the person's private home, the Englishman's castle, we found that he meant a house into which that person was taking various residents and paying guests, in other words, running a business. When a person runs a business by providing accommodation—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot discuss on Third Reading an Amendment that we debated earlier.

Dr. Winstanley: I am not discussing an Amendment, Mr. Speaker, but a matter which is in the Bill, which regulates what a person does in his or her home, if it is being used for business purposes. It is right that it should do so in this connection.
It has also been said by many hon. Members that in the, we are told, intimate matter of the private sale of a house the Bill in some way restricts a person's right to sell his house to whom he wishes. I tried to examine this by asking the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) what he thought about cases where people arranged privately to sell their house to an individual, not knowing that individual, satisfied themselves that the money was forthcoming and so on, but at the very end met the person, found that he was black and said, "I am afraid that I cannot sell the house to you." I asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he thought a person ought to be permitted to say that, and he said "No." But that is precisely the kind of thing—and the only kind of thing as I see it—that the Bill stops them from saying.
I accept that the Bill cannot do everything I should like it to do, but I do not accept these various arguments that in some curious way it restricts people from doing legitimate, sensible and reasonable things. I do not believe that any well-intentioned person will find that this Bill restricts them in any undesirable way at all.
When I said this was a sad occasion, let me also say I am sure it is a very useful occasion, because I think it has helped many hon. Members to learn more about what the Bill actually means. I think many of them were not very clear about this. I hope too that, as a result of these discussions, it may help people outside to realise what the Bill means.
I think I should emphasise, as did the hon. Lady the Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Joan Lestor), that this Bill is not about immigration. It is not about recent arrivals here. Whenever we discuss race relations and the people involved in this Bill, everybody immediately talks about recent arrivals, but I think we should constantly be reminded that the Bill is about people who live here, people who belong here, people who in another connection the Home Secretary might have referred to as belongers, people who have nowhere else to go to.
When we talk about people being assisted to go back to their place of origin, it should be remembered that for


many of them their place of origin is Cardiff, Liverpool or Manchester. It is this kind of thing which this House should hammering home.
Before I sit down, I should pass my congratulations to the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) for endeavouring to arrive at that kind of consensus. He was good enough to say some kind words about me on a previous occasion, and that did not do me any harm in Cheadle, and I hope my kind words about him tonight will not do him any harm.
In the debate on the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill on 15th November, 1967, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said that
persons lawfully within this country should be treated on the basis of the universal declaration of human rights, that one person should be treated in the same way as another in respect of dignity and human rights."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1967;Vol. 754, c. 441.]
Surely that is precisely what this Bill is trying to do. It may have some sad effects; it may not do everything we would like; but I am sure it would do a lot if we all said now that we support it, as I and my right hon. and hon. Friends do.

3.44 a.m.

Mr. Heffer: I do not want to detain the House long, but one of the hon. Members on the other side said that he was influenced in supporting this Bill because of a friend he had who was a civil rights worker and who was imprisoned in the United States. I am influenced in supporting this Bill because I have in my own family relatives who are of a different colour from myself, and I know the experiences which they have had at different times because of prejudice and certain discrimination that has been applied to them.
As far as I am concerned, it is regrettable that we have had to bring in legislation of this kind. It would have been much better if we could have had orderly integration in our country, and a multi-racial society where prejudice did not exist, without any legislation at all.
The only argument that has to be faced—the only serious argument that has been put forward—is whether the Bill is necessary and whether it is right

that we should bring it in. If we are honest with ourselves we have to admit that there has been practised over the past few years in particular among a small but nevertheless articulate section of the population discrimination against some of our citizens because of their colour and ethnic origins. Surely we have to learn the experience of the U.S.A. I said in Committee that the experiences in this country are not the same as those in the U.S.A. It would be wrong to translate its situation automatically in our country. But we have in front of us the experience in the U.S. where because they failed to tackle their problems early enough there is the great prejudice and upheaval that arises periodically in their cities.
This Bill surely is designed, rightly, to make certain that we deal with the problem before it gets to the stage that it has done in the U.S.A. For that reason every citizen in this country who is not prejudiced ought to welcome the Bill. It is true that legislation cannot make any one of us love our neighbour. It cannot eliminate prejudice. It cannot make the person who is so twisted in mind and attitude love another person whose skin is a different colour. But what it can do, and what it will do, is regulate the habits of our people in a civilised manner. This surely is the essential nature of the Bill.
The Bill obviously has a number of weaknesses. It could have been strengthened. But I do not think that the conciliation part could have been or ought to have been strengthened. I think we have got that right. Maybe our experience over the years will prove that we need to strengthen the Bill in this direction. But I think that it is right that we should, as we are doing in the Bill, rely first upon the normal methods of conciliation that exist within industry, and then as a last resort use the conciliation machinery in Part II of the Race Relations Board.
I welcome the Bill in every way possible. It is a necessary Bill. I hope that hon. Members opposite who believe in the Bill as I do will not merely abstain from voting but give us their support in the Lobby in the same way as some of my hon. Friends found themselves in the same Lobby on a matter of principle last week.

3.49 a.m.

Mr. Scott: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall), I have spent much time and effort in my constituency in trying to encourage good community relations, and, indeed, in the last two years I have been chairman of the Voluntary Liaison Committee in the City of Westminster which has worked for better community relations in that city.
I am bound to say that my experience has led me to exactly the opposite conclusion from that to which the experience of my right hon. Friend has led him. Many people have made many suggestions about what will be achieved or what will happen as a result of the passing of the Bill. I think it will do three very positive things, and three very desirable things. First, it will make clear that this nation is opposed to racial discrimination and that a public declaration is important. Secondly, it will give support to the wobblers, those who say that they do not want to discriminate but that their tenants, customers or employees will not like it unless they do. Thirdly, it will provide some redress to those of our citizens who suffer the humiliation of racial discrimination.
It is not a strong Bill but if it is operated well, vigorously and effectively, it can win the confidence both of the host and of the minority communities and can make a real contribution to harmonious race relations, and it can make clear that racial discrimination is not only unlawful but no longer respectable.
Much depends on the way in which the Board and the Community Relations Commission work, particularly the latter, because law enforcement is one thing but the development of community relations through the Commission is perhaps the bigger part of the task. If it can work imaginatively at national level and can encourage local committees to work in that way in our cities;if it can not only encourage compliance with the law but affirmative voluntary action to wipe out racial discrimination by voluntary action, then the passing of the Bill can be a beginning and not an end to a story.
The debates on the Bill have been confused much with the debate on immigration. To my mind, what the Bill

is about is that children in Paddington and many other places who have been born here, are going through our schools, who will get their O and A levels and many of whom will go to university, will want the jobs for which they are qualified and the houses they can afford. If we do not give them those jobs and houses, we shall be storing up a problem for ourselves. But this is not really why we should be passing the Bill. They should get the jobs they are qualified for and the houses they can afford because it is right that they should do so.

3.53 a.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: The hon. Member for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) has made a courageous speech and I do not wish to be tempted into examining the fissures in the party opposite. It might not help him and others in overcoming them. But something should be said and I say it directly to the right hon. Member for Wolver-hampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). I waited to see whether he would take part in these debates. I think that he should have done. One of the virtues of the House is that the views that an hon. Member expresses, particularly when they are unpopular, can be tested in debate. When an hon. Member makes claims, wide or extravagant, they can be subjected immediately to cross-examination. For example, the case of the Wol-verhampton widow might have been disposed of at once in the House. In the same way, many of the other allegations he has made outside the House he has not chosen to make inside it.
The right hon. Gentleman has such a great reputation in this House—everyone knows he can defend his views with great ability—that I find it remarkable that he has not chosen to try and persuade his fellow Members to accept the views he has stated outside. I do not accuse him of lack of courage. It would be foolish for anyone to do that. As I have said, his ability is of the very highest. That makes it all the more remarkable, if the issue is of such paramount importance for the future of the nation, as the right hon. Gentleman said in his famous, or infamous, speech, that he has not spoken in these debates. Surely this is the place where he should have come to speak, and then the House of Commons would have been able to judge


whether he was prepared to speak in the House in the same tone which he used outside. I therefore say to the right hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Evelyn King: On a point of order. Is this discussion of a speech largely about immigration and which in any event had nothing to do with the Bill in order on Third Reading?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must leave the Chair to judge what is in order.

Mr. Foot: I have said what I wished to say. The reputation and the maintenance of the reputation of the House of Commons require that hon. Members, particularly those of high standing in it such as the right hon. Gentleman, should be prepared to state their views in the House. I invite the right hon. Gentleman, if he does not do it today, to seek an early opportunity to recapitulate in the House the views which he stated outside it, so that they may be subjected to scrutiny and examination by other hon. Members. One of the reasons why many of us welcome the Bill is precisely that it will help to remedy some of the evil consequences of the right hon. Gentleman's deed when he delivered that infamous speech.

3.56 a.m.

Mr. Evelyn King: Unlike the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), having spent about 70 hours on the Bill, it would be my wish, at four o'clock in the morning, to say something about the Bill which the House, whether it agreed with it or not, would find constructive. The reason I cannot do that is that within the rules of order I can discuss only what is in the Bill. A major criticism of the Bill is that, with the possible exception of Part III, which deals with the Community Relations Commission, it is negative and consists of a list of things which people must not do.
I am practical enough to know that sometimes rules of that sort have to be made, but I earnestly hope, and I am entitled to say so in the light of some of the speeches, that no one will imagine for a second that the problems with which we are faced will be in any serious manner solved by the Bill. It would be out of order for me to dwell on the solu-

tions to the problem, which lie in housing, education and spending money. In effect—and I hope that I shall have fairly general agreement about this—it is a poor man's Bill, which does not touch the true and vital nature of the problem.
The problem which worries me almost more than any other is that of workability. I believe that I can carry most hon. Members with me about that, especially those who feel strongly about the Bill. They at least should agree with me that if we were to make to the immigrant community promises which we could not fulfill, if we were to offer hopes which were not realised, we would do something irresponsible.
I should like to comment on the workability. It is easy to overlook what the Bill says. The employment provisions, for instance, cover about 100,000 employers employing tens of millions of people. The Bill purports to say that if one of the million immigrants is unjustly treated in the means by which he gets his employment, or in the means by which he is promoted, or on the occasion on which he is sacked, there will be cause for complaint.
It goes on to say that the sale of houses shall come within its scope. I do not know precisely how many houses change hands every year;certainly tens of thousands, or how many tenancies are changed, but certainly hundreds of thousands. What I press on the House is that the sheer weight, the sheer vast-ness of the field which we are trying to cover, is such that if it is covered, there will have to be a whole machinery of enforcement, with officials and staffs, which is nowhere in the Bill defined.
A major portion of this work is to be done by the Race Relations Board. The total strength of that Board, to cover the whole field which I have tried to outline, is 19 persons; and from Buckinghamshire to Land's End I do not believe that there is a single one.
It is well that we should legislate genuinely and sincerely. If we say that these are the things which we believe ought to be the law, we should say, also, that we know these are the things which we can, in fact, do. We should say that we are providing the machinery for carrying out our intention, but I believe that in this we are bound to be doomed.
That is largely why, in most of the comments I have ventured to make in the Standing Committee I have sought to reduce the area within which the Bill would work; and I say that because I would rather have some small measures which can bear fruit than to set out before the immigrant community a Bill so wide in its scope that it cannot effectively be enforced.
At this hour I will say no more, but I beg hon. Members not to be misled by airy flights of talk about human rights. The first human right is that a promise made is fulfilled. Nobody would be more delighted than I if what I have ventured to say tonight comes to be proved wrong. If I am proved wrong, then I shall be delighted, but, on the evidence I have, I cannot prophesy for the Bill the success that I should like to see.

4.5 a.m.

Mr. Hogg: When I think of all the time which I have spent on the Bill since it was introduced on Second Reading I tremble to think that, at five minutes past four in the morning, I have yet another infliction to make on the House, but, having regard to the course which things have taken, I hope that the whole House would agree that manifestly I should not be doing my duty to the House—and indeed, still more to my party; because I have not played a small part in these debates—if I did not speak from this Bench.
If what I say to those behind me, and even more to those opposite to me in such good numbers, is accepted with forbearance, I shall be content, but this is a matter in which a certain amount of candour is required.
I think that I can honestly say that I can only remember one debate that I have ever taken part in in this House—the Norway debate, some time ago, in 1940—that has caused me more anxiety as to whether I was doing the right thing. In each case, I differed from some members of my own party. In each case, I was sorry to do so, because I respected them and respected their opinion. In each case, my decision was based partly on instinct as well as reason, but instincts are not always bad guides, especially if they are supported by experience.
We are now on Third Reading of the Bill, and, by custom, we only discuss its contents. There is one preliminary point I want to make, which is not purely a debating point, because it has a distinct bearing on our discussions. It will be seen that Clause 4, Clause 6, Clause 9, as amended, Clause 10, Clauses 11 and 12, as amended, the greater part of Clauses 13 to 17 inclusive, the whole of Part III, apart from one passing reference by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayles-bury (Sir S. Summers), whose speech I greatly appreciated, all the Schedules—none of these has come into controversy or serious discussion in today's debates.
In a sense that is a debating point, because some were consequently on things in dispute. Broadly speaking, they are provisions in the Bill that are either accepted or not seriously disputed. When one is considering a vote, although I do not want to say anything about that part of the Bill which constitutes the greater part of the remarks I have already made, I would ask the House not to forget that I have mentioned it, because it enters into my calculations as to what the proper course is. There are two entirely separate questions in any House of Commons debate. The first is, what is one's opinion on the controversy? The second is how one translates that into the "yes" or "no" procedure which constitutes the voting pattern which, rightly, disciplines us into accepting or rejecting. The relationship between these two separate issues is often a question of anxious consideration.
In this case, I have never had any doubt about policy, and there has been a wide consensus within my party upon what that policy should be. A dispute has arisen about how to translate it into a voting pattern. But, having accepted that this was basically a decision on which there was a very wide consensus of opinion, I am bound to accept that this has to be treated as a question of tactics, not in a pejorative sense, but in a proper, responsible sense, of casting a vote or not casting, acting in a way which does most good to the country, and which closely represents the opinion that one holds.
I have always thought, and I say this in great humility, that in this House, and in public life, whereas principle must be a question for the individual conscience,


and policy must be a question for a party, tactics can legitimately be regarded as the prerogative of leadership. I say this in a House which has discovered during its short life, since 1966, many difficulties of tactics, on both sides. In approaching the Bill and its contents I was conscious of three broad groups of opinion in the House, all of which were represented in my party. I suspect that all of them are present in the party opposite, although they have not come to the surface.
One is the group of enthusiastic supporters of the Bill, represented well in this Third Reading debate by the Undersecretary himself. I respect their opinion, and I think that even the most inveterate opponents of the Bill respect them, too. Certainly, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) respected it, because he described it—and it is not an insult so to describe it —as well-intentioned.
If I may venture a friendly criticism, it is—and hon. Members will give me credit for having said so throughout—that they are perhaps a little too unaware of the extent to which they have to bring people along with them in their opinions, a Title too oblivious of the necessity for good legislation as well as good intention, and possibly again a little unaware of the difficulty of enforcing particular provisions about which some of us feel doubts. It is for that reason that although I have accepted many of the purposes behind the Bill, I have never numbered myself of that company.
On the other side, and on the other extreme, I have been aware throughout of a body of opinion not represented so far in this Third Reading debate. Perhaps it has been holding back. There has been a body of opinion—and I challenge anyone to say that I am wrong—to whom any legislation of this kind or which bears a general resemblance to the legislation that we are discussing is wholly obnoxious. I do not reproach them any more than I reproach the enthusiastic supporters of the Bill. I do not accuse them of being uncharitable or of being racialist. On the contrary, I see quite clearly that it is their view that legislation of this

kind is inherently an infringement of individual liberty.
As I have said for a very long time and repeatedly in the course of our debates, the only liberty which is worth while is ultimately the liberty to do what is wrong—that is to say, the liberty to do what other people think is wrong. Therefore, I respect and recognise that there is a legitimate moral value behind that opposition. But I must add that it is not my position.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) was agreeable enough to say in a very well-written letter to The Times, which I read with great enjoyment, that he liked my political company. Well, I like his. But, knowing what his view is of this subject, knowing that he would oppose anything that right hon. Gentlemen opposite proposed, and that I do not reject everything that they propose, much as I enjoy his political company, I would find it a little embarrassing to find myself wholly identified in a straight vote against the Bill in the Lobby. I think that it would be natural for people who found us there together to suppose that we agreed, when we do not.
That is one of the difficulties that I felt from the start about handling the tactics of the Bill, by which I mean the way in which to translate what I believe to be a consistent, although admittedly controversial, view about its contents into a consistent and intelligible voting pattern.
I notice that none of the hon. Members on my side who have spoken so far on Third Reading have gone as far as I know the inveterate opponents of the Bill go. I wonder whether they are doing the party or the House or the country a service by identifying themselves with such a position. Respect it as I will, I cannot find it possible to identify myself with that position—that is to say, a blank negative to the Bill.
I now come to the actual contents—that is to say, to those parts of the Bill that have been discussed. I refer to Clauses 1 and 2, the Clauses dealing with employment and accommodation, and the enforcement Clauses. These are all that are in controversy.
The whole House knows that I have had my reservations about Clause 1. I share the view, although it was never adequately discussed because of the Rules of Order, which was put forward at intervals by the hon. Member for Hamp-stead (Mr. Whitaker). I believe that it was a mistake to put in Clause 1 in such a form as it holds at the moment, in which the root of the Bill limits its base to race, colour, ethnic origin and national origin. I believe, and I have said before, that that tends to some extent to polarise the antagonism which we want to diminish.
A more hopeful Clause 1 would have been something quite different which founded itself upon human rights. Unhappily, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South found that view quite as abhorrent as I found his total opposition to the Bill. As it was out of order we could never resolve our difficulties, but it causes me another doubt as to whether I should happily, on this occasion, find myself voting with my hon. and learned Friend in the "No" Lobby.
That brings me to Clause 2, which we have discussed and which I have criticised. I did so yesterday, and I do not want to repeat my criticism. I now want to say a word about the question whether it is inherently an infringement of liberty, because this is one of the objections which some of my hon. Friends feel to the Bill as a whole and it can be as conveniently discussed in relation to Clause 2 as to any other part of it.
I do not so find it. I have already said that I go along with it. I recognise that individual liberty involves the liberty to do what other people regard as wrong. I would fight for that liberty even where it was unpopular to do so, because it always is unpopular to defend in a public place the right to do what other people think to be wrong.
I am, however, bound to add this proviso to that doctrine. Where individual acts add up cumulatively to a large-scale social injustice, it is, a least, for consideration whether Parliament ought not to deal with them. Where one is dealing with services offered to the public, whether by a barrister, as I tend to offer my services, or as I used

to do before the Bill started, or as a doctor, a priest or a shopkeeper, and more particularly where those services are offered to a section of the public by one of the great sources of supply—the great landlords, the great trade unions, the great businesses or the great providers of transport—I begin to think that one is dealing with something where, if the individual right to the service is infringed, a serious source of injury might take place.
In at least two of the areas—and here I move on to Clauses 3 and 5—those of housing and employment, there is positive evidence that injustice on a serious scale may be taking place. I cannot, therefore, say that it is inherently and necessarily an infringement of the liberty which I respect to attempt to legislate about it.
I agree that I find blemishes in the legislation, and I have not sought to minimise those blemishes. I do not think that the House was wise to include in the Bill those parts of it which are so wide of scope as to cover what we have agreed to call, by a kind of legitimate shorthand, the small operator. I wanted to deal with the large operator and with the large-scale effects. That the House has decided against.
I accept the decision with regret, because I think it was a mistake, but in the end, in Clause 2, in Clause 3, in Clause 5, and in the subordinate Clauses 7 and 8 I find that there is material to praise as well as the material which I found to blame. So, also, in the enforcement Clauses. We have had a debate on damages and I will not repeat what I had to say then.
I also wish to criticise those parts of the enforcement Clauses which convey exclusive jurisdiction upon a limited number of county courts, not on county courts as a whole and not on the High Court, and add those extraordinary creatures that the Attorney-General in Committee found it so difficult to defend, the assessors, which I venture to say he must have attacked robustly in the privacy of Government counsels. These are blemishes, but, on the other hand, here too I find an element of the Bill which is not devoid of merit.
The Under-Secretary, in his enthusiasm, congratulated his colleagues upon


their courage and vision in bringing forward the proposals of the Bill. He even congratulated them on the Race Relations Act. What he ought to have done was to congratulate the Conservative minority on the Standing Committee which introduced the enforcement provisions of the Race Relations Act of 1965. It was a Conservative invention based largely on American experience. When the Government introduced that Bill they introduced it with criminal provisions. It came back from Standing Committee with conciliation and injunction machinery which came from us. I do not see why we should not claim credit for it. It am not claiming it exclusively, but the hon. Gentleman's praise was exclusively devoted to his own side and I think that we, too, are entitled to a little bit of the praise.
That leads me to the crux of the matter. On Second Reading, I supported, I hope with some force, a reasoned Amendment which said that, on balance, the Bill would do more harm than good. This is obviously a difficult judgment to make as a whole. I wholly disagree with those of my hon. Friends who ay that it is in ail respects the same Bill. I have not pretended to remind the House of the phrase which my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) reminded the House of and which I used on Second Reading. This is not a repetition of the history of the Race Relations Bill of 1965. The changes have not been fundamental here as they were then, but it would be a great mistake, in my judgment at any rate, to described them as contemptible or insignificant simply because they were not fundamental.
A new assessment clearly has to be made as to the balance, and it is a more difficult balance to draw. If I were to rest solely on that limb I am sure that I should be spending a great deal of the House's time, and I do not wish to do so, because I must point out that there are other differences between the situation on Second Reading and the situation which we now face. The Motion is different on Second Reading. We had the rational and frequently debated option of a reasoned Amendment, and we took it. We inquired whether that option was a reasonable option

on Third Reading. The conclusion we arrived at was that it was neither reasonable nor intelligible. It is within the rules of order, so I am informed, but in 30 years' experience of the House I cannot readily recollect a single instance where it has been taken.
Now, we have to choose between a direct vote for or a direct vote against, and I am reluctant to ask my party to give a direct vote against the Bill. Had that been the option on Second Reading, I should have taken the same view as I am taking now. If I had had to choose on Second Reading in the light of my then speech either to vote for the Bill or to vote against it, I should have refused to vote. As it was, I had another option and I asked my hon. Friends to take it.
But if my hon. Friends ask me what has changed since then, then I am bound to say that one thing that has changed has been my fundamental assessment of the Bill, which is that it is a matter to be discussed rationally in the light of the social context in which we are placed and in the light of its probable consequences, and not in a mood of bad temper or emotionalism. That is not the only thing that has changed. In my judgment, the social climate has also changed since Second Reading. This is where an element of instinct must come in, but I am not entering into the criticism that has been made on the benches opposite of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). I said all I had to say about that on Second Reading.
I would only add, with some seriousness of mind and purpose, that I have been rather perturbed by some of the manifestations of public feeling which have taken place since Second Reading. If I had to vote against the Bill, I would have found it very much more easy to do so on Second Reading than I would now. It is a matter of the highest importance, both for the House and the country, that the rather ugly manifestations of feeling that have taken place should not be associated with in any way by any hon. Member. I am not associating myself in any way with the criticisms, which were wholly unjust, in The Times leading article. But whether the criticism is just or unjust, it would be difficult—one would spend a great deal of time doing this—to explain away


a straight vote against the Bill as not being associated with that kind of feeling.

Hon. Members: Rubbish.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The debate has been placid so far. There is no reason why it should not remain so.

Mr. Hogg: My hon. Friends are perfectly at liberty to disagree with me, but I am entitled to express my opinion. I have served my party for 30 years—

Mr. Jennings: So have we.

Mr. Hogg: —and I have given up what I believe to be a promising professional career and I have abandoned a great hereditary position. I am not now going to be put down from saying what I believe it is my duty to say by unmannerly people who cannot hear views different from their own in silence. I ask my party to agree with me.

4.30 a.m.

Mr. Callaghan: Mr. Callaghan rose—

Mr. John Wells: On a point of order. I beg to move, That the Question be now put.

Mr. Speaker: I am not prepared to accept that Motion now.

Mr. Callaghan: It falls to me to say the last word, and I do so willingly. I am proud to take part in this debate, because whatever agreement or disagreement there may be with the views expressed by the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg)—I completely understand his emotion and that of those who may oppose him—the fact remains, as hon. Members will acknowledge, that in his speech, and in the speeches of others, such as those of the hon. Member" for Paddington, South (Mr. Scott) and the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall), we have heard the accents of truth, sincerity and principle.
At a time when politicians of all shades are under considerable attack for falling below the level of events, we can be proud of the kind of debate that we have had. It has taken place in the early hours of the morning, but it has certainly been none the worse for that. Indeed, in my view it has been all the better for it. I speak of the generality of the debate. We have listened with great attention and very great care for

99 per cent. of the time. Irrespective of whether we agreed with them or not, we respected the views put forward. I want to state my attitude, because I think that this is a very great occasion. When introducing the Bill I had read a great deal of the debates which had taken place before and what had been said by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his colleagues. Although I hope that I am as good a party man as any, I was determined to make this as far as possible a bipartisan approach. I am not ashamed of that. I believe it to be the right approach on this issue. I prepared a Bill which, although it fell short of the expectations of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, nevertheless, as I saw it, was based on a consensus of view in the House and would, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman adjures us, not antagonise the people of this country, but carry them with us.
On Second Reading, the right hon. and learned Gentleman put a number of questions and considerations to me. The particular points he put were about the position of the small employer, the position of the person who let his house or a part of it, about the owner-occupier who sold his house without recourse to an estate agent, who had a private transaction, and the position of the small landlord. I say this to those who criticise the right hon. and learned Gentleman. It is not for me to defend him; he probably can do that better without my help. In his reasoned Amendment he asked the Government to consider these points. All of them have been considered and changes in the Bill have been made on all of them. They may be changes which some people will find more palatable than others. I did it in pursuance of my very strong desire that the House of Commons, in so far as it is possible, should unite in this novel declaration of principle. I say this to those who have criticised the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I have endeavoured, not to his utter satisfaction, to meet the points that were made.
I really believe that it is more important to have a united House of Commons on this issue than it is to satisfy any desire to exploit party fissures or to attack each other's lack of principle and bona fides in this matter. I appeal to the House very sincerely tonight. I know


there are some who feel bound to vote, but I ask the House to let us have, if possible the Third Reading of the Bill without a Division. It could be the greatest and most unanimous declaration that could be made.
In the light of the nature of the deliberations we have had, in the light of the fact that the official Conservative Opposition does not propose to vote against the Bill, I think that the time has come when we should proceed with the discussions in the all-party committee I proposed when making my Second Reading speech. The nature of our discussions and the Bill which has emerged are of such a character that we should now begin, all parties in the House, to foresee the operation of the Measure, as I trust it will emerge from another place, and the other issues which concern race relations.
Therefore, I shall be approaching once more the right hon. and learned Gentleman—he gave me a reply last time which was favourable, but he said that he wished to reserve his position—and the Liberal Party to see if we can establish this committee now. I have the deepest and most profound conviction that the path of happiness and the health of our society lies on the declaration of principle that, whatever view we may take about people coming into this country, once they are here they must be treated as equals.
This is what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) could do to help. I take the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot). I intended to say something about it, but I will not pursue it, because my hon. Friend made it clear. The right hon. Gentleman has a responsibility to make a distinction, if he believes in a distinction, between his views on the number of people coming to this country and the treatment of those who are already here. He is at the moment associated with opposition to the Bill. He is also clearly associated with a desire to prevent any others from coming here.
I would take the view that the integration, absorption and assimilation of the million new citizens we have got here is of greater importance to the health of our community than the unlimited entry

of new migrants. A very difficult balance has to be held. But the right hon. Gentleman, who has the ear of the country on this question of race, has now the responsibility for making his position clear, not on migration, but on the question of the Bill. I regret very much that he has not attempted to intervene in any of our debates to make his position clear.
If there is one picture that will live in my memory, as I imagine that it will in the memory of every Member, it is the picture of the Palace of Westminster surrounded by good, decent British working-men jeering at the High Commissioner for Kenya because he was of a different colour. There must be a terrible gap, a terrible lack of education which I cannot believe that the right hon. Gentleman can defend. He cannot defend that kind of approach; and he has a great responsibility, because he has the greatest influence of anybody with the people of this country at the moment, because of the views he has expressed. He has a responsibility to make it clear that, no matter what the colour of a man's skin is, when he is in this country he should be treated equally with everyone else. It is the right hon. Gentleman's responsibility to begin to damp down the flames that he has stirred. I leave the right hon. Gentleman with that, but it is something that he should reflect on very seriously indeed.
As regards the Bill itself, there are four questions. Is it necessary? Will it make things worse? Is it practicable0 Is it enough? I answer those questions quite simply in this way. I believe that the Bill is necessary for the reasons expressed by many hon. Gentlemen, including the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers) and the right hon. and learned Member for St. Marylebone. There are, I regret to say, a number—and a growing number—of examples of discrimination, particularly in the fields of employment and housing. It is, in my view, and in the view of the great majority of the House of Commons, therefore necessary to declare that in a society in which we wish to live this discrimination shall be made unlawful.
Secondly, will it make things worse? This is the view which is taken by some hon. Gentlemen. We cannot forget history on this. The history of the matter


is that, when the Race Relations Bill, 1965 was introduced, great changes were made in it, but I do not think that I do the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) an injustice when I say that on Third Reading he said—I have not checked my memory on this and I am willing to withdraw this if he says that he did not say this; if he did not, others did—that the operation of the 1965 Act would make matters worse. That is precisely the criticism which is being uttered about this Bill at this time.
I think that anybody who has studied this matter will have no doubt that the operation of the Race Relations Act, 1965, has improved race relations in the limited fields in which it operated. There may be some who will disagree about that. I can only say that they are in a substantial minority on that matter. Therefore, if we may judge from the history of previous legislation—and I am entitled to draw a conclusion from it—it is at least as likely that the Bill will make things better as it is that it will make things worse; and I myself would put it much higher. I think that there is a very strong prospect that it will improve matters rather than make them worse, for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Paddington, South. I found more hope in the hon. Gentleman's approach and in his speech than I did in all that much publicised postbag of the right hon. Member for Wolverhamp-ton, South-West.
Then, is it practicable? I think that the answer to that is, Yes, despite the fears of the hon. Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Evelyn King). He referred to the millions of people in employment, but that is one reason, a very important reason, why I wanted to use the machinery of the trade unions and of the employers, the voluntary machinery which now exists, which, extending over

the whole field, at present operates for the millions of people to whom he referred. The individual grievance today is taken up—millions of them, if the hon. Gentleman likes; the individual grievance today is solved; and we are using exactly the same machinery in this very important field. Therefore, I take the view that, although there are bound to be difficulties in this matter, the machinery is practicable, and that it can be made to work if it is used with vigour.

Then the question is asked: is it enough? No, it is not enough. I should be out of order if I were to state now the other things which are necessary to make the Bill succeed, but I have never pretended that legislation on its own will solve this very great problem with which everyone in the House is faced. There are, clearly, other measures which are necessary, but to which I will not now refer.

Therefore, in commending the Bill to the House for Third Reading, I appeal, as strongly as I can, to every Member in the House, no matter where he may sit, to allow it to go forward. I believe that the arguments which have been put against it, sincerely held though they are, are not sufficiently strong to justify the House in being divided on a fundamental issue of human principle and human equality like this. For the sake of the House, for the sake of the country, for the sake of the 50 million of our own people in this country as well as the million immigrants we have here, the coloured citizens we have living here, for the sake of all of us, I beg right hon. and hon. Members to give the Bill an unopposed Third Reading.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time: —

The House divided: Ayes 182, Noes 44.

Division No. 274.]
AYES
[4.42 a.m.


Abse, Leo
Baxter, William
Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch &amp;F'bury)


Allaum, Frank (Salford, E.)
Bidwell, Sydney
Buchan, Norman


Alldritt, Walter
Blackburn, F.
Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)


Anderson, Donald
Blenkinsop, Arthur
Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James


Archer, Peter
Booth, Albert
Cant, R. B.


Armstrong, Ernest
Boston, Terence
Carmichael, Neil


Atkins, Ronald (Preston, N.)
Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Chapman, Donald


Atkinson, Norman (Tottenham)
Boyden, James
Coe, Denis


Bacon, Rt. Hn. Alice
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Coleman, Donald


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Concannon, J. D.


Barnes, Michael
Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Cullen, Mrs. Alice


Barnett, Joel
Brown,Bob(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,W.)
Dalyell, Tam




Davidson, Arthur (Accrington)
Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)
O'Malley, Brian


Davidson, James (Aberdeenshire,W.)
Hughes, Emrys (Ayrshire, S.)
Orbach, Maurice


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Orme, Slantey


Davies, Dr. Ernest (Stretford)
Hunter, Adam
Oswald, Thomas


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Jackson, Colin (B'h'se &amp; Spenb'gh)
Palmer, Arthur


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Janner, Sir Barnett
Parkyn, Brian (Bedford)


Dell, Edmund
Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred


Dewar, Donald
Jeger,Mrs. Lena (H'b'n &amp; St.P'cras,S.)
Pentland, Norman


Diamond, Rt. Hn. John
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Rees, Merlyn


Dobson, Ray
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Richard, Ivor


Dunnett, Jack
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Robinson, Rt. Hn. Kenneth (St.P 'c' as)


Dunwoody, Mrs. Cwyneth (Exeter)
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham,S.)
Robinson, W. O. J. (Walth'stow, E.)


Dunwoody, Dr. John (F'th &amp; C'b'e)
Judd, Frank
Rose, Paul


Eadie, Alex
Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)
Ross, Rt. Hn. William


Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)
Ryan, John


Ellis, John
Lee, John (Reading)
Shaw, Arnold (llford, S.)


Ennals, David
Lestor, Miss Joan
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)


Faulds, Andrew
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton.N.E,)


Fernyhough, E.
Luard, Evan
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)


Fletcher, Raymond (llkeston)
Lubbock, Eric
Silverman, Julius


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Slater, Joseph


Foot, Rt. Hn. Sir Dingle (Ipswich)
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Small, William


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Spriggs, Leslie


Ford, Ben
McBride, Neil
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Forrester, John
MacColl, James
Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley


Fraser, John (Norwood)
Macdonald, A. H.
Swain, Thomas


Freeson, Reginald
McGuire, Michael
Taverne, Dick


Galpern, Sir Myer
Mackenzie, Alasdair(Ross &amp;Crom'ty)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. George


Ginsburg, David
Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)
Urwin, T. W.


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
Mackintosh, John P.
Varley, Eric G.


Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Maclennan, Robert
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Grey, Charles (Durham)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Watkins, David (Consett)


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
McNamara, J. Kevin
Weitzman, David


griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)
Wellbeloved, James


Griffiths, Will (Exchange)
Mahon, Simon (Bootle)
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Mallalieu, J.P.W.(Huddersfield,E.)
Whitaker, Ben


Hamling, William
Marks, Kenneth
White, Mrs. Eirene


Hannan, William
Marquand, David
Whitlock, William


Harper, Joseph
Mendelson, J. J.
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mikardo, Ian
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornchurch)


Haseldine, Norman
Millan, Bruce
Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)


Hazell, Bert
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Heffer, Eric S.
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Winnick, David


Hilton, W. S.
Mitchell, R. C. (S'th'pton, Test)
Winstanley, Dr. M. P.


Hooley, Frank
Molloy, William
Woof, Robert


Horner, John
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Yates, Victor


Howarth, Robert (Bolton, E.)
Morris, John (Aberavon)



Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Moyle, Roland
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Howie, W.
Murray, Albert
Mr. Ernest G. Perry and


Hoy, James
Newens, Stan
Mr. Ioan L. Erans.




NOES


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Pink, R. Bonner


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Hirst, Geoffrey
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch


Bitten, John
Hordern, Peter
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas


Biggs-Davison, John
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Ridsdale, Julian


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Russell, Sir Ronald


Body, Richard
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.


Bullus, Sir Eric
Knight, Mrs. Jill
Taylor, Edward M.(C'gow,Cathcart)


Burden, F. A.
Longden, Gilbert
Teeling, Sir William


Campbell, B. (Oldham, West)
Maginnis, John E.
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Cordle, John
Maude, Angus
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Mawby, Ray
Williams, Donald (Dudley)


Cunningham, Sir Knox
Maydon, Lt.-cmdr. S. L. C.
Woodnutt. Mark


Drayson, G. B.
Montgomery, Fergus



Errington, Sir Eric
Murton, Oscar
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Goodhart, Philip
Nabarro, Sir Gerald
Mr. Ronald Bell and


Goodhew, Victor
Neave, Airey
Mr. Harold Gurden.


Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

SCHOOL, GREAT DUNMOW

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper]

4.50 a.m.

Mr. Peter Kirk: I apologise for detaining the House just a little longer at this very early hour of the morning, and apologise to the right hon. Lady for asking her to stay here to answer this debate because of the short notice I was able to give her about it.
The subject I wish to raise, though not of the wide-ranging importance of that we have been discussing, is, nevertheless, of very great importance to large numbers of my constituents. It concerns the rather complicated story of the secondary school at Great Dunmow, a story which I have tried to unravel myself and which I hope the right hon. Lady can asist me in unravelling a little further.
The school was built on this site in 1958, and was finally completed with a four-form entry for 600 children in 1960. It soon became apparent that a school of this size would not be able to serve the expanding needs of the area, and by 1964 the report of Her Majesty's inspector showed that the number of school children stood at 643, the lowest figure for that year, and that in September, 1964, it was expected to have risen to 720. The inspector said this was well outstripping the accommodation, and that the school would also be subject to still greater pressure as increase in entry advanced. So, three years ago, it was obvious that the school was already overcrowded, and likely to get more overcrowded as time went on.
It may well be asked why nothing was done about it. The story was that when the previous Government announced their provisional intention to expand the airport at Stansted, their provisional plan contained a lateral runway which had nothing to do with the two parallel runways—later the subject of discussion—and that this lateral runway would have ended just outside the back door of the Great Dunmow school.
The local authority rightly thought in these circumstances that it was not possible for it to consider an extension to the school, but the lateral runway was dropped from the airport plans, and, in

consequence, there appeared to be no reason why an extension to the school should not go on.
It was decided by the county council to increase the school to a six-form entry instead of a four-form entry, thus providing another 200 places which it was felt would cope with the expected expansion. But when the matter was looked at again in relation to the capital programme for the school year 1967–68, as I understand the plan was then that this extension should be taken into consideration with the proposal to raise the school-leaving age, and that the school should be expanded to eight-form entry with 1,320 pupils, at a cost of£142,445. Then there is the raising of the school-leaving age, which was dropped. The situation now appears to be that no proposal whatsoever exists in any capital programme to expand the school.
I had a Question to the Secretary of State on 27th June. The right hon. Lady told me:
We are unable to authorise this school to start this year because of the prior claim of schools to meet more urgent needs. We will be ready to consider it for the 1969–70 programme but I cannot say at this stage what the outcome will be."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1968;Vol. 767, c. 800.]
When I asked what were the more urgent needs, all I got was a helpful answer, which did not answer my Question, telling me how much Essex had spent on education. I am not quarrelling with the county council, which has done the best it can. It keeps putting the school in the programme, and the Ministry keeps taking it out. I want to ensure that the school goes into the programme and stays there.
What puzzled me about the right hon. Lady's reply was that I had already received a letter from her on 19th March this year in which she said:
The Essex education authority have submitted the project in their revised proposals and have assured us of the urgent need. We shall certainly consider it for inclusion in the review programme for 1968–69, but I cannot yet say what the outcome will be.
Only three months later she was saying that it is not in the 1968–69 programme and does not know whether it will be in the 1969–70 programme. What happened between March, when we were to consider it for 1968–69, and 27th June, when we cannot even be definite about whether it will be considered for 1969–70?
The right hon. Lady should be clear what the situation in the school now is. Her Majesty's inspector, in 1964, noted that by September of that year the school would have 720 pupils, well outstripping the accommodation. In February this year it had 748 pupils, 148 more than is provided for. In September, this year's entry will raise the number of children to 804. Two classes are now being taught in demountable classrooms, some classes have occasionally to be taught in the corridors, two classes are being taught in a disused, substandard, abandoned primary school five miles away, sixth-form work is being done in a caravan provided by the parents of some of the children, and one class is being taught in the staff room. The right hon. Lady tells me that there are more urgent cases in Essex. I should be interested to hear where in rural Essex there is a more urgent one.
The prospect, therefore, is of another 60 children coming in this September and raising the total from 748 to 804. I do not think that this is a situation which can be allowed to run on with merely the prospect that perhaps there will be a chance of getting something in the estimates for 1969–70. I urge the right hon. Lady to realise that there is no alternative relief available. All the neighbouring secondary schools at Braintree, Chelmsford and Saffron Walden are full and cannot take any more children from Great Dunmow. In July this year the new sewerage works in the area was complete, with the result that new residential development over the whole area, particularly at Great Dunmow and the neighbouring villages of Felsted and Barnston, held up for 10 years, will go ahead, and so pressure on the school will grow even heavier.
While it is too much to expect the right hon. Lady to tell me any definite news tonight, I hope she will realise the extent of the urgency of the school situation and perhaps press upon her Department the need for some fairly rapid action. Otherwise, the school will simply burst at the seams.

5.0 a.m.

The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Miss Alice Bacon): The hon. Gentleman the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Kirk) has

described the position at the Great Dunmow secondary school and I know that the conditions are broadly as he stated. The extension of this school from a four-form entry school to a six-form entry school at a cost of£166,000 was included in the 1967–68 building programme. School building programmes are reckoned from 1st April to 31st March and since this school was included in the 1967–68 programme it was open to the Essex authority at any time between 1st April, 1967, and 31st March, 1968, to start the school. But this it did not do.
In January, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced the postponement of the raising of the school-leaving age, the object of which was to save the money which was to have been spent on buildings for that purpose in the next two years. Local authorities had been allocated£36 million for each of the years 1968–69 and 1969–70, but this was partly offset by£7 million in each of the two years to help with secondary reorganisation.
Every year, local authorities have a building backlog of schools which have been in the previous year's programme and which for some reason they have not managed to start. This school was in the 1967–68 programme and could have been started by Essex at any time during that year. But the position was altered by the effect of having to take away the money which had been allocated for the raising of the school-leaving age.
It was clear that, unless we had taken some action, the local authorities would have been able to build as much from their backlog as the Government were saving by postponing the raising of the school-leaving age. So the Department issued a circular saying that those schools which were not started by 31st March, 1968, would have to be resubmitted for the 1968–69 programmes. Since about£29 million had to be taken out of the building programme which had already been allocated for 1968–69, it was only right that local authorities should be given a chance to state their priorities in the light of the new circumstances.
As I have said, Essex could have started this school at any time up to 31st March, 1968, but it did not do so because


it was not ready to start and it therefore had to take its chance in the 1968–69 building programme. The local authority included the school in its revised proposals, but not as No. 1 priority, for 1968–69 as being justified in terms of meeting urgent basic need and as being essential to secondary reorganisation in the area.
But I must stress—and this to some extent answers the hon. Gentleman's queries—that when we considered these proposals, together with the proposals from the rest of the local authorities in February, it was doubtful whether the school would be ready to start within the programme year—that is, up to spring, 1969. The sketch plans had not been completed so that the timetable for the subsequent planning and tendering stages to allow a start before 1st April, 1969, was very tight.
The hon. Gentleman asked what school was more urgent. We had to survey the whole country and there were some schools of equal urgency where the local authorities were ready to go ahead at once. These other schools were just as urgently needed and could certainly start before the Dunmow school could start and they had to be given priority. If this school could not have been started, say, until about February, 1969—I am merely using this date as an example—the difference between it being in the 1968–69 programme and the 1969–70 programme could probably have been only a matter of two months.
The authority has been invited to submit its proposals for schools to start in the 1969–70 programme. If it includes this school, and it probably will, its claims for a place in the programme in terms of meeting basic needs will be carefully considered, but, of course, we have to survey the whole country, and I do not think that the hon. Gentleman would expect me to go further than that tonight. However, as the secondary reorganisation scheme approved for the area envisages an intake in 1969, the school may also be eligible for a share of the special£7 million added to the 1969–70 programme to help reorganisation.
Again, I say that when we were considering it in the light of the£7 million for the 1968–69 programme, we had to bear in mind that it was not ready to start, whereas other urgent projects in

the rest of the country were ready to start immediately. This school can, therefore, be considered on two counts. If it is included, a start can be made early in the programme year beginning April, 1969, and little time will have been lost, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will realise that I cannot give any assurance at this time.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the fact that in my answer I referred to what Essex was getting. Essex is getting a total of£2 million worth of starts in 1968–69, with 15 primary and seven secondary schools. These were the schools submitted by the Essex authority. I am pleased that tonight the hon. Gentleman has stated his case fairly and has not sought to make capital out of the general school building position. I should like to tell the House that a very great deal of school building is going on. In 1964, the value of school building projects under construction in England and Wales was£145 million; on 1st January, 1968, it was£152 million; and on 31st March, 1968, it was£193 million, so that nearly£200 million worth of school building is going on.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are going on with this large school building programme and that Essex is getting a fair share. We have considered the Dunmow proposal. I know the difficulties there. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any specific assurance for the future, but I think that he will realise what I meant when I talked about more urgent projects. There were those which were ready to go ahead immediately, whereas the Dunmow school was not. It was placed in the 1967–68 programme, which shows that the Stansted development had nothing to do with it. We put it in the programme, but for some reason, probably beyond the control of the Essex authority, it was not started before the deadline of 1st April, this year, and that meant that it had to be considered in next year's programme.
It was doubtful that it would be able to be started before nearly the end of the programme year; but we shall soon be considering proposals for the 1969–70 programme and I cannot go further than that this evening.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes past Five o'clock.